tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-69303942811126113672023-11-15T23:56:53.030+08:00Philippine Law Case Digests etc.This site is for students who need help with their case loads for law school.
- These cases were handed to us, and then digested and I would like to share it with you guys.
If you need to share it with others like printing it out. please cite the webpage as to give credit to whom the credit is due thanks.
LEAVE YOUR COMMENTS BELOW!jeffdavid1986http://www.blogger.com/profile/05933347691489339078noreply@blogger.comBlogger43125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6930394281112611367.post-82946517171944006592011-09-23T15:42:00.000+08:002011-09-23T15:42:43.481+08:00Remedial Law - Civil Procedure- Francisco Chavez vs. PCGG et al., GR No. 130716, December 09, 1998<b>Francisco Chavez vs. PCGG et al., GR No. 130716, December 09, 1998</b><br />
<br />
<b>Facts:</b><br />
<br />
Petitioner, instituted a case against public respondent to make public any negotiations and/or agreements pertaining to the latter's task of recovering the Marcoses' ill-gotten wealth. The respondents argued that the action was premature since he has not shown that he had asked the respondents to disclose the negotiations and agreements before filing the case. <br />
<br />
<b>Issue: </b><br />
<br />
Does the petitioner have the personality or legal standing to file the instant petition?<br />
<br />
<b>Held:</b><br />
<br />
The instant petition is anchored on the right of the people to information and access to government records, documents and papers- a right guaranteed under section 7, article III of the Philippine Constitution. The petitioner a former solicitor general, is a Filipino citizen, and because of the satisfaction of the two basic requisites laid down by decisional law to sustain petitioner's standing i.e<br />
<br />
(1) ENFORCEMENT OF A LEGAL RIGHT<br />
(2) ESPOUSED BY A FILIPINO CITIZEN<br />
<br />
we rule, that the petition at bar be allowed. <br />
<br />
I hope this helps. <br />
<br />
Jeff Davidjeffdavid1986http://www.blogger.com/profile/05933347691489339078noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6930394281112611367.post-17624777528726042702011-09-23T15:23:00.001+08:002011-09-23T15:24:57.152+08:00Commercial Law- Insurance- Misamis Lumber vs. Capital Insurance, G.R. L-21380, May 20, 1966Misamis Lumber vs. Capital Insurance, G.R. L-21380, May 20, 1966<br />
<br />
Facts:<br />
<br />
The vehicle owned by the petitioner was covered by an insurance policy issued by the respondent. In such policy it contained instructions and details on how to proceed with the claim for repairs. <br />
<br />
When the time came for the vehicle to be repaired, the petitioner took it upon himself to have the vehicle repaired without the authority from the insurer, in the policy if such an event is to occur, and a repair was done without the authority of the insurer, its liability is limited only to 150 pesos. The repair bill exceeded such amount. <br />
<br />
Upon filing of claim the insurer refused payment in excess of 150 pesos. <br />
<br />
<b>Issue(s):</b><br />
<br />
1.) Can the respondent be made to reimburse the petitioner for the actual cost of repairs which exceed the repair limit amount?<br />
<br />
<b>Ruling:</b><br />
<br />
The lower court’s recourse to legal hermeneutics is not called for because paragraph 4 of the policy is clear and specific and leaves no room for interpretation. The interpretation is even unjustified because it opposes what was specifically stipulated. Thus it will be observed that the policy drew out not only the limits of the insurer’s liability but also the mechanics that the insured had to follow to be entitled to full indemnity for repairs. The option to undertake repairs is accorded to the insurance company per paragraph 2. The said company was deprived of the option because the insured took it upon itself to have the repairs made, and only notified the insurer when the repairs are done. As a consequence, paragraph 4, which limits the company’s liability to P150.00 applies. <br />
<br />
<b><br />
Summary of Ruling:<br />
</b><br />
The court ruled in this manner because the policy expressly limits the liability for authorized repair at P150.00, and being expressed and unambiguous it leaves no room for interpretation, and it must be applied as such. The cardinal principle of insurance law of interpreting insurance contracts favorably to the insured is applicable only in cases of doubt, not when the intention of the policy is clear or the language is sufficiently clear to convey the meaning of the parties, although the contract may be onerous. <br />
<br />
I hope this helps. <br />
<br />
Jeff Davidjeffdavid1986http://www.blogger.com/profile/05933347691489339078noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6930394281112611367.post-63595183461567344792011-09-23T15:18:00.001+08:002011-09-23T15:30:22.799+08:00Commercial Law- Insurance- Ty vs. First National Surety, G.R. L-16138, April 29, 1961<b>Ty vs. First National Surety, G.R. L-16138, April 29, 1961</b><br />
<br />
<br />
<b>Issue(s):</b><br />
<br />
1.) Can injuries that prevent the appellant from performing his work or labor necessary in the pursuance of his occupation or business be equated with “loss of left hand” for the purpose of the latter claiming from his insurance policies?<br />
<br />
<b>Ruling:</b><br />
<br />
The agreement contained in the insurance policies is the law between the parties. As the terms and conditions are clear, express and specific that only amputation of the left hand should be considered as a loss thereof, an interpretation that would include the mere fracture or other temporary disability not covered by the policies would certainly be unwarranted.<br />
<br />
<b>Summary of Ruling:<br />
</b><br />
The court ruled in this manner because in the insurance policy of the petitioner there is no mention of mere injury short of amputation of the hand as equating with the definition of “loss of either hand” since in the policy itself it defines loss as: “…the loss a hand shall mean the loss by amputation through the bones of the wrist…” <br />
<br />
The courts will only hazard an interpretation of such insurance policies if there is ambiguity with its provisions; in this case, the policy is clear on what is compensable, therefore the courts must apply the ordinary meaning of the provision, which is that the definition of loss is limited to amputation. <br />
<br />
Commerical Law- Insurance Lesson:<br />
<br />
An Insurance Policy is in effect a contract of adhesion, so where there is ambiguity or doubt the doubt should be resolved in favor of the party who merely adhered to the contract and against the party that who caused the obscurity. <br />
<br />
This also would apply to restrictive provisions in the policy, where the provision is open to two or more interpretation that interpretation that is most beneficial to the insured shall be adopted. Any limitation to the liability must be construed in such a way as to preclude the insurer from non-compliance with its obligations (De leon, 2010)<br />
<br />
<br />
I hope this helps. <br />
<br />
Jeff Davidjeffdavid1986http://www.blogger.com/profile/05933347691489339078noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6930394281112611367.post-10160325404205582492011-09-23T15:03:00.001+08:002011-09-23T15:03:57.344+08:00Back from the deadWill start posting digests again. <br />
<br />
so sorry for the absence. <br />
<br />
I hope this helps. Jeff Davidjeffdavid1986http://www.blogger.com/profile/05933347691489339078noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6930394281112611367.post-75469907810005031322010-01-11T12:14:00.000+08:002010-01-11T12:14:01.858+08:00Criminal Law 2- People of the Philippines vs. Elias Lovedioro y CastroThis case is with regard to Art 134 of the R.P.C -Rebellion<br />
<br />
Case of People of the Philippines vs. Elias Lovedioro y Castro<br />
G.R.No. 112235 29November1995 (People vs. Lovedioro 250 SCRA 389)<br />
<br />
<br />
<b>FACTS OF THE CASE:</b><br />
<br />
Elias Lovedioro with 3 other companions fatally shot SPO3 Jesus Lucilo while Lucilo was walking along Burgos St. away from Daraga, Albay Public Market. The victim died on the same day from massive blood loss. On November 6, 1992, Elias Lovedioro was then charged of the crime of murder, and subsequently found guilty. Lovedioro then appealed the decision, contesting the verdict of murder instead of rebellion. It was confirmed by the prosecution’s principal witness that Lovedioro was a member of the New People’s Army.<br />
<b><br />
ISSUES OF THE CASE:</b><br />
<br />
Was the RTC correct in holding Lovedioro liable for the crime of murder, instead of rebellion?<br />
<br />
- <b>Yes.</b> Because, overt acts and purpose are essential components of the crime of rebellion, with either of these elements wanting, the crime of rebellion does not exist.<br />
- Political motive should be established before a person charged with a common crime- alleging rebellion in order to lessen the possible imposable penalty- could benefit from the law’s relatively benign attitude towards political crimes. If no political motive is established or proved, the accused should be convicted of the common crime and not of rebellion.<br />
- In cases of rebellion, motive relates to the act, and mere membership in an organization dedicated to the furtherance of rebellion would not, by and of itself suffice.<br />
- The killing of the victim, as observed by the Solicitor General, offered no contribution to the achievement of the NPA’s subversive aims, in fact, there were no known acts of the victim’s that can be considered as offending to the NPA.<br />
- Evidence shows that Lovedioro’s allegation of membership to the N.P.A was conveniently infused to mitigate the penalty imposable upon him.<br />
<br />
<b>HELD:</b><br />
