Aug 30, 2009

Satutory Construction- Pascual vs. Pascual- Bautista

Satutory Construction

Case of Pascual vs. Pascual- Bautista
207SCRA 561 25March1992

FACTS OF THE CASE:

Petitioners Olivia and Hermes Pascual are the acknowledged natural children of the natural children of the late Eligio Pascual the latter being a full blood brother of the decedent Don Andres Pascual. Adela Soldevilla Pascual the surviving spouse of the late Don Andes Pascual filed w/ the RTC Branch 162, a special proceeding case no.7554 for administration of the intestate estate of her late husband. Olivia and Hermes are illegitimate children of Eligio Pascual (although they contend that the term “illegitimate children” as described in art 992 should be construed as “spurious children”) .

ISSUES OF THE CASE:

Can Art. 992 of the Civil Code of the Philippines be interpreted to exclude recognized natural children from the inheritance of the deceased?

Yes, Because the art. 992 of the Civil Code explicitly states that:

“An illegitimate child has no right to inherit ab intestato from the legitimate children and relatives of his father or mother; nor shall such children or relatives inherit in the same manner from the illegitimate child.”

In applying the above doctrine to the case at bar respondents did not err in holding that petitioners herein cannot represent their father Eligio Pascual in the succession of the latter to the intestate estate of the decedent Andres Pascual, since under Art 176 of the Family Code all illegitimate children are generally placed under one category, whether spurious or not.

HELD:

PETITION IS DISMISSED FOR LACK OF MERIT AND THE ASSAILED DECISION OF THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS DATED APRIL 29,1988 IS AFFIRMED

STAT CON LESSON:

When the law is clear, it is not susceptible to interpretation. (It must be applied regardless of who maybe affected, even if the law may be harsh or onerous)

I hope this helps.

Jeff David

Aug 28, 2009

Criminal Law- People of the Philippine Islands vs. Diokno

THIS CASE IS REGARDING ARTICLE 13 PAR(S) (5,6, & 7)

"Those who act with passion or obfuscation suffers a diminution of his intelligence and intent"

Case of People of the Philippine Islands vs. Diokno
G.R.No. L- 45100 26October1936

FACTS OF THE CASE:
The accused Epifanio and Roman Diokno appealed the decision of the C.F.I of Laguna. On 04 January 1935, Salome Diokno, to whom Yu Hiong was engaged for about a year, invited the latter to go with her. Yu Hiong accepted the invitation but he told Salome that her father was angry with him. On 05- 06 January 1935 Roman Diokno, telegraphed his father informing him that his sister has eloped w/ the Chinaman. On 07 January 1935 they chanced upon the Chinaman at the house of Antonio Layco, upon confrontation, the Chinaman implored pardon, and was then stabbed by the accused Roman stabbed him at the back and later on the left side, and Epifanio stabbed him once, upon falling on the landing of the stairs the Chinaman was then stabbed repeatedly.
The municipal police was alerted to the incident and was able to catch Epifanio in the crime scene; he admitted that he stabbed the victim. While Roman was then accosted after 3 days, the wounds that were inflicted on the Chinaman were mortal which then caused the death of the victim.

ISSUES OF THE CASE:

CAN THE ACCUSED BE GRANTED THE PRIVILEGE OF MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCE AS BASED ON ART 13 PAR(s) 5, 6 & 7?

- YES. With regard to art 13 par 5, because although the elopement took place on January 4, 1935, and the aggression on the 7th, the offense did not cease while and her marriage to the deceased unlegalized. Therefore, there was no interruption from the time the offense was committed to the vindication of it. That the accused belongs to a family of old customs to whom the elopement of a daughter with a man constitutes a grave offense to their honor and causes disturbance of the peace and tranquility of the home.
- YES. With regard to art 13 par 6, because the fact, that the accused The fact that the accused saw the victim run upstairs when he became aware of their presence, as if he refused to deal with them after having gravely offended them, was certainly a stimulus strong enough to produce in their mind a fit of passion which blinded them and led them to commit the crime with which they are charged
- Yes. With regard to art 13 par 7, it can be granted to Epifanio Diokno, after surrendering immediately.

