Francisco Chavez vs. PCGG et al., GR No. 130716, December 09, 1998
Facts:
Petitioner, instituted a case against public respondent to make public any negotiations and/or agreements pertaining to the latter's task of recovering the Marcoses' ill-gotten wealth. The respondents argued that the action was premature since he has not shown that he had asked the respondents to disclose the negotiations and agreements before filing the case.
Issue:
Does the petitioner have the personality or legal standing to file the instant petition?
Held:
The instant petition is anchored on the right of the people to information and access to government records, documents and papers- a right guaranteed under section 7, article III of the Philippine Constitution. The petitioner a former solicitor general, is a Filipino citizen, and because of the satisfaction of the two basic requisites laid down by decisional law to sustain petitioner's standing i.e
(1) ENFORCEMENT OF A LEGAL RIGHT
(2) ESPOUSED BY A FILIPINO CITIZEN
we rule, that the petition at bar be allowed.
I hope this helps.
Jeff David
Sep 23, 2011
Commercial Law- Insurance- Misamis Lumber vs. Capital Insurance, G.R. L-21380, May 20, 1966
Misamis Lumber vs. Capital Insurance, G.R. L-21380, May 20, 1966
Facts:
The vehicle owned by the petitioner was covered by an insurance policy issued by the respondent. In such policy it contained instructions and details on how to proceed with the claim for repairs.
When the time came for the vehicle to be repaired, the petitioner took it upon himself to have the vehicle repaired without the authority from the insurer, in the policy if such an event is to occur, and a repair was done without the authority of the insurer, its liability is limited only to 150 pesos. The repair bill exceeded such amount.
Upon filing of claim the insurer refused payment in excess of 150 pesos.
Issue(s):
1.) Can the respondent be made to reimburse the petitioner for the actual cost of repairs which exceed the repair limit amount?
Ruling:
The lower court’s recourse to legal hermeneutics is not called for because paragraph 4 of the policy is clear and specific and leaves no room for interpretation. The interpretation is even unjustified because it opposes what was specifically stipulated. Thus it will be observed that the policy drew out not only the limits of the insurer’s liability but also the mechanics that the insured had to follow to be entitled to full indemnity for repairs. The option to undertake repairs is accorded to the insurance company per paragraph 2. The said company was deprived of the option because the insured took it upon itself to have the repairs made, and only notified the insurer when the repairs are done. As a consequence, paragraph 4, which limits the company’s liability to P150.00 applies.
Summary of Ruling:
The court ruled in this manner because the policy expressly limits the liability for authorized repair at P150.00, and being expressed and unambiguous it leaves no room for interpretation, and it must be applied as such. The cardinal principle of insurance law of interpreting insurance contracts favorably to the insured is applicable only in cases of doubt, not when the intention of the policy is clear or the language is sufficiently clear to convey the meaning of the parties, although the contract may be onerous.
I hope this helps.
Jeff David
Facts:
The vehicle owned by the petitioner was covered by an insurance policy issued by the respondent. In such policy it contained instructions and details on how to proceed with the claim for repairs.
When the time came for the vehicle to be repaired, the petitioner took it upon himself to have the vehicle repaired without the authority from the insurer, in the policy if such an event is to occur, and a repair was done without the authority of the insurer, its liability is limited only to 150 pesos. The repair bill exceeded such amount.
Upon filing of claim the insurer refused payment in excess of 150 pesos.
Issue(s):
1.) Can the respondent be made to reimburse the petitioner for the actual cost of repairs which exceed the repair limit amount?
Ruling:
The lower court’s recourse to legal hermeneutics is not called for because paragraph 4 of the policy is clear and specific and leaves no room for interpretation. The interpretation is even unjustified because it opposes what was specifically stipulated. Thus it will be observed that the policy drew out not only the limits of the insurer’s liability but also the mechanics that the insured had to follow to be entitled to full indemnity for repairs. The option to undertake repairs is accorded to the insurance company per paragraph 2. The said company was deprived of the option because the insured took it upon itself to have the repairs made, and only notified the insurer when the repairs are done. As a consequence, paragraph 4, which limits the company’s liability to P150.00 applies.
Summary of Ruling:
The court ruled in this manner because the policy expressly limits the liability for authorized repair at P150.00, and being expressed and unambiguous it leaves no room for interpretation, and it must be applied as such. The cardinal principle of insurance law of interpreting insurance contracts favorably to the insured is applicable only in cases of doubt, not when the intention of the policy is clear or the language is sufficiently clear to convey the meaning of the parties, although the contract may be onerous.