<br />
WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, the trial court's decision dated September 14, 1993, sentencing the accused of Murder is hereby AFFIRMED, in toto.<br />
<br />
I hope this helps.<br />
<br />
Jeff Davidjeffdavid1986http://www.blogger.com/profile/05933347691489339078noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6930394281112611367.post-67458429673303931472010-01-11T12:07:00.000+08:002010-01-11T12:07:25.845+08:00Criminal Law 2- People of the Philippines vs. Federico Geronimo alias Cmdr. Oscar, et al.This case is with regard to Art 134 of the R.P.C -Rebellion<br />
<br />
Case of People of the Philippines vs. Federico Geronimo alias Cmdr. Oscar, et al. <br />
G.R.No. L- 8936 23October1956 (People v Geronimo 110 Phil 90)<br />
<b><br />
FACTS OF THE CASE:</b><br />
<br />
On June 24, 1954 a Federico Geronimo, et al. were charged with the complex crime of rebellion with murders, robberies, and kidnapping. These are the ranking officers/ or members of CCP and Huks. In the information it alleged 5 instances including an ambush on Mrs. Aurora Quezon’s convoy on April 28, 1949 and ending on February 1954 where Geronimo killed Policarpio Tipay a Barrio Lieutenant. He pleaded guilty to the accusation and the trial court found him guilty of the complex crime of rebellion with murders, robberies, and kidnappings, sentencing him to reclusion perpetua. He appealed raising the sole question of whether the crime committed by him is not the complex crime of rebellion, but simply rebellion, thus punishable only by prision mayor. <br />
<br />
<b>ISSUES OF THE CASE:</b><br />
<br />
Can rebellion be complexed with murder, robbery or kidnapping?<br />
<br />
-<b> No.</b> Even if the crime is not committed in furtherance of rebellion, without political motivation, the crime would be separately punishable and would not be absorbed in rebellion. <br />
- According to the Hernandez resolution; the complexing of rebellion will lead to undesirable results.<br />
- It cannot be taken with rebellion to constitute a complex crime, for the constitutive acts and intent would be unrelated to each other. He would be held liable for separate crimes, and these cannot be merged into a juridical whole. <br />
<b><br />
HELD:</b><br />
<br />
In view of the foregoing, the decision appealed from is modified and the accused convicted for the simple (non-complex) crime of rebellion under article 135 of the Revised Penal Code, and also for the crime of murder; and considering the mitigating effect of his plea of guilty, the accused-Appellant Federico Geronimo is hereby sentenced to suffer 8 years of prision mayor and to pay a fine of P10,000, (without subsidiary imprisonment pursuant to article 38 of the Penal Code) for the rebellion and, as above explained, for the murder, applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, to not less than 10 years and 1 day of prision mayor and not more than 18 years of reclusion temporal; to indemnify the heirs of Policarpio Tibay in the sum of P6,000; and to pay the costs. <br />
<br />
I hope this helps.<br />
<br />
Jeff Davidjeffdavid1986http://www.blogger.com/profile/05933347691489339078noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6930394281112611367.post-155762764214499782009-12-17T12:07:00.000+08:002009-12-17T12:07:46.452+08:00Civil Law 2- ObliCon- Heirs of Luis Bacus vs Court of Appeals, Spouses Faustino Duray and Victoriana DurayThis case is with regard to Art 1191 of the NCC- Reciprocal Obligations<br />
<br />
Case of Heirs of Luis Bacus vs Court of Appeals, Spouses Faustino Duray and Victoriana Duray<br />
G.R.No. 127695 03December2001<br />
<br />
<b>FACTS OF THE CASE</b>:<br />
<br />
On 1984 Luis Bacus leased to Faustino Duray a parcel of agricultural land with total land area of 3,002 of square meters, in Cebu. The lease was for six years ending in 1990, the contract contained an option to buy clause. Under the said option, the lessee had the exclusive and irrevocable right to buy 2,000 square meters 5 years from a year after the effectivity of the contract, at P200 per square meter. That rate shall be proportionately adjusted depending on the peso rate against the US dollar, which at the time of the execution of the contract was 14 pesos.<br />
<br />
Close to the expiration of the contract Luis Bacus died on 1989, after Duray informed the heirs of Bacus that they are willing and ready to purchase the property under the option to buy clause. The heirs refused to sell, thus Duray filed a complaint for specific performance against the heirs of Bacus. He showed that he is ready and able to meet his obligations under the contract with Bacus. The RTC ruled in favor of the Durays and the CA later affirmed the decision. <br />
<br />
<b>ISSUES OF THE CASE:</b><br />
<br />
Can the heirs of Luis Bacus be compelled to sell the portion of the lot under the option to buy clause?<br />
<br />
- Yes, <b>Obligations under an option to buy are reciprocal obligations. </b>The performance of one obligation is conditioned on the simultaneous fulfillment of the other obligation. <i><b>In other words, in an option to buy, the payment of the purchase price by the creditor is contingent upon the execution and delivery of the deed of sale by the debtor.</b></i><br />
- When the Duray’s exercised their option to buy the property their obligation was to advise the Bacus’ of their decision and readiness to pay the price, they were not yet obliged to make the payment. Only upon the Bacus’ actual execution and delivery of the deed of sale were they required to pay. <br />
- The Durays did not incur in delay when they did not yet deliver the payment nor make a consignation before the expiration of the contract. <i><b>In reciprocal obligations, neither party incurs in delay if the other party does not comply or is not ready to comply in a proper manner with what is incumbent upon him. Only from the moment one of the parties fulfills his obligation, does delay by the other begin. </b></i><br />
<br />
<b>HELD:</b><br />
<br />
The petition is DENIED nad the decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED.<br />
<b><br />
Obligations and Contracts Terms:</b><br />
<br />
• <b>Reciprocal Obligations</b>- Those which arise from the same cause, and in which each party is a debtor and a creditor of the other, such that the obligation of one is dependent upon the obligation of the other. They are to be performed simultaneously such that the performance of one is conditioned upon the simultaneous fulfillment of the other<br />
<br />
I hope this helps.<br />
<br />
Jeff Davidjeffdavid1986http://www.blogger.com/profile/05933347691489339078noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6930394281112611367.post-413621066219004312009-12-17T11:04:00.000+08:002009-12-17T11:04:39.884+08:00Civil Law 2- ObliCon- Francisco Lao Lim vs Court of Appeals and Benito Villavicencio DyCase of Francisco Lao Lim vs Court of Appeals and Benito Villavicencio Dy<br />
G.R.No. 87047 31October1990<br />
<br />
This case is with regard to Art 1182 of the NCC- Potestative Condition- Stipulation dependent upon the sole will of the debtor<br />
<br />
<b><br />
FACTS OF THE CASE:</b><br />
Records show that Francisco Lim, entered into a contract of lease with Benito Dy for a period of 3 years, from 1976 to 1979. After the stipulated term expired the respondent refused to leave the premises, so Francisco Lim filed an ejectment suit against Benito Dy. This case was then taken over by a judicially approved compromise agreement which provides an automatic increase in rent of 20% every 3 years. On 1985 Dy, informed Lim of his intention to renew the lease up to 1988, Lim did not agree to the renewal. <br />
In 1987 another ejectment suit was filed by Lim after the failure of Dy to vacate the premises. It was dismissed by the RTC and later affirmed by the CA for the following reasons: (1) the stipulation in the compromise agreement which allows the lessee (Benito Dy) to stay on the premises as long as he needs it and can pay rents is valid, being a resolutory condition, and therefore beyond the ambit of art 1308 of the NCC; and (2) the compromise agreement has the effect of res judicata.<br />
<br />
<b>ISSUES OF THE CASE:</b><br />
<br />
Was the stipulation in the compromise agreement which allows the lessee to stay on the premises as long as he needs it and can pay rents is valid?<br />
<br />
- No, since the stipulation “for as long as the defendant needed the premises and can meet and pay said increases” <i><b>is a purely potestative condition because it leaves the effectivity and enjoyment of leasehold rights to the sole and exclusive will of the lessee.</b></i><br />
- The continuance, effectivity, and fulfillment of a contract of lease cannot be made to depend exclusively upon the free and uncontrolled choice of the lessee between continuing payment of the rentals or not, completely depriving the owner of any say in the matter. <i><b>Mutuality does not obtain in such a contract of lease and no equality exists between the lessor and the lessee.</b></i><br />
<br />
HELD:<br />
<br />
The decision of the Court of Appeals is REVERSED AND SET ASIDE. Benito Dy is ordered to immediately vacate and return the possession of the premises and pay the monthly rentals due thereon in accordance with the compromise agreement until he shall have actually vacated the same. This Judgment is immediately executory.<br />
<br />
<b>Obligations and Contracts Terms:</b><br />
<br />
• <b>Potestative Condition</b>- This can be found in Art 1182 of the NCC. A potestative condition speaks of fulfillment of an obligation rests solely upon the will of the debtor. <i><b>An obligation which is subject to a suspensive potestative condition is non- demandable, hence it is void.</b></i> If it is the debtor himself who determines the fulfillment of the condition, such an agreement produces no juridical effect that can be enforced, and thus null <br />