HELD:

PETITIONERS ARE FOUND GUILTY OF THE CRIME OF HOMICIDE AND GRANTING 3 MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCES FOR EPIFANIO AND 2 MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCES FOR ROMAN, W/ NO AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCES, THUS THEY ARE ENTITLED TO A PENALTY A DEGREE LOWER THAN WHAT IS PRESCRIBED BY LAW PRISION MAYOR IN THIS CASE (8 YEARS TO 1 DAY)
I hope this helps.

Jeff David

Criminal Law- People vs. Morales

THIS IS WITH REGARD TO ARTICLE 12 PAR(S) 5 &6 OF THE REVISED PENAL CODE

"The accused must not have opportunity for escape of self-defense"

Case of People of the R.P. vs. Morales
G.R.No. 148518 15April2004

FACTS OF THE CASE:

That on or about the 9th day of November, 1994, in the municipality of Bacolor, province of Pampanga, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring and confederating together and mutually helping one another, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, abduct and kidnap Jefferson C. Tan, Joanna C. Tan, Jessie Anthony C. Tan, Malou Ocampo and Cesar Quiroz, while the latter were on board a L-300 van with Plate No. CKW-785 at San Vicente, Bacolor, Pampanga, for the purpose of extorting ransom money from the parents of the said victims with threat to kill the said victims if their parents failed to deliver the ransom money, that said victims were brought and detained in Bataan until the father of victims, Feliciano Tan, paid and delivered to the aforesaid accused the amount of P92,000.00.

ISSUES OF THE CASE:

For this particular case, since 2 appellants are involved, the digest would only look into the issue of Fernando Morales;

- CAN FERNANDO MORALES BE GRANTED THE EXEMPTING CIRCUMSTANCES OF IRRESISTIBLE FORCE AND/OR UNCONTROLLABLE FEAR OF AN EQUAL OR GREATER INJURY

- IF CONSPIRACY WAS PROVEN BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT

- No. Since according to the ruling in the case of People v. Del Rosario. Under Article 12 of the Revised Penal Code, a person is exempt from criminal liability if he acts under the compulsion of an irresistible force, or under the impulse of an uncontrollable fear of equal or greater injury, because such person does not act with freedom. In Del Rosario, however, we held that for such defense to prosper the duress, force, fear intimidation must be present, imminent and impending, and of such nature as to induce a well-grounded apprehension of death or serious bodily harm if the act be done. A threat of future injury is not enough
- By not availing of the chance to escape (since the other accused were waiting for them at the distance of 1 kilometer) their allegation of fear or duress becomes untenable, for it to apply: it is necessary that the compulsion be of such a character as to leave no opportunity to escape or self-defense in equal combat.
- The fear (threats against family members), were not of imminence as to prevent any chance of escape, and that this fear they allegedly suffered does not suffice to grant them the exempting circumstance.
- Yes. The acts done by the appellants (was involved in the initial abduction, feeding/guarding the children while they are w/ them, instructing the father to go to Gumi for the ransom) clearly shows that there was close coordination, indicating a common purpose or design
- Conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the commission of a felony and decide to commit it. Where all the accused acted in concert at the time of the commission of the offense, and it is shown by such acts that they had the same purpose or common design and were united in its execution, conspiracy is sufficiently established.
- It must be shown that all participants performed specific acts with such closeness and coordination as to indicate a common purpose or design to commit the felony.

HELD:

DECISION OF THE LOWER COURT CONVICTING THE ACCUSED FOR THE CRIME OF KIDNAPPING FOR RANSOM AND SENTENCING EACH TO DEATH IS AFFIRMED

I hope this helps.

Jeff David

Aug 27, 2009

Criminal Law- Guevarra vs. Almodovar

THIS CASE IS WITH REGARD TO ARTICLE 12 (3) OF THE R.P.C.

"Intent distinguished from discernment"

Case of People of the Guevarra vs. Almodovar
G.R.No. 75256 26January1989

FACTS OF THE CASE:
The Petitioner John Philip Guevarra, petitioned the court for a special civil action for certiorari against the Hon. Judge Ignacio Almodovar of the city court of Legaspi. The petitioner, then 11 years old was target shooting with his best friend Teodoro Amine, Jr. and three other children in the backyard in the morning of 29October1984. Unfortunately, Teodoro was hit by a pellet on the left collar bone, w/c then caused his death.

ISSUE OF THE CASE:


Can an 11- year old boy be charged w/ the crime of homicide thru reckless imprudence?