I hope this helps.
Jeff David
Commercial Law- Insurance- Ty vs. First National Surety, G.R. L-16138, April 29, 1961
Ty vs. First National Surety, G.R. L-16138, April 29, 1961
Issue(s):
1.) Can injuries that prevent the appellant from performing his work or labor necessary in the pursuance of his occupation or business be equated with “loss of left hand” for the purpose of the latter claiming from his insurance policies?
Ruling:
The agreement contained in the insurance policies is the law between the parties. As the terms and conditions are clear, express and specific that only amputation of the left hand should be considered as a loss thereof, an interpretation that would include the mere fracture or other temporary disability not covered by the policies would certainly be unwarranted.
Summary of Ruling:
The court ruled in this manner because in the insurance policy of the petitioner there is no mention of mere injury short of amputation of the hand as equating with the definition of “loss of either hand” since in the policy itself it defines loss as: “…the loss a hand shall mean the loss by amputation through the bones of the wrist…”
The courts will only hazard an interpretation of such insurance policies if there is ambiguity with its provisions; in this case, the policy is clear on what is compensable, therefore the courts must apply the ordinary meaning of the provision, which is that the definition of loss is limited to amputation.
Commerical Law- Insurance Lesson:
An Insurance Policy is in effect a contract of adhesion, so where there is ambiguity or doubt the doubt should be resolved in favor of the party who merely adhered to the contract and against the party that who caused the obscurity.
This also would apply to restrictive provisions in the policy, where the provision is open to two or more interpretation that interpretation that is most beneficial to the insured shall be adopted. Any limitation to the liability must be construed in such a way as to preclude the insurer from non-compliance with its obligations (De leon, 2010)
I hope this helps.
Jeff David
Issue(s):
1.) Can injuries that prevent the appellant from performing his work or labor necessary in the pursuance of his occupation or business be equated with “loss of left hand” for the purpose of the latter claiming from his insurance policies?
Ruling:
The agreement contained in the insurance policies is the law between the parties. As the terms and conditions are clear, express and specific that only amputation of the left hand should be considered as a loss thereof, an interpretation that would include the mere fracture or other temporary disability not covered by the policies would certainly be unwarranted.
Summary of Ruling:
The court ruled in this manner because in the insurance policy of the petitioner there is no mention of mere injury short of amputation of the hand as equating with the definition of “loss of either hand” since in the policy itself it defines loss as: “…the loss a hand shall mean the loss by amputation through the bones of the wrist…”
The courts will only hazard an interpretation of such insurance policies if there is ambiguity with its provisions; in this case, the policy is clear on what is compensable, therefore the courts must apply the ordinary meaning of the provision, which is that the definition of loss is limited to amputation.
Commerical Law- Insurance Lesson:
An Insurance Policy is in effect a contract of adhesion, so where there is ambiguity or doubt the doubt should be resolved in favor of the party who merely adhered to the contract and against the party that who caused the obscurity.
This also would apply to restrictive provisions in the policy, where the provision is open to two or more interpretation that interpretation that is most beneficial to the insured shall be adopted. Any limitation to the liability must be construed in such a way as to preclude the insurer from non-compliance with its obligations (De leon, 2010)
I hope this helps.
Jeff David
Back from the dead
Will start posting digests again.
so sorry for the absence.
I hope this helps. Jeff David
so sorry for the absence.
I hope this helps. Jeff David
Jan 11, 2010
Criminal Law 2- People of the Philippines vs. Elias Lovedioro y Castro
This case is with regard to Art 134 of the R.P.C -Rebellion
Case of People of the Philippines vs. Elias Lovedioro y Castro
G.R.No. 112235 29November1995 (People vs. Lovedioro 250 SCRA 389)
FACTS OF THE CASE:
Elias Lovedioro with 3 other companions fatally shot SPO3 Jesus Lucilo while Lucilo was walking along Burgos St. away from Daraga, Albay Public Market. The victim died on the same day from massive blood loss. On November 6, 1992, Elias Lovedioro was then charged of the crime of murder, and subsequently found guilty. Lovedioro then appealed the decision, contesting the verdict of murder instead of rebellion. It was confirmed by the prosecution’s principal witness that Lovedioro was a member of the New People’s Army.