<br />
I hope this helps.<br />
<br />
Jeff Davidjeffdavid1986http://www.blogger.com/profile/05933347691489339078noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6930394281112611367.post-48097646810952581232009-12-04T19:07:00.001+08:002009-12-04T19:08:23.963+08:00Civil Law 2- ObliCon- Security Bank & Trust Co. and Rosito C. Manhit vs. Court of Appeals and Ysmael FererThis case is with regard to Art 1182 of the NCC- Potestative Condition- Stipulation dependent upon the sole will of the debtor<br />
<br />
Case of SECURITY BANK & TRUST COMPANY and ROSITO C. MANHIT vs COURT OF APPEALS and YSMAEL C. FERRER<br />
G.R.No. 117009 11October1995<br />
<b><br />
FACTS OF THE CASE:</b><br />
<br />
SBTC and Manhit contracted Ferrer to construct in 200 days a building in consideration of 1,760,000.00. Ferrer was able to finish the construction of the building within the prescribed time, but incurred additional expenses of about 300,000.00 on top of the original cost due to drastic increases in construction materials. Ferrer made timely demands for payment of the increased cost, and SBTC and a representative of an architectural firm consulted by SBTC verified Ferrer’s claims for additional cost. A recommendation was then made to settle the claim for 200,000.00 but SBTC did not pay the amount, and instead denied any liability for the additional cost. Ferrer then filed a claim for breach of contract with damages in the RTC, which ruled in favor of Ferrer, Court of Appeals affirmed the decision.<br />
<b><br />
ISSUES OF THE CASE:</b><br />
<br />
Is SBTC liable for the increase in cost of the construction due to drastic increases in cost of material?<br />
<br />
- <b>Yes</b>, since under Art 1182 of the NCC, a conditional obligation shall be void if its fulfillment depends upon the sole will of the debtor. Under Art IX of the building contract it allows for the adjustment of the contract price upon mutual agreement of the parties. <br />
- It is the absence of this mutual agreement that the bank is using to support its contention that it is not liable for the increased cost, and in effect this is an obligation dependent on SBTC’s sole will, since its consent is required for the recovery of the increased cost to be allowed.<br />
- This in effect allows SBTC to acquire the constructed building at a price that is far below its actual construction cost, and this constitutes unjust enrichment for SBTC at the expense of Ferrer. This is not allowed by law by virtue of Art 22 of NCC.<br />
<b><br />
HELD:</b><br />
<br />
WHEREFORE, with the above modification in respect of the amount of attorney's fees, the appealed decision of the Court of Appeals in CA G.R. CV No. 40450 is AFFIRMED.<br />
<br />
<b><br />
Obligations and Contracts Terms:</b><br />
<br />
<b>Conditional Obligation-</b> a condition wherein the execution of which is suspended by a condition which has not been accomplished, and subject to which it has been contracted.<br />
<b><br />
Potestative Obligation-</b> a condition whose fulfillment was completely within the power of the obligated party<br />
<br />
<br />
I hope this helps.<br />
<br />
Jeff Davidjeffdavid1986http://www.blogger.com/profile/05933347691489339078noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6930394281112611367.post-45618896057226162912009-12-04T17:42:00.000+08:002009-12-04T17:42:06.565+08:00Civil Law 2- ObliCon- JACINTO TANGUILIG doing business under the name and style J.M.T Engineering and General Merchandising vs. Court of Appeals and Vicente Herce Jr.This case is with regard to ART 1174 of the NCC - Fortuitous Events<br />
<br />
Case of JACINTO TANGUILIG doing business under the name and style J.M.T. ENGINEERING AND GENERAL MERCHANDISING vs COURT OF APPEALS and VICENTE HERCE JR.<br />
<br />
G.R.No. 125994 29June2001<br />
<br />
<b>FACTS OF THE CASE:</b><br />
<br />
Herce contracted Tanguilig to construct a windmill system for him, for consideration of 60,000.00. Pursuant to the agreement Herce paid the downpayment of 30,000.00 and installment of 15,000.00 leaving a 15,000.00 balance. <br />
<br />
Herce refused to pay the balance because he had already paid this amount to SPGMI which constructed a deep well to which the windmill system was to be connected since the deepwell, and assuming that he owed the 15,000.00 this should be offset by the defects in the windmill system which caused the structure to collapse after strong winds hit their place. According to Tanguilig, the 60,000.00 consideration is only for the construction of the windmill and the construction of the deepwell was not part of it. The collapse of the windmill cannot be attributed to him as well, since he delivered it in good and working condition and Herce accepted it without protest. Herce contested that the collapse is attributable to a typhoon, a force majeure that relieved him of liability. <br />
<br />
The RTC ruled in favor of Tanguilig, but this decision was overturned by the Court of Appeals which ruled in favor of Herce<br />
<br />
<br />
<b>ISSUES OF THE CASE:</b><br />
<br />
Can the collapse of the windmill be attributed to force majeure? Thus, extinguishing the liability of Tanguilig?<br />
<br />
- <b>Yes</b>, in order for a party to claim exemption from liability by reason of fortuitous event under Art 1174 of the Civil Code the event should be the sole and proximate cause of the loss or destruction of the object of the contract.<br />
- In Nakpil vs. Court of Appeals, the S.C. held that 4 requisites must concur that there must be a (a) the cause of the breach of the obligation must be independent of the will of debtor (b) the event must be either unforeseeable or unavoidable; (c) the event be such to render it impossible for the debtor to fulfill his obligation in a normal manner; and (d) the debtor must be free from any participation in or aggravation of the injury to the creditor.<br />
- Tanguilig merely stated that there was a strong wind, and a strong wind in this case is not fortuitous, it was not unforeseeable nor unavoidable, places with strong winds are the perfect locations to put up a windmill, since it needs strong winds for it to work.<br />
<br />
<b>HELD:</b><br />
<br />
WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is MODIFIED. Respondent VICENTE HERCE JR. is directed to pay petitioner JACINTO M. TANGUILIG the balance of P15,000.00 with interest at the legal rate from the date of the filing of the complaint. In return, petitioner is ordered to "reconstruct subject defective windmill system, in accordance with the one-year guaranty" and to complete the same within three (3) months from the finality of this decision.<br />
<br />
<b>Obligations and Contracts Terms:</b><br />
<br />
<b>Fortuitous Events</b>- Refers to an occurrence or happening which could not be foreseen, or even if foreseen, is inevitable. It is necessary that the obligor is free from negligence. Fortuitous events may be produced by two (2) general causes: (1) by Nature, such as but not limited to, earthquakes, storms, floods, epidemics, fires, and (2) by the act of man, such as but not limited to, armed invasion, attack by bandits, governmental prohibitions, robbery, provided that they have the force of an imposition which the contractor or supplier could not have resisted.<br />
<br />
<br />
I hope this helps.<br />
<br />
Jeff Davidjeffdavid1986http://www.blogger.com/profile/05933347691489339078noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6930394281112611367.post-33151229015715287722009-12-04T15:59:00.000+08:002009-12-04T15:59:26.362+08:00Civil Law 2- ObliCon- Danilo Solangon and Ursula Solangon vs. Jose Avelino SalazarThis case is with regard to Art 1170 of the NCC (Stipulated interest held unconscionable)<br />
<br />
Case of DANILO SOLANGON AND URSULA SOLANGON vs JOSE AVELINO SALAZAR <br />
G.R.No. 125994 29June2001<br />
<br />
<b>FACTS OF THE CASE:</b><br />
On 1986, 1987, and 1990 the Solangons’ executed 3 real estate mortgages in which they mortgaged a parcel of land situated in Sta. Maria, Bulacan, in favor of the Salazar to secure payment of a loan of P60, 000.00 payable within a period of four (4) months, with interest thereon at the rate of 6% per month, to secure payment of a loan of P136, 512.00, payable within a period of one (1) year, with interest thereon at the legal rate, and to secure payment of a loan in the amount of P230, 000.00 payable within a period of four (4) months, with interest thereon at the legal rate. <br />
This action was initiated by the Solangons to prevent the foreclosure of the mortgaged property. They alleged that they obtained only one loan form the defendant-appellee, and that was for the amount of P60, 000.00, the payment of which was secured by the first of the above-mentioned mortgages. The subsequent mortgages were merely continuations of the first one, which is null and void because it provided for unconscionable rate of interest. They have already paid the defendant-appellee P78, 000.00 and tendered P47, 000.00 more, but the latter has initiated foreclosure proceedings for their alleged failure to pay the loan P230, 000.00 plus interest.<br />
<br />
<b>ISSUES OF THE CASE:</b><br />
<br />
Is a loan obligation that is secured by a real estate mortgage with an interest of 72% p.a. or 6% a month unconscionable?<br />
<br />
- Yes, although the C.B. Circular No 905 lifted the ceiling on interest rates there is nothing in the said circular that grants lenders carte blanche authority to raise interest rates to levels which will either enslave their borrowers or lead to hemorrhaging of their assets.<br />
- In the case of Medel vs. C.A. the S.C. has held that 5.5% per month was reduced for being iniquitous, unconscionable and exorbitant hence it is contrary to morals (contra bonos mores)<br />
- In this case the Solangons’ are in a worse situation than the Medel case (6% per month interest rate) the said interest rate should be reduced equitably.<br />