- Intent and discernment are two different concepts. Intent means: a determination to do certain things; an aim; the purpose of the mind, including such knowledge as is essential to such intent. Discernment means: the mental capacity to understand the difference between right and wrong
- While they (intent and discernment) are products of mental processes w/in a person; intent refers to the desired of one’s act (active) while discernment refers to the moral significance that a person ascribes to an act (passive)
- Minors 9yrs to 15yrs are presumed to be without criminal capacity; but this presumption may be rebutted if it could be proven that they were capable of appreciating the nature and criminality of the act, that is, that (they) acted w/ discernment
- Discernment is embraced w/in the concept of intelligence w/c is one of the elements of a culpable felony, thus it is important that a minor 9yrs to below 15 yrs of age to have acted w/ discernment to show that he acted w/ intelligence thus being liable for the offense under Art 365 of the R.PC

HELD:
PETITION DISMISSED FOR LACK OF MERIT AND THE TRO EFFECTIVE 17SEPTEMBER1986 IS LIFTED. LET IT BE REMANDED TO THE LOWER COURT FOR TRIAL ON THE MERITS. NO COSTS.

I hope this helps.

Jeff David

Statutory Construction- Baga vs. Philippine National Bank

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION- WITH REGARD TO AN ISSUE OF A PARTICULAR STATUTE BEING PARAMOUNT OVER A GENERAL STATUTE IN CASE OF CONFLICT


Case of Petronila Baga vs. Philippine National Bank
No. L-9695 10September1956

FACTS OF THE CASE:
In JUNE 1953 PNB was appointed upon petition of the U.S.V.A as guardian to the estate of the minor Baga. 4 months after, Baga filed a petition stating that after marrying Garcia she is now emancipated under the New Civil Code, and that her emancipation has an effect of terminating her guardianship, and then would enable her to administer her own property under art 399 of the code.

ISSUES OF THE CASE:

Whether the lower correctly held that art 399 of the New Civil Code modified or supplemented sec 28 of the Veterans guardianship act.

The emancipation provisions in the code into the cases provided for by sec 23 of the R.A. 390 would result in its discordance with the model legislation and violate the legislative intent.
R.A. 390 being a special law limited in its operation to money benefits from Veteran's Acts, must control as against the provisions of the the New Civil Code which is a general statute.

HELD:

THE COURT REVERSED THE LOWER COURT'S DECISION. (EMANCIPATION BY MARRIAGE DOES NOT TERMINATE A MINOR'S GUARDIANSHIP CONSTITUTED UNDER R.A. 390)

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION LESSON:

Repeals by implication are not favored, a special law must be taken as intended to constitute an exception to the general law, in the absence of special circumstances forcing a contrary conclusion.(When a general and a particular provision are inconsistent the latter is paramount to the former)
I hope this helps.

Jeff David

Statutory Construction- Laxamana vs. Baltazar

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION- WITH REGARD TO AN ISSUE OF A PARTICULAR STATUTE BEING PARAMOUNT OVER A GENERAL STATUTE IN CASE OF CONFLICT


Case of Jose Laxamana vs. Jose T. Baltazar
No. L-5955 19September1952

FACTS OF THE CASE:
July 1952 the mayor of Saxmoan Pampanga was suspended the vice-mayor Jose T. Baltazar, assumed office as mayor by virtue of sec. 2195 of the Revised Administrative Code. However the Provincial Governor acting under the Revised Election Code sec 21(a) with the consent of the Provincial Board appointed Jose L. Laxamana as mayor of Saxmoan, who immediately took the corresponding official oath.

ISSUES OF THE CASE:


If the provision in the revised administrative was repealed by the subsequent provision of the Revised election code.

In the revised administrative code it explicitly says that in the absence of the municipal president the vice-president should take its place.
Even after the enactment of the Revised Election Code the Dep't of the Interior and the ofc of the executive secretary have consistently held that in the case of suspension or other temporary disability shall by operation of the law assume the office of mayor.

HELD:

THE COURT DISMISSED THE QUO WARRANTO PETITION OF LAXAMANA

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION LESSON:

Where one statute deals with a subject in general terms and another deals with the same subject in a more detailed way, the two shall be harmonized if possible but if there be any conflict the latter will prevail (When a general and a particular provision are inconsistent the latter is paramount to the former)
I hope this helps.