ISSUES OF THE CASE:
Was the RTC correct in holding Lovedioro liable for the crime of murder, instead of rebellion?
- Yes. Because, overt acts and purpose are essential components of the crime of rebellion, with either of these elements wanting, the crime of rebellion does not exist.
- Political motive should be established before a person charged with a common crime- alleging rebellion in order to lessen the possible imposable penalty- could benefit from the law’s relatively benign attitude towards political crimes. If no political motive is established or proved, the accused should be convicted of the common crime and not of rebellion.
- In cases of rebellion, motive relates to the act, and mere membership in an organization dedicated to the furtherance of rebellion would not, by and of itself suffice.
- The killing of the victim, as observed by the Solicitor General, offered no contribution to the achievement of the NPA’s subversive aims, in fact, there were no known acts of the victim’s that can be considered as offending to the NPA.
- Evidence shows that Lovedioro’s allegation of membership to the N.P.A was conveniently infused to mitigate the penalty imposable upon him.
HELD:
WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, the trial court's decision dated September 14, 1993, sentencing the accused of Murder is hereby AFFIRMED, in toto.
I hope this helps.
Jeff David
Case of People of the Philippines vs. Elias Lovedioro y Castro
G.R.No. 112235 29November1995 (People vs. Lovedioro 250 SCRA 389)
FACTS OF THE CASE:
Elias Lovedioro with 3 other companions fatally shot SPO3 Jesus Lucilo while Lucilo was walking along Burgos St. away from Daraga, Albay Public Market. The victim died on the same day from massive blood loss. On November 6, 1992, Elias Lovedioro was then charged of the crime of murder, and subsequently found guilty. Lovedioro then appealed the decision, contesting the verdict of murder instead of rebellion. It was confirmed by the prosecution’s principal witness that Lovedioro was a member of the New People’s Army.
ISSUES OF THE CASE:
Was the RTC correct in holding Lovedioro liable for the crime of murder, instead of rebellion?
- Yes. Because, overt acts and purpose are essential components of the crime of rebellion, with either of these elements wanting, the crime of rebellion does not exist.
- Political motive should be established before a person charged with a common crime- alleging rebellion in order to lessen the possible imposable penalty- could benefit from the law’s relatively benign attitude towards political crimes. If no political motive is established or proved, the accused should be convicted of the common crime and not of rebellion.
- In cases of rebellion, motive relates to the act, and mere membership in an organization dedicated to the furtherance of rebellion would not, by and of itself suffice.
- The killing of the victim, as observed by the Solicitor General, offered no contribution to the achievement of the NPA’s subversive aims, in fact, there were no known acts of the victim’s that can be considered as offending to the NPA.
- Evidence shows that Lovedioro’s allegation of membership to the N.P.A was conveniently infused to mitigate the penalty imposable upon him.
HELD:
WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, the trial court's decision dated September 14, 1993, sentencing the accused of Murder is hereby AFFIRMED, in toto.
I hope this helps.
Jeff David
Criminal Law 2- People of the Philippines vs. Federico Geronimo alias Cmdr. Oscar, et al.
This case is with regard to Art 134 of the R.P.C -Rebellion
Case of People of the Philippines vs. Federico Geronimo alias Cmdr. Oscar, et al.
G.R.No. L- 8936 23October1956 (People v Geronimo 110 Phil 90)
FACTS OF THE CASE:
On June 24, 1954 a Federico Geronimo, et al. were charged with the complex crime of rebellion with murders, robberies, and kidnapping. These are the ranking officers/ or members of CCP and Huks. In the information it alleged 5 instances including an ambush on Mrs. Aurora Quezon’s convoy on April 28, 1949 and ending on February 1954 where Geronimo killed Policarpio Tipay a Barrio Lieutenant. He pleaded guilty to the accusation and the trial court found him guilty of the complex crime of rebellion with murders, robberies, and kidnappings, sentencing him to reclusion perpetua. He appealed raising the sole question of whether the crime committed by him is not the complex crime of rebellion, but simply rebellion, thus punishable only by prision mayor.
ISSUES OF THE CASE:
Can rebellion be complexed with murder, robbery or kidnapping?
- No. Even if the crime is not committed in furtherance of rebellion, without political motivation, the crime would be separately punishable and would not be absorbed in rebellion.
- According to the Hernandez resolution; the complexing of rebellion will lead to undesirable results.
