Sep 23, 2011

Remedial Law - Civil Procedure- Francisco Chavez vs. PCGG et al., GR No. 130716, December 09, 1998

Francisco Chavez vs. PCGG et al., GR No. 130716, December 09, 1998

Facts:

Petitioner, instituted a case against public respondent to make public any negotiations and/or agreements pertaining to the latter's task of recovering the Marcoses' ill-gotten wealth. The respondents argued that the action was premature since he has not shown that he had asked the respondents to disclose the negotiations and agreements before filing the case.

Issue:

Does the petitioner have the personality or legal standing to file the instant petition?

Held:

The instant petition is anchored on the right of the people to information and access to government records, documents and papers- a right guaranteed under section 7, article III of the Philippine Constitution. The petitioner a former solicitor general, is a Filipino citizen, and because of the satisfaction of the two basic requisites laid down by decisional law to sustain petitioner's standing i.e

(1) ENFORCEMENT OF A LEGAL RIGHT
(2) ESPOUSED BY A FILIPINO CITIZEN

we rule, that the petition at bar be allowed.

I hope this helps.

Jeff David

Commercial Law- Insurance- Misamis Lumber vs. Capital Insurance, G.R. L-21380, May 20, 1966

Misamis Lumber vs. Capital Insurance, G.R. L-21380, May 20, 1966

Facts:

The vehicle owned by the petitioner was covered by an insurance policy issued by the respondent. In such policy it contained instructions and details on how to proceed with the claim for repairs.

When the time came for the vehicle to be repaired, the petitioner took it upon himself to have the vehicle repaired without the authority from the insurer, in the policy if such an event is to occur, and a repair was done without the authority of the insurer, its liability is limited only to 150 pesos. The repair bill exceeded such amount.

Upon filing of claim the insurer refused payment in excess of 150 pesos.

Issue(s):

1.) Can the respondent be made to reimburse the petitioner for the actual cost of repairs which exceed the repair limit amount?

Ruling:

The lower court’s recourse to legal hermeneutics is not called for because paragraph 4 of the policy is clear and specific and leaves no room for interpretation. The interpretation is even unjustified because it opposes what was specifically stipulated. Thus it will be observed that the policy drew out not only the limits of the insurer’s liability but also the mechanics that the insured had to follow to be entitled to full indemnity for repairs. The option to undertake repairs is accorded to the insurance company per paragraph 2. The said company was deprived of the option because the insured took it upon itself to have the repairs made, and only notified the insurer when the repairs are done. As a consequence, paragraph 4, which limits the company’s liability to P150.00 applies.


Summary of Ruling:

The court ruled in this manner because the policy expressly limits the liability for authorized repair at P150.00, and being expressed and unambiguous it leaves no room for interpretation, and it must be applied as such. The cardinal principle of insurance law of interpreting insurance contracts favorably to the insured is applicable only in cases of doubt, not when the intention of the policy is clear or the language is sufficiently clear to convey the meaning of the parties, although the contract may be onerous.

I hope this helps.

Jeff David

Commercial Law- Insurance- Ty vs. First National Surety, G.R. L-16138, April 29, 1961

Ty vs. First National Surety, G.R. L-16138, April 29, 1961


Issue(s):

1.) Can injuries that prevent the appellant from performing his work or labor necessary in the pursuance of his occupation or business be equated with “loss of left hand” for the purpose of the latter claiming from his insurance policies?

Ruling:

The agreement contained in the insurance policies is the law between the parties. As the terms and conditions are clear, express and specific that only amputation of the left hand should be considered as a loss thereof, an interpretation that would include the mere fracture or other temporary disability not covered by the policies would certainly be unwarranted.

Summary of Ruling:

The court ruled in this manner because in the insurance policy of the petitioner there is no mention of mere injury short of amputation of the hand as equating with the definition of “loss of either hand” since in the policy itself it defines loss as: “…the loss a hand shall mean the loss by amputation through the bones of the wrist…”

The courts will only hazard an interpretation of such insurance policies if there is ambiguity with its provisions; in this case, the policy is clear on what is compensable, therefore the courts must apply the ordinary meaning of the provision, which is that the definition of loss is limited to amputation.

Commerical Law- Insurance Lesson:

An Insurance Policy is in effect a contract of adhesion, so where there is ambiguity or doubt the doubt should be resolved in favor of the party who merely adhered to the contract and against the party that who caused the obscurity.

This also would apply to restrictive provisions in the policy, where the provision is open to two or more interpretation that interpretation that is most beneficial to the insured shall be adopted. Any limitation to the liability must be construed in such a way as to preclude the insurer from non-compliance with its obligations (De leon, 2010)


I hope this helps.

Jeff David

Back from the dead

Will start posting digests again.

so sorry for the absence.

I hope this helps. Jeff David