Jeff David

Aug 26, 2009

Criminal Law- People vs. Oriente

THIS CASE IS WITH REGARD TO ARTICLE 11 Par. 1 and ARTICLE 13 Par(s): 3 and 4 OF THE REVISED PENAL CODE

"FELONIES AND CIRCUMSTANCES WHICH AFFECT CRIMINAL LIABILITY (11")
"CIRCUMSTANCES WHICH MITIGATE CRIMINAL LIABILITY (13)"


Case of People of the R.P. vs. Oriente
G.R.No. 155094 30January2007

FACTS OF THE CASE:


This case is about Manuel Oriente’s appeal of his conviction for the crime of homicide. The appellant w/ other persons, attacked and assaulted Romulo Vallo, hitting him with a lead pipe on different parts of the body, thereby inflicting upon him serious and mortal wounds which were the direct and immediate cause of his death (as confirmed by the medico- legal). In the case there was one witness for the prosecution; Arnel Tanael.
When the case was tried at the C.A. the court (C.A.) found that the R.T.C erred in finding two mitigating circumstances were present, namely, lack of intent to commit so grave a wrong and sufficient provocation or threat on the part of the offended party, so the court modified the penalty imposed by the R.T.C.

ISSUES OF THE CASE:
[in this particular case there are a number of issues, but the most compelling is the 2nd and 4th issues]

DID THE C.A. AND THE R.T.C ERR IN NOT APPRECIATING THAT THERE WAS AN UNLAWFUL AGGRESSION ON THE PART OF THE VICTIM, AND THE MEANS EMPLOYED BY APPELLANT TO PREVENT THE SAME WAS REASONABLE AND FALLS UNDER THE JUSTIFYING CIRCUMSTANCES OR SELF-DEFENSE


- No. Since when self-defense is invoked, the burden of evidence shifts to the accused to show that the killing is legally justified. It must be shown by clear and convincing evidence. The appellant cannot rely on the weakness of the evidence of the prosecution.
- All three requirements for self- defense must concur; but unlawful aggression is condition sine qua non.
- The fact that the deceased was not able to make use of his gun after being hit in the forehead by the weapon of the appellant as alleged by the defense makes their claim of self-defense unusual
- Injuries sustained by the deceased were extensive
- Importantly, the appellant failed to establish the existence of the gun, that was alleged to have constituted the “unlawful aggression”

CAN THE ACCUSED BE GRANTED THE OPPORTUNITY OF MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCE, DUE TO THE PREMISE THAT THERE WAS LACK OF INTENT IN THE PART OF THE APPELLANT TO COMMIT SO GRAVE A WRONG AND THAT THERE WAS SUFFICIENT PROVOCATION ON THE PART OF THE DECEASED?

- Modification of the penalties was based on the presence of mitigating or aggravating circumstances.
- The claim of lack of intent to commit so grave a wrong cannot be appreciated because the acts employed by the accused were reasonably sufficient to produce and did actually produce the death of the victim
- Provocation in this case cannot be appreciated as well since provocation is deemed sufficient if it is adequate to excite a person to commit the wrong, w/c must be proportionate in gravity
- The fact that a heated or intense argument preceded the incident is not by itself the sufficient provocation on the part of the offended party as contemplated by law. Also, appellant failed to establish by competent evidence that the deceased had a gun and used it to threaten petitioner.

HELD:
PETITION DENIED. DECISION AND RESOLUTION OF C.A. ARE AFFIRMED W/ MODIFICATIONS, the C.A. erred in imposing 12 years and one day of reclusion temporal as the maximum term of the indeterminate sentence. In the computation of the maximum term, the law prescribes that the attending circumstances should be considered. There being no aggravating or mitigating circumstance in this case, the penalty that should be imposed is the medium period of the penalty prescribed by law, that is, reclusion temporal in its medium period, or, anywhere between fourteen years, eight months and one day to seventeen years and four months
I hope this helps.