- <br />
<br />
<b>HELD:</b><br />
WHEREFORE, the appealed decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED subject to the MODIFICATION that the interest rate of 72% per annum is ordered reduced to 12 % per annum.<br />
<br />
<b>Obligations and Contracts Terms:</b><br />
<br />
<b>Legal Interest</b>- the legal rate of interest for the loan or forbearance of any money, goods or credits, where such loan or renewal or forbearance is secured in whole or in part by a mortgage upon real estate the title to which is duly registered, in the absence of express contract as to such rate of interest, shall be 12% per annum, unless it is unconscionable or contrary to laws, morals, public policy. <br />
<br />
I hope this helps.<br />
<br />
Jeff Davidjeffdavid1986http://www.blogger.com/profile/05933347691489339078noreply@blogger.com1tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6930394281112611367.post-32212580602992515622009-12-04T15:29:00.001+08:002009-12-04T15:30:48.179+08:00Civil Law 2- ObliCon- SECURITY BANK AND TRUST COMPANY vs. REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF MAKATI, BRANCH 61, MAGTANGGOL EUSEBIO and LEILA VENTURA,This is with regard to ART 1170- Interest rate from damages as stipulated by parties<br />
<br />
Case of Security Bank and Trust Company vs. R.T.C MAKATI BR. 61 MAGTANGGOL EUSEBIO AND LEILA VENTURA <br />
G.R.No. 113926 23October1996<br />
<br />
<b>FACTS OF THE CASE:</b><br />
On April 27, 1983, private respondent Magtanggol Eusebio executed 3 Promissory Notes from different dates in favor of petitioner Security Bank and Trust Co. (SBTC) in the amounts of 100,000, 100,000, and 65,000. Respondent bound himself to pay the said amounts in six (6) monthly installments plus 23% interest per annum.On all the abovementioned promissory notes, private respondent Leila Ventura had signed as co-maker. Upon maturity there were still principal balance remaining on the notes. Eusebio refused to pay the balance payable, so SBTC filed a collection case against him. The RTC rendered a judgment in favor of SBTC, although the rate of interest imposed by the RTC was 12% p.a. instead of the agreed upon 23% p.a. The court denied the motion filed by SBTC to apply the 23% p.a. instead of the 12% p.a.<br />
<b><br />
ISSUES OF THE CASE:</b><br />
<br />
Did the RTC err in using 12% instead of the 23% as agreed upon by the parties? <br />
<br />
- Yes, the rate of interest was agreed upon by the parties freely. Significantly, respondent did not question that rate.<br />
- P.D. No. 1684 and C.B. Circular No. 905 no more than allow contracting parties to stipulate freely regarding any subsequent adjustment in the interest rate that shall accrue on a loan or forbearance of money, goods or credits.<br />
- It is not for respondent court a quo to change the stipulations in the contract where it is not illegal. Furthermore, Article 1306 of the New Civil Code provides that contracting parties may establish such stipulations, clauses, terms and conditions as they may deem convenient, provided they are not contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order, or public policy.<br />
- The 12% shall be applied for obligations arising from loans, or forbearance of money in the absence of express stipulations<br />
<br />
<b>HELD:</b><br />
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the decision of the respondent court a quo, is hereby AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that the rate of interest that should be imposed be 23% per annum.<br />
<br />
<b>Obligations and Contracts Terms:</b><br />
<b>PROMISSORY NOTE</b> - A written document in which a borrower agrees (promises) to pay back money to a lender according to specified terms. A written promise to pay a certain sum of money, at a future time, unconditionally.<br />
<br />
A promissory note differs from a mere acknowledgment of debt, without any promise to pay, as when the debtor gives his creditor an I 0 U. In its form it usually contains a promise to pay, at a time therein expressed, a sum of money to a certain person therein named, or to his order, for value received. It is dated and signed by the maker. It is never under seal.<br />
<br />
He who makes the promise is called the maker, and he to whom it is made is the payee.<br />
<br />
I hope this helps.<br />
<br />
Jeff Davidjeffdavid1986http://www.blogger.com/profile/05933347691489339078noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6930394281112611367.post-83526293189525635102009-11-29T21:47:00.000+08:002009-11-29T21:47:10.076+08:00Civil Law 2- ObliCon- Ernesto Ang and Rosalinda Ang vs. Court of Appeals and Lee Chuy Realty CorporationThis case is with regard to Art 1170 of the NCC- Damages<br />
<br />
Ernesto Ang and Rosalinda Ang vs. C.A. and Lee Chuy Realty Corporation<br />
GR No 80058 13February 1989<br />
<br />
<b>Facts:<br />
</b>On December 1979 Lee Chuy Realty Corporation (buyer) issued in favour of Ernesto and Rosalinda Ang (seller), MBTC check in the amount of 50,000.00 as initial down payment for the purchase of the property. In the receipt that was accompanied the payment it supposedly embodied the terms and conditions of their agreement. This accompanying receipt was not returned and instead the buyers where sent another receipt prepared and signed by the Angs. The first receipt indicated the purchase price of 1.6 million while the new receipt did not. On January 12, 1980 the seller informed the buyer that they only have until January 24,1980 to pay the balance of the purchase price, with which the failure to do so will result in the cancellation of their agreement. <br />
In response the buyers duly informed the sellers that they have been ready to comply with the obligation, while the sellers have not yet complied with their obligation to clear the subject properties of the obstructions thereon. By March 3, 1980 the buyers through their counsel, demanded for the refund of the down payment on account of the failure of the sellers to comply with their obligations, and their subsequent withdrawal from the sale. After the failure of the sellers to return the 50,000.00 the buyers filed a complaint for the collection of a sum of money plus damages before the RTC. The RTC decided in favour of the sellers. On appeal, the Court of Appeals overturned the decision of the RTC and held that it was the sellers that committed the breach of agreement. <br />
<br />
<b>Issue: <br />
</b><i>Was the court of Appeals correct in holding the Angs liable for breach of the agreement?<br />
</i><br />
- Yes, as was shown the sellers breached the agreement when they failed to fulfil the obligation incumbent upon them namely: (1) That seller will undertake to remove and clear the subject property of all occupants and obstructions within the month of December 1979 and (2) That when the subject property is cleared of all occupants and obstructions, the seller shall deliver a deed of absolute sale in favour of private respondent with all pertinent papers necessary for the issuance of a certificate of title in the name of the buyer. <br />
- It was the failure of the seller to comply with aforementioned conditions of the agreement that caused the delay in the payment of the obligation of the buyer (which is to pay the balance of the total payment on or before January 24, 1980). this was merely a slight breach of agreement and does not merit a rescission of the contract<br />
- Furthermore, the seller refused to proceed with the sale unless the buyer agreed to the higher price of 2,340,000.00 the seller with this action committed a serious breach of agreement. There already existed a perfected contract of sale between the parties and the purchase price was set at 1,600,000.00. The seller cannot increase the price that was agreed upon, without the consent of the buyer. the disagreement with the price due to the seller’s refusal to sell means that it is a serious breach of contract and that it grants the buyer the right to rescind the agreement<br />
<br />
<b>Held:<br />
</b>The decision of the Court of Appeals is Affirmed. (As a consequence of the resolution of the sale, the parties should be restored to their original situation. Seller should refund the down payment with legal interest from the date of the extra-judicial demand made on March 3, 1980.)<br />
<br />
<b>Obligations and Contracts terms:<br />
</b><b>Reciprocal Obligations<i></i></b>- The power to rescind is implied and any of the contracting parties may, upon non-fulfilment by the other party of his part of the obligation, resolve the contract. It shall not be permitted for slight or casual breaches of contract. It may only be granted on breaches that are so substantial and fundamental as to defeat the object of the parties making the agreement.<br />
<br />
I hope this helps.<br />
<br />
Jeff Davidjeffdavid1986http://www.blogger.com/profile/05933347691489339078noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6930394281112611367.post-6446273701999426142009-11-29T21:43:00.000+08:002009-11-29T21:43:19.463+08:00Civil Law 2- Olivia Navoa and Ernesto Navoa vs. Court of Appeals, Teresita Domdoma and Eduardo DomdomaThis case is with regard to Art 1169 of the NCC - Delay<br />
<br />
Olivia Navoa and Ernesto Navoa vs. C.A., Teresita Domdoma and Eduardo Domdoma<br />
GR No 59255 20December1995<br />
<b>Facts:</b><br />
On December 1977 Teresita Domdoma and Eduardo Domdoma filed a case with the RTC for collection of various sums of money based on loans given by them to Olivia Navoa. They cased was dismissed on the ground that there was no cause of action and that the Domdoma’s do not have no capacity to sue. They appealed to the C.A. and was granted a favourable decision.<br />