- It cannot be taken with rebellion to constitute a complex crime, for the constitutive acts and intent would be unrelated to each other. He would be held liable for separate crimes, and these cannot be merged into a juridical whole.
HELD:
In view of the foregoing, the decision appealed from is modified and the accused convicted for the simple (non-complex) crime of rebellion under article 135 of the Revised Penal Code, and also for the crime of murder; and considering the mitigating effect of his plea of guilty, the accused-Appellant Federico Geronimo is hereby sentenced to suffer 8 years of prision mayor and to pay a fine of P10,000, (without subsidiary imprisonment pursuant to article 38 of the Penal Code) for the rebellion and, as above explained, for the murder, applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, to not less than 10 years and 1 day of prision mayor and not more than 18 years of reclusion temporal; to indemnify the heirs of Policarpio Tibay in the sum of P6,000; and to pay the costs.
I hope this helps.
Jeff David
Case of People of the Philippines vs. Federico Geronimo alias Cmdr. Oscar, et al.
G.R.No. L- 8936 23October1956 (People v Geronimo 110 Phil 90)
FACTS OF THE CASE:
On June 24, 1954 a Federico Geronimo, et al. were charged with the complex crime of rebellion with murders, robberies, and kidnapping. These are the ranking officers/ or members of CCP and Huks. In the information it alleged 5 instances including an ambush on Mrs. Aurora Quezon’s convoy on April 28, 1949 and ending on February 1954 where Geronimo killed Policarpio Tipay a Barrio Lieutenant. He pleaded guilty to the accusation and the trial court found him guilty of the complex crime of rebellion with murders, robberies, and kidnappings, sentencing him to reclusion perpetua. He appealed raising the sole question of whether the crime committed by him is not the complex crime of rebellion, but simply rebellion, thus punishable only by prision mayor.
ISSUES OF THE CASE:
Can rebellion be complexed with murder, robbery or kidnapping?
- No. Even if the crime is not committed in furtherance of rebellion, without political motivation, the crime would be separately punishable and would not be absorbed in rebellion.
- According to the Hernandez resolution; the complexing of rebellion will lead to undesirable results.
- It cannot be taken with rebellion to constitute a complex crime, for the constitutive acts and intent would be unrelated to each other. He would be held liable for separate crimes, and these cannot be merged into a juridical whole.
HELD:
In view of the foregoing, the decision appealed from is modified and the accused convicted for the simple (non-complex) crime of rebellion under article 135 of the Revised Penal Code, and also for the crime of murder; and considering the mitigating effect of his plea of guilty, the accused-Appellant Federico Geronimo is hereby sentenced to suffer 8 years of prision mayor and to pay a fine of P10,000, (without subsidiary imprisonment pursuant to article 38 of the Penal Code) for the rebellion and, as above explained, for the murder, applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, to not less than 10 years and 1 day of prision mayor and not more than 18 years of reclusion temporal; to indemnify the heirs of Policarpio Tibay in the sum of P6,000; and to pay the costs.
I hope this helps.
Jeff David
Dec 17, 2009
Civil Law 2- ObliCon- Heirs of Luis Bacus vs Court of Appeals, Spouses Faustino Duray and Victoriana Duray
This case is with regard to Art 1191 of the NCC- Reciprocal Obligations
Case of Heirs of Luis Bacus vs Court of Appeals, Spouses Faustino Duray and Victoriana Duray
G.R.No. 127695 03December2001
FACTS OF THE CASE:
On 1984 Luis Bacus leased to Faustino Duray a parcel of agricultural land with total land area of 3,002 of square meters, in Cebu. The lease was for six years ending in 1990, the contract contained an option to buy clause. Under the said option, the lessee had the exclusive and irrevocable right to buy 2,000 square meters 5 years from a year after the effectivity of the contract, at P200 per square meter. That rate shall be proportionately adjusted depending on the peso rate against the US dollar, which at the time of the execution of the contract was 14 pesos.
Close to the expiration of the contract Luis Bacus died on 1989, after Duray informed the heirs of Bacus that they are willing and ready to purchase the property under the option to buy clause. The heirs refused to sell, thus Duray filed a complaint for specific performance against the heirs of Bacus. He showed that he is ready and able to meet his obligations under the contract with Bacus. The RTC ruled in favor of the Durays and the CA later affirmed the decision.
ISSUES OF THE CASE:
Can the heirs of Luis Bacus be compelled to sell the portion of the lot under the option to buy clause?