Jeff David

Aug 25, 2009

Criminal Law- People vs. Valledor

This case is with regard to ART 12 par 1

"An insane person is exempt from criminal liability, unless he acted during a lucid interval"


Case of People of the R.P. vs. Valledor
G.R.No. 129291 03July2002

FACTS OF THE CASE:


This case is about Enrico Valledor’s appeal of his conviction for the crime of consummated, frustrated and attempted murder. Last 06 March 1991, the appellant attacked Roger Cabiguen (stabbed on the forearm), Elza Rodriguez (stabbed on the chest), Ricardo Maglalang (was inflicted w/ physical injuries on different parts of the body) There were two other people inside the room (they were not harmed by the appellant). Roger and Ricardo were both wounded, while Elza died from the stab wound. After his arrest, accused-appellant was intermittently confined at the National Center for Mental Health. Thus, he was arraigned only on February 19, 1993 wherein he pleaded not guilty. Thereafter, the cases were archived until November 15, 1994, when accused-appellant was declared mentally fit to withstand trial. This time, accused-appellant admitted commission of the crimes charged but invoked the exempting circumstance of insanity.

The appellant’s plea of insanity was anchored on the following instances:
1.) On January 1990 the Mother of the appellant noticed that he is behaving abnormally. The mother then brought the appellant to Dr. de Guzman, a medical practitioner. She then disclosed to the doctor that insanity runs in the family
2.) Dr. de Guzman then diagnosed the appellant as suffering from “psychosis w/ schizophrenia” and prescribed the appellant w/ an anti-depressant known as thoracin which kept the appellant sane for a period of 2 months
3.) On 04 March 1991, the appellant’s mother noticed that he is acting strangely, so she left to buy Thoracin, but when she returned the appellant is nowhere to be found.
4.) On 06 March 1991 (date of commission of crime) he was seen swimming across the river Barangay Captain and Councilman took the appellant out of the water inside the boat, accused-appellant kept on crying and uttering words to the effect that his family will be killed. Suspecting that appellant was mentally ill, the Barangay Captain, asked the Councilman to accompany accused-appellant to Puerto Princesa City. Sibunga acceded and thereafter took a jeepney with appellant, while on the jeepney the appellant then jumped off the jeepney and boarded a tricycle.
5.) On 11 March 1991 he was interviewed by the City Health Officer I and was recommended to be committed to the NATIONAL MENTAL HOSPITAL
6.) While under the care of the hospital the medical findings for the appellant was that he was suffering from: Psychosis or Insanity classified under Schizophrenia

ISSUES OF THE CASE:

Can Insanity as an exempting circumstance be granted to the accused?

No, since in considering insanity as a defense, it presumed that all persons to be of sound mind. Otherwise stated, the law presumes all acts to be voluntary, and it is improper to presume that acts were done unconsciously
- The acts made by the appellant shows that he does not have complete absence of the power to discern as shown by his stabbing of the two victims (roger and elza) while leaving the other two people in the room unharmed, also his action of fleeing from the scene after the incident indicated that he was aware of the wrong he committed.
- The actions performed by the appellant does not sufficiently prove his insanity at the time of commission of the crime: "A man may act crazy but it does not necessarily and conclusively prove that he is legally so."
- Although it can be argued that the appellant is suffering from mental illness what is decisive is his mental condition at the time of the perpetration of the offense. Failing to discharge the burden of proving that he was legally insane when he stabbed the victims, he should be held liable for his felonious acts.

HELD:


THE COURT FOUND THE ACCUSED GUILTY WITH MODIFICATIONS: HE IS GUILTY OF THE CRIME OF MURDER FOR THE KILLING OF ELZA RODRIGUEZ, AND ATTEMPTED MURDER FOR BOTH ROGER CABIGUEN AND ROGELIO MAGLALANG (FROM FRUSTRATED MURDER FOR INJURIES CAUSED TO MAGLALANG IT WAS REDUCED TO ATTEMPTED MURDER)


I hope this helps.

Jeff David

Statutory Construction- Commissioner of Internal Revenue vs. TMX Sales Inc.

Statutory Construction

Case of Commissioner of Internal Revenue vs. TMX Sales Inc.
GR No. 83736 15January1992