There were 6 instances in which the Domdoma’s gave Olivia Navoa a loan. The first instance is when Teresita gave Olivia a diamond ring valued at 15,000.00 which was secured by a PCIB check under the condition that if the ring was not returned within 15 days from August 15, 1977 the ring is considered sold. Teresita attempted to deposit the check on November 1977 but the check was not honoured for lack of funds. After this instance, there were other loans of various amounts that were extended by Teresita to Olivia, loans which were secured by PCIB checks, which were all dated to 1 month after the loan. All these checks were not honoured under the same reason as the first loan.<br />
<b>Issue: <br />
</b><i>Was the decision of the RTC to dismiss the case due to having no cause of action valid?<br />
</i>- <b>NO</b>, A cause of action is the fact or combination of facts which affords a party a right to judicial interference in his behalf. <br />
- For the first loan it is a fact, that the ring was considered sold to Olivia Navoa 15 days after August 15, 1977, and even then, Olivia Navoa failed to pay the price for the ring when the payment was due (check issued was not honoured. Thus it is confirmed that Teresita’s right under the agreement was violated.<br />
- As for the other loans extended by Teresita to Olivia, they were all secured by PCIB checks. It can be inferred that since the checks were all dated to 1 month after the loan, it follows that the loans are then payable 1 month after they were contracted, and also these checks were dishonoured by the bank for lack of funds.<br />
- Olivia and Ernesto Navoa failed to make good the checks that were issued as payment for their obligations. Art 1169 of the Civil Code is explicit: those obliged to deliver or to do something incur in delay from the time the obligee judicially or extra-judicially demands from them the fulfilment of the obligations, the continuing refusal of Olivia and Ernesto Navoa to comply with the demand of payment shows the existence of a cause of action.<br />
<br />
<b>Held:<br />
</b>The petition is DENIED and the decision of the C.A. remanding the case to the RTC for trial on the merits is affirmed. <br />
<br />
<b>Obligations and Contracts terms:<br />
</b><b>Security-<i></i></b> A means of ensuring the enforcement of an obligation or of protecting some interest in property. It may be personal or property security.<br />
<b>Cause of Action- <i></i></b>is the fact or combination of facts which affords a party a right to judicial interference in his behalf. The requisites for a cause of action are: (a) a right in favour of the plaintiff by whatever means and under whatever law it arises or created, (b) an obligation on the part of the defendant to respect and not to violate such right; and, (c) an act or omission on the part of the defendant constituting a violation of the plaintiff’s right or breach of the obligation of the defendant to the plaintiff. <br />
<br />
I hope this helps.<br />
<br />
Jeff Davidjeffdavid1986http://www.blogger.com/profile/05933347691489339078noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6930394281112611367.post-1524985853686449192009-11-25T14:56:00.001+08:002009-11-25T14:59:11.812+08:00Civil Law 2- ObliCon- MMTC and Apolinario Ajoc vs. C.A. and Col. Sabalburo et alThis case is with regard to Art 1162- Culpa Aquiliana<br />
<br />
<br />
Case of Metro Manila Transport Corporation and Apolinario Ajoc vs. C.A. and Col. Sabalburo et al<br />
G.R.No. 141089 01August2002<br />
<b><br />
FACTS OF THE CASE:</b><br />
Last December 24 1986 Florentina Sabalburo and her companions were making their way to Baclaran to buy foodstuffs for Noche Buena. Florentina Sabalburo and her companions waited for the traffic light to turn red so that they could cross the street to take a ride to Baclaran. Upon crossing the street during the red light, Florentina Sabalburo was hit by a fast moving MMTC bus, driven by Apolinario Ajoc.<br />
Ms. Sabalburo was then taken by the driver and conductress of the MMTC bus to San Juan de Dios hospital. The victim was not able to regain consciousness and she succumbed to her injuries on January 03, 1987. The Trial court decided in favor of Sabalburo et. al and ordered MMTC to pay damages. MMTC then appealed the case to the Court of Appeals which affirmed the decision of the trial court.<br />
<br />
<b>ISSUES OF THE CASE:</b><br />
<br />
Was the RTC and CA correct in ordering MTCC to pay damages to the plaintiff?<br />
<br />
- Yes, According to the S.C. both courts are correct in awarding damages to the plaintiff.<br />
- Even though MMTC argues that the proximate cause of the victim’s death is her negligence thus requesting the court to apply Art 2179 of the civil code, instead of Art 2176, the S.C upheld the findings of the trial courts that the driver and MMTC had been negligent in its duties and it is this negligence that led to the death of the victim thus showing that Art 2176 is the more applicable provision in this case. <br />
- Also MMTC is liable for the death of the victim due to Art 2180 of the civil code, wherein the obligation imposed by Article 2176 is demandable not only for one’s own acts or omissions-, but also for those of persons for whom one is responsible.<br />
- It should be shown that whenever an employee’s negligence causes damage or injury to another, there instantly arises a presumption juris tantum that there was negligence on the part of the employer, either in the selection of the employee (culpa in eligiendo) or the supervision over him after the selection (culpa in vigilando). Hence, to escape solidary liability for a quasi-delict committed by his employee, an employer must rebut the presumption by presenting convincing proof that in the selection and supervision of his employee, he has exercised the care and diligence of a good father of a family. In the present case, petitioner MMTC failed to rebut the presumption of negligence on its part.<br />
<br />
HELD:<br />
<br />
The Decision of the Court of Appeals is affirmed.<br />
<b><br />
Obligations and Contracts Terms:<br />
<br />
CULPA AQUILIANA- </b> refers to acts or omissions which cause damage to another, there being fault or negligence on the part of the defendant, who is obliged by law to pay for the damages done.<br />
<br />
Art 2176 of the Civil Code is applied if <b>there’s no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties</b>. Although the Supreme Court has already held that a quasi- delict can occur even if there is a contractual relation, <b>since the act that lead to the breaking a contract may also be a tort</b><br />
<br />
I hope this helps.<br />
<br />
Jeff Davidjeffdavid1986http://www.blogger.com/profile/05933347691489339078noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6930394281112611367.post-31281657705032269162009-11-24T10:35:00.000+08:002009-11-24T10:35:31.623+08:00Civil Law 2- ObliCon- F.F. Manacop Construction Co. Inc., vs. CA and MIAAThis case is with reference to Art 1160 of the New Civil Code- Quasi- Contracts<br />
<br />
<b>Case of FF. MAÑACOP CONSTRUCTION CO., INC. VS. C.A. and MIAA<br />
G.R.No. 122196 15January1997</b><br />
<br />
<b>FACTS OF THE CASE:</b><br />
Ff Mañacop Construction Company Inc, was contracted by MIAA to construct a perimeter fence from Asia Overseas Inc to Airscope Development Corp. for and in consideration of the quoted price of 307,440.00 Due to the urgency of the need, FFMCC proceeded with the fence construction even if the Notice to Proceed has not yet been signed by the General Manager. <br />
After the Feb 1986 Revolution, the new general manager of MIAA stopped the construction of said fence, by the time of the halt in construction it is already 95% finished which was worth 282,068.00.<br />
After making repeated demands to make MIAA pay for the constructed fence, FMCC filed a case against MIAA. During trial it has been found that MIAA is liable to pay 238,501.48 based upon quantum meruit since there is an absence of a written contract between parties. On appeal the Court agreed with MIAA with regard to the error of the trial court in the valuation of the obligation. According to the decision of the Appellate Court, the computation for the obligation owed by MIAA should be referred to the Commission on Audit, as was shown in the case of Eslao v. Commission on Audit.<br />
<br />
<b>ISSUES OF THE CASE:</b><br />
<br />
Was the RTC correct in ordering MIAA to pay FMCC on the basis of Quantum Meuit?<br />
<br />
- Yes. The S.C. basing its decision on the Eslao case, it was shown the contract was not fraudulent or mala in se, also it has been shown that the project was already covered by a specific appropriation.<br />
- Property or benefit is not ultra vires (they can be a subject of an express contract and are within the contractual powers of the public body) <br />
- <b>It is shown as well that MIAA was reaping the benefits from the scallop fence and wire placed by the petitioner.</b><br />
- It is also shown that the payment is limited to the actual cost of chargeable against funds authorized and certified for such purpose. <br />
- Unliquidated claims present a justiciable question ripe for judicial determination which is beyond the powers of COA to adjudicate.<br />
<br />
<b>[ The difference between the Eslao case and this one, is that the matter was referred to the COA for the Eslao case because the matter on the exact amount was not at issue and the determination thereof involves a review of the factual findings and evidence in support thereof. For this case the Lower court has already determined the actual amount owed by MIAA to FMCC, so there was no need for referral to COA]<i></i></b><br />
<br />
<b>HELD:</b><br />
<br />
The decision of the Court of Appeals is set aside and the decision of the RTC is reinstated.<br />
<br />
<b>Obligations and Contracts Terms:</b><br />
<br />