- Yes, Obligations under an option to buy are reciprocal obligations. The performance of one obligation is conditioned on the simultaneous fulfillment of the other obligation. In other words, in an option to buy, the payment of the purchase price by the creditor is contingent upon the execution and delivery of the deed of sale by the debtor.
- When the Duray’s exercised their option to buy the property their obligation was to advise the Bacus’ of their decision and readiness to pay the price, they were not yet obliged to make the payment. Only upon the Bacus’ actual execution and delivery of the deed of sale were they required to pay.
- The Durays did not incur in delay when they did not yet deliver the payment nor make a consignation before the expiration of the contract. In reciprocal obligations, neither party incurs in delay if the other party does not comply or is not ready to comply in a proper manner with what is incumbent upon him. Only from the moment one of the parties fulfills his obligation, does delay by the other begin.
HELD:
The petition is DENIED nad the decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED.
Obligations and Contracts Terms:
• Reciprocal Obligations- Those which arise from the same cause, and in which each party is a debtor and a creditor of the other, such that the obligation of one is dependent upon the obligation of the other. They are to be performed simultaneously such that the performance of one is conditioned upon the simultaneous fulfillment of the other
I hope this helps.
Jeff David
Case of Heirs of Luis Bacus vs Court of Appeals, Spouses Faustino Duray and Victoriana Duray
G.R.No. 127695 03December2001
FACTS OF THE CASE:
On 1984 Luis Bacus leased to Faustino Duray a parcel of agricultural land with total land area of 3,002 of square meters, in Cebu. The lease was for six years ending in 1990, the contract contained an option to buy clause. Under the said option, the lessee had the exclusive and irrevocable right to buy 2,000 square meters 5 years from a year after the effectivity of the contract, at P200 per square meter. That rate shall be proportionately adjusted depending on the peso rate against the US dollar, which at the time of the execution of the contract was 14 pesos.
Close to the expiration of the contract Luis Bacus died on 1989, after Duray informed the heirs of Bacus that they are willing and ready to purchase the property under the option to buy clause. The heirs refused to sell, thus Duray filed a complaint for specific performance against the heirs of Bacus. He showed that he is ready and able to meet his obligations under the contract with Bacus. The RTC ruled in favor of the Durays and the CA later affirmed the decision.
ISSUES OF THE CASE:
Can the heirs of Luis Bacus be compelled to sell the portion of the lot under the option to buy clause?
- Yes, Obligations under an option to buy are reciprocal obligations. The performance of one obligation is conditioned on the simultaneous fulfillment of the other obligation. In other words, in an option to buy, the payment of the purchase price by the creditor is contingent upon the execution and delivery of the deed of sale by the debtor.
- When the Duray’s exercised their option to buy the property their obligation was to advise the Bacus’ of their decision and readiness to pay the price, they were not yet obliged to make the payment. Only upon the Bacus’ actual execution and delivery of the deed of sale were they required to pay.
- The Durays did not incur in delay when they did not yet deliver the payment nor make a consignation before the expiration of the contract. In reciprocal obligations, neither party incurs in delay if the other party does not comply or is not ready to comply in a proper manner with what is incumbent upon him. Only from the moment one of the parties fulfills his obligation, does delay by the other begin.
HELD:
The petition is DENIED nad the decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED.
Obligations and Contracts Terms:
• Reciprocal Obligations- Those which arise from the same cause, and in which each party is a debtor and a creditor of the other, such that the obligation of one is dependent upon the obligation of the other. They are to be performed simultaneously such that the performance of one is conditioned upon the simultaneous fulfillment of the other
I hope this helps.
Jeff David
Civil Law 2- ObliCon- Francisco Lao Lim vs Court of Appeals and Benito Villavicencio Dy
Case of Francisco Lao Lim vs Court of Appeals and Benito Villavicencio Dy
G.R.No. 87047 31October1990
This case is with regard to Art 1182 of the NCC- Potestative Condition- Stipulation dependent upon the sole will of the debtor
FACTS OF THE CASE:
Records show that Francisco Lim, entered into a contract of lease with Benito Dy for a period of 3 years, from 1976 to 1979. After the stipulated term expired the respondent refused to leave the premises, so Francisco Lim filed an ejectment suit against Benito Dy. This case was then taken over by a judicially approved compromise agreement which provides an automatic increase in rent of 20% every 3 years. On 1985 Dy, informed Lim of his intention to renew the lease up to 1988, Lim did not agree to the renewal.