FACTS OF THE CASE:
Private respondent TMX Sales, Inc., a domestic corporation, filed its quarterly income tax return for the first quarter of 1981, declaring an income of P571,174.31, and consequently paying an income tax thereon of P247,010.00 on May 15, 1981. During the subsequent quarters, however, TMX Sales, Inc. suffered losses so that when it filed on April 15, 1982 its Annual Income Tax Return for the year ended December 31, 1981, it declared a gross income of P904,122.00 and total deductions of P7,060,647.00, or a net loss of P6,156,525.00 (CTA Decision, pp. 1-2; Rollo, pp. 45-46).
Thereafter, on July 9, 1982, TMX Sales, Inc. thru its external auditor, SGV & Co. filed with the Appellate Division of the Bureau of Internal Revenue a claim for refund in the amount of P247,010.00 representing overpaid income tax. (Rollo, p. 30)
This claim was not acted upon by the Commissioner of Internal Revenue. On March 14, 1984, TMX Sales, Inc. filed a petition for review before the Court of Tax Appeals against the Commissioner of Internal Revenue, praying that the petitioner, as private respondent therein, be ordered to refund to TMX Sales, Inc. the amount of P247,010.00, representing overpaid income tax for the taxable year ended December 31, 1981.
In his answer, the Commissioner of Internal Revenue averred that "granting, without admitting, the amount in question is refundable, the petitioner (TMX Sales, Inc.) is already barred from claiming the same considering that more than two (2) years had already elapsed between the payment (May 15, 1981) and the filing of the claim in Court (March 14, 1984). (Sections 292 and 295 of the Tax Code of 1977, as amended)."
On April 29, 1988, the Court of Tax Appeals rendered a decision granting the petition of TMX Sales, Inc. and ordering the Commissioner of Internal Revenue to refund the amount claimed.

ISSUES OF THE CASE:

In a case involving corporate quarterly income tax, does the two-year prescriptive period to claim a refund of erroneously collected tax provided for in Section 292 (now Section 230) of the National Internal Revenue Code commence to run from the date the quarterly income tax was paid, as contended by the petitioner, or from the date of filing of the Final Adjustment Return (final payment), as claimed by the private respondent?

The filing of quarterly income tax returns required in Section 85 (now Section 68) and implemented per BIR Form 1702-Q and payment of quarterly income tax should only be considered mere installments of the annual tax due.
The two-year prescriptive period provided in Section 292 (now Section 230) of the Tax Code should be computed from the time of filing the Adjustment Return or Annual Income Tax Return and final payment of income tax.
Where the tax account was paid on installment, the computation of the two-year prescriptive period under Section 306 (Section 292) of the Tax Code, should be from the date of the last installment.

HELD:

COURT HELD THAT THE PETITION WAS DENIED AND IT AFFIRMED THE DECISION OF THE COURT OF TAX APPEALS.

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION LESSON:

Court stated that statutes should receive a sensible construction, such as will give effect to the legislative intention and so as to avoid an unjust or an absurd conclusion. INTERPRETATIO TALIS IN AMBIGUIS SEMPER FRIENDA EST, UT EVITATUR INCONVENIENS ET ABSURDUM.
Where there is ambiguity, such interpretation as will avoid inconvenience and absurdity is to be adopted. Furthermore, courts must give effect to the general legislative intent that can be discovered from or is unraveled by the four corners of the statute, and in order to discover said intent, the whole statute, and not only a particular provision thereof, should be considered.

I hope this helps.

Jeff David

Statutory Construction- People vs. Purisima

Statutory Construction

Case of People of the R.P. vs. Purisima
GR Nos. L-42050-66 20November1978

FACTS OF THE CASE:
There are twenty-six (26) Petitions for Review filed by the People of the Philippines represented, respectively, by the Office of the City Fiscal of Manila, the Office of the Provincial Fiscal of Samar, and joined by the Solicitor General, are consolidated in this one Decision as they involve one basic question of law.
Before those courts, Informations were filed charging the respective accused with "illegal possession of deadly weapon" in violation of Presidential Decree No. 9. On a motion to quash filed by the accused, the three Judges mentioned above issued in the respective cases filed before them — the details of which will be recounted below — an Order quashing or dismissing the Informations, on a common ground, viz, that the Information did not allege facts which constitute the offense penalized by Presidential Decree No. 9 because it failed to state one essential element of the crime.

ISSUES OF THE CASE:

Are the Informations filed by the People sufficient in form and substance to constitute the offense of "illegal possession of deadly weapon" penalized under Presidential Decree (PD for short) No. 9?

There are two elements to the the offense: first, the carrying outside one's residence of any bladed, blunt, or pointed weapon, etc. not used as a necessary tool or implement for a livelihood; and second, that the act of carrying the weapon was either in furtherance of, or to abet, or in connection with subversion, rebellion, insurrection, lawless violence, criminality, chaos, or public disorder.
The petitioner by having one particular stand of the carrying of any dangerous weapon outside of the residence w/o regard to motive or intent makes this a case of statutory construction.