Difference of Quantum Meruit from Quantum Valebant- Quantum Meruit allows recovery of the reasonable value regardless of any agreement as to value. It entitles the party to “as much as he, reasonable deserves”, as distinguished from Quantum Valebant or to “as much as what is reasonably worth.”<br />
<br />
<br />
<br />
I hope this helps.<br />
<br />
Jeff Davidjeffdavid1986http://www.blogger.com/profile/05933347691489339078noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6930394281112611367.post-63222338116224914202009-11-23T22:45:00.001+08:002009-11-24T10:37:59.794+08:00Civil Law 2- ObliCon- TRB Employees Union- Independent vs. NLRC and Emmanuel Noel A. CruzThis case is with reference to Art 1160 of the New Civil Code- Quasi- Contracts<br />
Case of Traders Royal Bank Employees Union- Independent vs NLRC and Emmanuel Noel A. Cruz<br />
G.R.No. 120592 14March1997<br />
<br />
<b>FACTS OF THE CASE:</b><br />
That TRB Employees Union, had a retainer agreement with Atty. Cruz, for 3,000.00 in consideration of the law firm’s undertaking to render the services enumerated in their contract. During the existence of the agreement the union referred to the private respondent the claims of its members for holiday, mid-year and year-end bonuses against their employer TRB.<br />
The NLRC granted the petition of the union with regard to the demand for bonuses. After, the S.C. acting upon the challenge of TRBank of the NLRC decision in its decision on August 30, 1990 modified the decision of the NLRC by deleting the award of mid- year and year- end bonus differentials while affirming the award of holiday pay differential.<br />
<br />
After TRB voluntarily complied with the decision, the respondent on September 18, 1990 notified the union, TRB management, and the NLRC of his right to exercise and enforce his attorney’s lien over the award of holiday pay differential through a letter dated October 8, 1990.<br />
<br />
<b>ISSUES OF THE CASE:<br />
</b><br />
Was the lien made by the respondent attorney over the award as attorney’s fees valid?<br />
<br />
- Yes, Because the contract between the Union and the attorney stipulates that the 3,000.00 paid as retainer fees is intended merely as a consideration for the law firm’s commitment to render the services enumerated on PART A and B of the retainer agreement.<br />
- The retainer fee paid by the Union is not a payment for the firm’s execution or performance of the services listed in the contract, subject to the particular qualifications.<br />
- Obligations do not emanate only from contracts. One of the sources of extra- contractual obligations found in our civil code is the quasi contract premised on the roman maxim that <i>nemo alterius detrimento locupletari potest</i> <br />
- As early as 1903 the court has allowed the payment of reasonable professional fees to an interpreter, not withstanding the lack of understanding with his client as to his remuneration, on the basis a quasi-contract. <b>It is not necessary that the parties agree on a definite fee for the special services rendered by the firm in order that the union may be obligated to pay compensation. Equity and fair play dictate that petitioner should pay the same after it accepted, availed itself of, and benefited from the firm’s services.</b><br />
- The measure of compensation for private respondent’s services as against his client should be properly addressed by the rule of <i>quantum meruit</i> is used as the basis for determining the lawyer’s professional fees in the absence of a contract.<br />
HELD:<br />
The resolution of the NLRC with regard to the attorney’s fees is modified, and Union is hereby ordered to pay 10,000 for the firm’s rendered services.<br />
<br />
Obligations and Contracts Terms:<br />
<br />
• General Retaining Fee- is the fee paid to a lawyer to secure his future services as general counsel for any ordinary legal problem that may arise from routinary business of the client and referred to him for legal action. The reason for the remuneration is that the lawyer is deprived of the opportunity of rendering services for a fee to the opposing party or other parties. It is a compensation for lost opportunities.<br />
<br />
I hope this helps.<br />
<br />
Jeff Davidjeffdavid1986http://www.blogger.com/profile/05933347691489339078noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6930394281112611367.post-67207980282435705932009-11-23T21:49:00.000+08:002009-11-23T21:49:18.068+08:00Civil Law 2- ObliCon- Pichel vs. AlonzoThis case is with reference to Art 1157 of the New Civil Code- Sources of Contracts<br />
<br />
Case of Luis Pichel vs. Prudencio Alonzo <br />
G.R.No. L- 36902 30January1982<br />
<br />
<b>FACTS OF THE CASE:</b><br />
That Prudencio Alonzo (VENDOR) executed a deed of sale for the coconut fruits of his land in Balactasan Plantation in Lamitan, Basilan, in favor of Luis Pichel (VENDEE). The land from which the subject coconut fruits are derived from was subjected to a cancellation of the award in 1965, due to the reason of violation of the law that disallows alienation of land (the vendor’s rights to the land were reinstated in 1972)<br />
The vendor and his wife sold to the vendee the fruits of the coconut trees from 1968 to 1976 for consideration of 4,200. Even during the date of sale, the land was still leased to one Ramon Sua, and it was part of the agreement of the sale that the sum of 3,650.00 was to be paid by the vendor to Ramon Sua as to release the land. <br />
The RTC decided in favor of the vendor, due to the fact that the deed of sale that was executed was invalid, due to its supposed violation of RA No. 477, in which they equated the deed of sale executed by the parties as a contract of lease. <br />
<br />
ISSUES OF THE CASE:<br />
<br />
Was the Deed of Sale valid?<br />
<br />
- Yes, The RTC erred in constructing the deed of sale as a contract of lease.<br />
- There was no need on the part of the RTC to interpret the contract, since there was no ambiguity, it merely contracts the sale of the <b>fruits of the land</b>, not the land itself.<br />
- The S.C. relied upon ART 1370 of the Civil Code, regarding the rule on interpreting contracts.<br />
- Its interpretation in express form is the preferred. Construction shall be employed when such literal interpretation is impossible.<br />
- The possession of the coconut fruits for 7 years is different from possession of the land, since the coconut fruits are mere accessories and the land is the principal- a transfer of accessories does not necessarily mean a transfer of principal, it is the other way around.<br />
- The vendor after having received the consideration for the sale of his coconut fruits cannot be allowed to impugn the validity of the contracts he entered into, to the prejudice of petitioner who contracted in good faith and consideration<br />
<br />
HELD:<br />
The Judgment of the lower court has been set aside, and another one entered in its place, dismissing the complaint.<br />
<br />
<b>Obligations and Contracts Terms:<br />
</b><br />
• Difference between a contract of sale and a lease of things: that the delivery of the thing sold transfers ownership, while in a lease no such transfer of ownership results as the rights of the lessee are limited to the use and enjoyment of the thing leased.<br />
• Contract of Lease- defined as giving or the concession of the enjoyment or use of a thing for a specified time and fixed price.<br />
<br />
I hope this helps.<br />
<br />
Jeff Davidjeffdavid1986http://www.blogger.com/profile/05933347691489339078noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6930394281112611367.post-81535184716883998702009-11-16T13:56:00.001+08:002009-11-16T13:57:12.203+08:00Civil Law 2- ObliCon- FGU Insurance vs. GPS TruckingThis case is with reference to Art 1159 of the New Civil Code<br />
<br />
Case of FGU INSURANCE CORPORATION vs. G.P.S TRUCKING CORPORATION and LAMBERT M. EROLES <br />
G.R.No. 141910 06August2002<br />
<br />
FACTS OF THE CASE:<br />
G.P. Sarmiento Trucking Corporation (GPS) undertook to deliver on 18 June 1994 thirty (30) units of Condura S.D. white refrigerators aboard one of its Isuzu truck, driven by Lambert Eroles. While the truck was traversing the north diversion road along McArthur highway in Barangay Anupol, Bamban, Tarlac, it collided with an unidentified truck, causing it to fall into a deep canal, resulting in damage to the cargoes.<br />
FGU Insurance Corporation (FGU), an insurer of the shipment, paid to Concepcion Industries, Inc., the value of the covered cargoes: P204, 450.00. FGU, in turn, being the subrogee of the rights and interests of the insured sought reimbursement of the amount, from GPS. Since GPS failed to heed the claim, FGU filed a complaint for damages and breach of contract of carriage against GPS and its driver with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 66, of Makati City. In its answer, respondents asserted that GPS was the exclusive hauler only of Concepcion Industries, Inc., since 1988, and it was not so engaged in business as a common carrier. Respondents further claimed that the cause of damage was purely accidental. GPS, instead of submitting its evidence, filed with leave of court a motion to dismiss the complaint by way of demurrer to evidence on the ground that petitioner had failed to prove that it was a common carrier. The RTC and CA both ruled in favor of the Respondent. <br />
<br />
ISSUES OF THE CASE:<br />
<br />
WHETHER RESPONDENT GPS, EITHER AS A COMMON CARRIER OR A PRIVATE CARRIER, MAY BE PRESUMED TO HAVE BEEN NEGLIGENT WHEN THE GOODS IT UNDERTOOK TO TRANSPORT SAFELY WERE SUBSEQUENTLY DAMAGED WHILE IN ITS PROTECTIVE CUSTODY AND POSSESSION.<br />
<br />
- In culpa contractual, upon which the action of petitioner rests as being the subrogee of Concepcion Industries, Inc., the mere proof of the existence of the contract and the failure of its compliance justify, prima facie, a corresponding right of relief. Thus, FGU has a claim for the amount paid out.<br />