In 1987 another ejectment suit was filed by Lim after the failure of Dy to vacate the premises. It was dismissed by the RTC and later affirmed by the CA for the following reasons: (1) the stipulation in the compromise agreement which allows the lessee (Benito Dy) to stay on the premises as long as he needs it and can pay rents is valid, being a resolutory condition, and therefore beyond the ambit of art 1308 of the NCC; and (2) the compromise agreement has the effect of res judicata.
ISSUES OF THE CASE:
Was the stipulation in the compromise agreement which allows the lessee to stay on the premises as long as he needs it and can pay rents is valid?
- No, since the stipulation “for as long as the defendant needed the premises and can meet and pay said increases” is a purely potestative condition because it leaves the effectivity and enjoyment of leasehold rights to the sole and exclusive will of the lessee.
- The continuance, effectivity, and fulfillment of a contract of lease cannot be made to depend exclusively upon the free and uncontrolled choice of the lessee between continuing payment of the rentals or not, completely depriving the owner of any say in the matter. Mutuality does not obtain in such a contract of lease and no equality exists between the lessor and the lessee.
HELD:
The decision of the Court of Appeals is REVERSED AND SET ASIDE. Benito Dy is ordered to immediately vacate and return the possession of the premises and pay the monthly rentals due thereon in accordance with the compromise agreement until he shall have actually vacated the same. This Judgment is immediately executory.
Obligations and Contracts Terms:
• Potestative Condition- This can be found in Art 1182 of the NCC. A potestative condition speaks of fulfillment of an obligation rests solely upon the will of the debtor. An obligation which is subject to a suspensive potestative condition is non- demandable, hence it is void. If it is the debtor himself who determines the fulfillment of the condition, such an agreement produces no juridical effect that can be enforced, and thus null
I hope this helps.
Jeff David
G.R.No. 87047 31October1990
This case is with regard to Art 1182 of the NCC- Potestative Condition- Stipulation dependent upon the sole will of the debtor
FACTS OF THE CASE:
Records show that Francisco Lim, entered into a contract of lease with Benito Dy for a period of 3 years, from 1976 to 1979. After the stipulated term expired the respondent refused to leave the premises, so Francisco Lim filed an ejectment suit against Benito Dy. This case was then taken over by a judicially approved compromise agreement which provides an automatic increase in rent of 20% every 3 years. On 1985 Dy, informed Lim of his intention to renew the lease up to 1988, Lim did not agree to the renewal.
In 1987 another ejectment suit was filed by Lim after the failure of Dy to vacate the premises. It was dismissed by the RTC and later affirmed by the CA for the following reasons: (1) the stipulation in the compromise agreement which allows the lessee (Benito Dy) to stay on the premises as long as he needs it and can pay rents is valid, being a resolutory condition, and therefore beyond the ambit of art 1308 of the NCC; and (2) the compromise agreement has the effect of res judicata.
ISSUES OF THE CASE:
Was the stipulation in the compromise agreement which allows the lessee to stay on the premises as long as he needs it and can pay rents is valid?
- No, since the stipulation “for as long as the defendant needed the premises and can meet and pay said increases” is a purely potestative condition because it leaves the effectivity and enjoyment of leasehold rights to the sole and exclusive will of the lessee.
- The continuance, effectivity, and fulfillment of a contract of lease cannot be made to depend exclusively upon the free and uncontrolled choice of the lessee between continuing payment of the rentals or not, completely depriving the owner of any say in the matter. Mutuality does not obtain in such a contract of lease and no equality exists between the lessor and the lessee.
HELD:
The decision of the Court of Appeals is REVERSED AND SET ASIDE. Benito Dy is ordered to immediately vacate and return the possession of the premises and pay the monthly rentals due thereon in accordance with the compromise agreement until he shall have actually vacated the same. This Judgment is immediately executory.
Obligations and Contracts Terms:
• Potestative Condition- This can be found in Art 1182 of the NCC. A potestative condition speaks of fulfillment of an obligation rests solely upon the will of the debtor. An obligation which is subject to a suspensive potestative condition is non- demandable, hence it is void. If it is the debtor himself who determines the fulfillment of the condition, such an agreement produces no juridical effect that can be enforced, and thus null
I hope this helps.
Jeff David
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