- The law, recognizing the obligatory force of contracts, will not permit a party to be set free from liability for any kind of misperformance of the contractual undertaking or a contravention of the tenor thereof<br />
- GPS recognizes the existence of a contract of carriage between it and petitioner’s assured, and admits that the cargoes it has assumed to deliver have been lost or damaged while in its custody. In such a situation, a default on, or failure of compliance with, the obligation in this case, the delivery of the goods in its custody to the place of destination - gives rise to a presumption of lack of care and corresponding liability on the part of the contractual obligor the burden being on him to establish otherwise. GPS has failed to do so.<br />
<br />
HELD:<br />
The decision of the lower courts insofar as Lambert M. Eroles is concerned is affirmed but assailed decision with regard to GPS trucking is reversed. It, is hereby ordered to pay FGU Insurance Corporation the value of the damaged and lost cargoes in the amount of P204, 450.00<br />
<br />
Obligations and Contracts Terms:<br />
<br />
• expectation interest- the interest in having the benefit of his bargain by being put in as good a position as he would have been in had the contract been performed<br />
• reliance interest- the interest in being reimbursed for loss caused by reliance on the contract by being put in as good a position as he would have been in had the contract not been made <br />
• Restitution interest- which is his interest in having restored to him any benefit that he has conferred on the other party.<br />
• Subrogee- the person or entity that assumes the legal right to attempt to collect a claim of another (subrogor) in return for paying the other's expenses or debts which the other claims against a third party. A subrogee is usually the insurance company which has insured the party whose expenses were paid.<br />
<br />
I hope this helps.<br />
<br />
Jeff Davidjeffdavid1986http://www.blogger.com/profile/05933347691489339078noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6930394281112611367.post-74820063830184595262009-10-05T11:37:00.000+08:002009-10-05T11:37:24.302+08:00Criminal Law- People vs. GenosaTHIS CASE IS WITH REGARD TO ART. 11 (1), AND ART 14 (16) OF THE R.P.C<br />
<br />
Case of People of the R.P. vs. Genosa<br />
G.R.No. 135981 15January2004<br />
<b><br />
FACTS OF THE CASE:</b><br />
<br />
That Marivic Genosa, the Appellant on the 15November1995, attacked and wounded his husband, which ultimately led to his death. According to the appellant she did not provoke her husband when she got home that night it was her husband who began the provocation. The Appellant said she was frightened that her husband would hurt her and she wanted to make sure she would deliver her baby safely. In fact, The Appelant had to be admitted later at the Rizal Medical Centre as she was suffering from eclampsia and hypertension, and the baby was born prematurely on December 1, 1995.<br />
<br />
The Appellant testified that during her marriage she had tried to leave her husband at least five (5) times, but that Ben would always follow her and they would reconcile. The Apellant said that the reason why Ben was violent and abusive towards her that night was because 'he was crazy about his recent girlfriend, Lulu Rubillos.<br />
<br />
The Appellant after being interviewed by specialists, has been shown to be suffering from Battered Woman Syndrome.<br />
The appellant with a plea of self defense admitted the killing of her husband, she was then found guilty of Parricide, with the aggravating circumstance of treachery, for the husband was attacked while asleep.<br />
<br />
<b>ISSUES OF THE CASE:</b><br />
<br />
<i><b>Can Marivic Genosa be granted the Justifying circumstance of Self-defense, and can she be held liable for the aggravating circumstance of treachery?</b></i><br />
<br />
<b>No,</b> Since self- defense since the existence of Battered woman syndrome, which the appellant has been shown to be suffering in the relationship <i>does not in itself establish the legal right of the woman to kill her abusive partner. Evidence must still be considered in the context of self-defense.</i><br />
In the present case, however, according to the testimony of the appellant there was a sufficient time interval between the unlawful aggression of the husband and her fatal attack upon him. She had already been able to withdraw from his violent behavior and escape to their children's bedroom. During that time, he apparently ceased his attack and went to bed. The reality or even the imminence of the danger he posed had ended altogether.<i> He was no longer in a position that presented an actual threat on her life or safety. </i><br />
<br />
<b>Without continuous aggression there can be no self-defense. And absence of aggression does not warrant complete or incomplete self-defense. </b><br />
<br />
<b>No,</b> There is treachery when one commits any of the crimes against persons by employing means, methods or forms in the execution thereof without risk to oneself arising from the defense that the offended party might make.<br />
<br />
The circumstances must be shown as indubitably as the killing itself; they cannot be deduced from mere inferences, or conjectures, which have no place in the appreciation of evidence. Besides, equally axiomatic is <i>the rule that when a killing is preceded by an argument or a quarrel, treachery cannot be appreciated as a qualifying circumstance, because the deceased may be said to have been forewarned and to have anticipated aggression from the assailant. </i><br />
<br />
<i>In the present case, however it was not conclusively shown, that the appellant intentionally chose a specific means of successfully attacking her husband without any risk to herself from any retaliatory act that he might make.</i> To the contrary, it appears that the thought of using the gun occurred to her only at about the same moment when she decided to kill her spouse. In the absence of any convincing proof that she consciously and deliberately employed the method by which she committed the crime in order to ensure its execution, the doubt should be resolved in her favor.<br />
<br />
<b>HELD:</b><br />
<br />
The conviction of Appellant Marivic Genosa for parricide is hereby AFFIRMED. However, there being two (2) mitigating circumstances and no aggravating circumstance attending her commission of the offense, her penalty is REDUCED to six (6) years and one (1) day of prision mayor as minimum; to 14 years, 8 months and 1 day of reclusion temporal as maximum.<br />
<b><br />
ADDENDUM:<br />
</b><br />
<b>When can BWS (Battered Woman Syndrome) as self defense be appreciated?</b><br />
<i><br />
Where the brutalized person is already suffering from BWS, further evidence of actual physical assault at the time of the killing is not required.</i> Incidents of domestic battery usually have a predictable pattern. To require the battered person to await an obvious, deadly attack before she can defend her life "would amount to sentencing her to 'murder by installment.' Still, impending danger (based on the conduct of the victim in previous battering episodes) prior to the defendant's use of deadly force must be shown. <i>Threatening behavior or communication can satisfy the required imminence of danger. Considering such circumstances and the existence of BWS, self-defense may be appreciated.</i><br />
<br />
<br />
I hope this helps.<br />
<br />
Jeff Davidjeffdavid1986http://www.blogger.com/profile/05933347691489339078noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6930394281112611367.post-39398258608247725172009-09-23T09:43:00.001+08:002009-09-23T09:44:12.289+08:00Statutory Construction- People vs. Yu Hai alias “HAYA”<b>Statutory Construction</b><br />
<br />
- Headnotes and Epigraphs <br />
- Construction to avoid Absurdity<br />
<br />
<br />
Case of People of the Philippines vs. Yu Hai alias “HAYA”<br />
GR Nos. L- 9598, 38216 15August1956<br />
<b><br />
FACTS OF THE CASE:</b><br />
On October 22, 1954, the accused was charged in the Justice of the Peace Court of Caloocan of a violation of Article 195, sub-paragraph 2 of the Revised Penal Code, for having allegedly permitted the game of panchong or paikiu, a game of hazard, and having acted as maintainer thereof. The accused moved to quash the information on the ground that it charged more than one offense and that the criminal action or liability therefore had already been extinguished; and the Justice of the Peace of Court, in its order of December 24, 1954, sustained the motion to quash on the theory that the offense charged was a light offense which, under Article 90 of the Revised Penal Code, prescribed in two months. <br />
<br />
<b>ISSUES OF THE CASE:</b><br />
<br />
Did the court err in considering the offense committed as a light felony?<br />
<br />
No, since the light offenses as defined in art 9 of the R.P.C states that “an offense which penalty arresto menor or a fine not exceeding 200 pesos." The argument of the SolGen on the matter is erroneous since the basis for his argument of classifying the offense committed as a correctional penalty, is Art 26 of the RPC which classifies fines not offenses.<br />
<br />
Also, if the SolGen’s interpretation of the law is accepted then it will lead to and absurd situation wherein a light felony as defined by Art 9 will have 2 prescriptive periods, and 1 peso will mean the difference of 9 years and 10 months, and there is no reason for a law-maker to raise the prescriptive period for certain light offenses over other light offenses<br />
<br />
Therefore it is more sensible and to apply Art 9 over Art 26 since we are discussing the prescription of a crime not the penalty. An as this construction is more favorable to the accused, it should be the one to be adopted.<br />
<br />
<b>HELD:</b><br />
<br />
THE DECISION IS AFFIRMED WITH COSTS DE OFICIO. <br />
<br />
<b>STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION LESSON:</b><br />
<br />
Headnotes or epigraphs- When a statute is divided into several subjects or articles, having respective appropriate headings, it must be presumed that the provisions of each article are controlling upon the subject thereof and operate as a general rule for settling such questions therein.<br />
<br />
Construction to avoid absurdity- If the words of the statute are susceptible of more than one meaning, the absurdity of the result of one construction is a strong argument against its adoption, and in favor of such sensible interpretation as will avoid such result.<br />
<br />
I hope this helps.<br />
<br />
Jeff Davidjeffdavid1986http://www.blogger.com/profile/05933347691489339078noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6930394281112611367.post-82455787697362819062009-09-03T10:21:00.002+08:002009-09-03T10:21:55.730+08:00NO NEW CASES FOR THE MEANTIME.GUYS, DUE TO SOME PERSONAL REASONS I WILL NOT BE ABLE TO POST NEW DIGESTS FOR THE MEANTIME. BUT REST ASSURED, AFTER THIS HAS PASSED, MORE DIGESTS WOULD BE ADDED.jeffdavid1986http://www.blogger.com/profile/05933347691489339078noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6930394281112611367.post-67492587056130313702009-09-02T17:37:00.000+08:002009-09-02T17:37:54.777+08:00Statutory Construction- Regalado vs. YuloSTATUTORY CONSTRUCTION<br />
<br />
Case of Regalado vs. Yulo<br />
No. 42935 15February1935<br />
<br />
<b>FACTS OF THE CASE:</b><br />
<br />
This case was brought about by the action quo warranto to determine the respective rights of the petitioner Felipe Regalado and one of the respondents, Esteban T. Villar, to the office of Justice of the peace of Malinao, Albay.<br />
<br />
Felipe Regalado qualified for the office of justice of the peace of Malinao, Albay on April 12, 1906. On September 13, 1934 Regalado became 65 yrs old. As a consequence thereafter the judge of first instance of Albay, acting in accordance w/ instructions from the Sec of Justice, designated Esteban T. Villar, Justice of the peace of Malinao, Albay. Regalado surrendered the office to Villar under protest. <br />
<br />
<br />
ISSUES OF THE CASE:<br />
<br />
Whether or not under the provisions of section 203 of the Administrative Code, as amended by the Act No. 3899, the Justices and auxiliary justices appointed prior to the approval of the Act No. 3899 who reached the age of 65 yrs after said Act took effect shall cease to hold office upon reaching the age of 65 yrs.<br />
<br />
No, Because justices appointed prior to the approval of the act and who completed 65 yrs of age on September 13 1934, subsequent to the approval of the Act which was on November 16 1931 and who by law is required to cease to hold office on January 1, 1933 is not affected by the said act. <br />
<br />
HELD:<br />
RESPONDENT ESTEBAN VILLAR BE OUSTED FROM THE OFFICE OF JUSTICE OF THE PEACE OF MALINAO, ALBAY, AND THAT THE PETITIONER FELIPE REGALADO BE PLACED IN POSSESSION OF THE SAME.<br />
<b><br />
STAT CON LESSON:</b><br />
<br />
The intent of the law is to be ascertained from the words used in its construction. (If legislative intent is not expressed in some appropriate manner, the courts cannot by interpretation speculate as to an intent and supply a meaning not found in the phraseology of the law.)<br />
<br />
I hope this helps.<br />
<br />
Jeff Davidjeffdavid1986http://www.blogger.com/profile/05933347691489339078noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6930394281112611367.post-5535143658091869512009-09-02T17:29:00.000+08:002009-09-02T17:29:07.703+08:00Statutory Construction- Commissioner vs. ReluniaSTATUTORY CONSTRUCTION- THE ISSUE WITH REGARD TO THE USE OF THE TITLE OF STATUTE TO MAKE INTERPRETATION EASIER<br />
<br />
<br />
Case of Commissioner vs. Relunia<br />
No. 11860 29May1959<br />
<br />
<b>FACTS OF THE CASE:</b><br />
<br />
On December 10 1953, the RPS “MISAMIS ORIENTAL” a unit of the Philippine Navy was dispatched to Japan to transport contingents of the 14th BCT bound for Pusan Korea and carry Christmas gifts for our troops there. It seems thereafter, it was used for transportation purposes in connection with the needs of Filipino Soldiers in Korea. <br />
<br />
While in Japan it loaded 180 cases containing various articles subject to custom duties. Upon arrival in the Philippines all theses articles were then declared forfeit by the Collector of Customs of Manila for violations of the customs law.<br />
<br />
<b>ISSUES OF THE CASE:</b><br />
<br />
Is the RPS MISAMIS ORIENTAL being a Navy vessel required to have a manifest? <br />
<br />
Yes, Because although the law prescribes that only vessels engaged in foreign trade are required to present a manifest, the interpretation of the court all vessels whether private or government owned including ships of the Philippine Navy, coming from a foreign port with the possible exception of war vessels or vessels employed by any foreign government not engaged in the transportation of merchandise by way of trade, as provided for in the 2nd paragraph of sec. 1221 of the Revised Administrative Code, are required to prepare and present a manifest to the customs authorities upon arrival at any Philippine Port. <br />
<br />
<b>HELD:</b><br />
APPEALED DECISION OF THE COURT OF TAX APPEALS AS REGARDS TO THE FORFEITURE OF THE ELECTRIC RANGE IN QUESTION IS SET ASIDE, AND THE DECISION OF THE COMMISSIONER OF CUSTOMS AFFIRMING THAT OF THE COLLECTOR OF CUSTOMS AS REGARDS TO THE SAME ARTICLE IS AFFIRMED.<br />
<br />
<b>STAT CON LESSON:<br />
</b><br />
The title of the statute can be resorted to if there is doubt as to the legislative intent. (The title can be resorted to as an aid where there is doubt as to the meaning of the law or the intention of the legislature, and not otherwise.)<br />
<br />
I hope this helps.<br />
<br />
Jeff Davidjeffdavid1986http://www.blogger.com/profile/05933347691489339078noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6930394281112611367.post-52829265800701645562009-09-02T17:21:00.001+08:002009-09-02T17:21:46.822+08:00Criminal Law- People of the R.P. vs. PugayTHIS CASE IS WITH REGARD TO ART. 3(2) & 8(2) OF THE R.P.C.<br />
<br />
"<i>A Conspiracy exists when two or more people come to an agreement concerning the commission of a felony and decide to commit it.</i>"<br />
<br />
"<i>A man must use common sense, and exercise due reflection in all his acts; it is his duty to be cautious, careful and prudent, if not from instinct, then through fear of incurring punishment.</i>"<br />
<br />
<br />
Case of People of the R.P. vs. Pugay<br />
No. L-74324 17November1988<br />
<b><br />
FACTS OF THE CASE:</b><br />
The accused are pronounced by the RTC of Cavite guilty beyond reasonable doubt for the crime of murder of Bayani Miranda and sentencing them to a prison term ranging from 12 years (prison mayor) as mimimum to 20 years (prison temporal) as maximum and for samson to be sentenced to reclusion perpetua.<br />
<br />
Miranda and the accused Pugay are friends. Miranda used to run errands for Pugay and they used to sleep together. On the evening of May 19, 1982 a town fiesta was held in the public plaza of Rosario Cavite. Sometime after midnight accused Pugay and Samson with several companions arrived (they were drunk), and they started making fun of Bayani Miranda. Pugay after making fun of the Bayani, took a can of gasoline and poured its contents on the latter, Gabion (principal witness) told Pugay not to do the deed. Then Samson set Miranda on fire making a human torch out of him. They were arrested the same night and barely a few hours after the incident gave their written statements.<br />
<br />
<b>ISSUES OF THE CASE:</b><br />
<br />
Is conspiracy present in this case to ensure that murder can be the crime? If not what are the criminal responsibilities of the accused?<br />
<br />
There is <b>no</b>:<br />
<b>CONSPIRACY</b>- is determined when two or more persons agree to commit a felony and decide to commit it. Conspiracy must be proven with the same quantum of evidence as the felony itself, more specifically by proof beyond reasonable doubt. It is not essential that there be proof as to the existence of a previous agreement to commit a crime. It is sufficient if, at the time of commission of the crime, the accused had the same purpose and were united in its executed.<br />
Since there was no animosity between miranda and the accused, and add to the that that the meeting at the scene of the incident was purely coincidental, and the main intent of the accused is to make fun of miranda.<br />
Since there is no conspiracy that was proven, the respective criminal responsibility of Pugay and Samson arising from different acts directed against miranda is individual NOT collective and each of them is liable only for the act that was committed by him. <br />
<br />
<i>**Conspiracy may be implied from concerted action of the assailants in confronting the victim.<b><b></b></b></i><br />
<b><br />
Criminal Responsibilities:</b><br />
PUGAY: Having failed to exercise diligence necessary to avoid every undesirable consequence arising from any act committed by his companions who at the same time were making fun of the deceased. - GUILTY OF RECKLESS IMPRUDENCE RESULTING TO HOMICIDE<br />
<br />
SAMSON:Since there are <b>NO</b> sufficient evidence that appears in the record establishing qualifying circumstances (treachery, conspiracy). And granted the mitigating circumstance that he never INTENDED to commit so grave a wrong. - GUILTY OF HOMICIDE<br />
<br />
HELD:<br />
JUDGEMENT OF THE LOWER COURT WAS AFFIRMED WITH MODIFICATIONS. JUDGEMENT FOR GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT FOR MURDER WAS LOWERED TO THE ABOVE JUDGEMENTS.<br />
<br />
I hope this helps.<br />
<br />
Jeff Davidjeffdavid1986http://www.blogger.com/profile/05933347691489339078noreply@blogger.com0