HELD:

COURT DISMISSED ALL MOTIONS MADE BY THE PETITIONER AND AFFIRMS ALL DECISIONS MADE BY THE RESPONDENT JUDGES.

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION LESSON:

The problem of determining what acts fall within the purview of a statute, it becomes necessary to inquire into the intent and spirit of the decree and this can be found among others in the preamble or, whereas" clauses which enumerate the facts or events which justify the promulgation of the decree and the stiff sanctions stated therein.

It is a salutary principle in statutory construction that there exists a valid presumption that undesirable consequences were never intended by a legislative measure, and that a construction of which the statute is fairly susceptible is favored, which will avoid all objectionable, mischievous, indefensible, wrongful, evil, and injurious consequence

I hope this helps.

Jeff David

Aug 24, 2009

Statutory Construction- People of the Philippine Islands vs. Rivera

Case of People of the Philippine Islands vs. Faustino Rivera
GR Nos. L-38215, 38216 22December1933

FACTS OF THE CASE:
The accused Faustino Rivera was being charged by the crime of Indictment of the Innocent planned and punished under the Art 363 of the Revised Penal Code. The Provincial Prosecutor filed a case against Rivera for filing a complaint in writing and executing an oath accusing falsely and without probable cause Vito Sunday and Felisa Moreno of the crime of theft.

ISSUES OF THE CASE:

Does Art 363 of the R.P.C apply in this case?

It does not apply since the law that the crime Rivera was accused of committing is not explicitly stated in the R.P.C (although it is worthy to mention that the crime of indictment of the innocent is present in the Old Penal Code)
The old penal code described it as the charge of the offense is the imputation itself if made in front of the administrative/ judicial officer while the R.P.C defines the offense as the act that leads (tends directly) to imputation of the offense.
The art 363 of the R.P.C was defined or described as “planting of evidence.”

HELD:

COURT HELD THAT THE ACCUSED FAUSTINO RIVERA IS NOT GUILTY OF THE CRIME FO INCRIMINATION OF THE INNOCENT.

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION LESSON:

It is well settled law that where the text of a statute is clear, it is improper to resort to a caption or title to make it obscure.

It is a well settled rule that statutes should receive a sensible construction, such as will give effect to the legislative intention and so as to avoid an unjust or an absurd conclusion. (Lau Ow Bew vs. United States, 144 U. S., 47, 59; 36 Law. ed., 340, 344.)

I hope this helps.

Jeff David

Criminal Law- People vs. Ladonga

This Case is in reference to the application of Art 8 and 10 of the Revised Penal Code

"B.P. Blg 22- Bouncing Checks Law"

Case of People of the R.P. vs. Ladonga
G.R. No. 141066 17February2005

FACTS OF THE CASE:
The Petitioner Evangeline Ladonga seeks a review of the Decision, dated May 17, 1999, of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 20443, affirming the Decision dated August 24, 1996, of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 3 of Bohol, in Criminal Case Nos. 7068, 7069 and 7070 convicting her of violation of B.P. Blg. 22, otherwise known as The Bouncing Checks Law.

The RTC, convicted both Evangeline Ladonga and her spouse Adronico, both are regular customers in the pawnshop business of Mr. Oculam in Tagbilaran City, Bohol; sometime in May 1990, the Ladonga spouses obtained a P9,075.55 loan from him, guaranteed by United Coconut Planters Bank (UCPB) Check No. 284743, post dated to dated July 7, 1990 issued by Adronico; sometime in the last week of April 1990 and during the first week of May 1990, the Ladonga spouses obtained an additional loan of P12,730.00, guaranteed by UCPB Check No. 284744, post dated to dated July 26, 1990 issued by Adronico; between May and June 1990, the Ladonga spouses obtained a third loan in the amount of P8,496.55, guaranteed by UCPB Check No. 106136, post dated to July 22, 1990 issued by Adronico; the three checks bounced upon presentment for the reason "CLOSED ACCOUNT"; when the Ladonga spouses failed to redeem the check, despite repeated demands, he filed a criminal complaint against them.

ISSUES OF THE CASE:


In this case Evangeline Ladonga is trying to contest her conviction on the grounds that she was not a party to the agreement and that she was not a signatory to the checks and that the decision of the Court of Appeals with regard to her being a co-conspirator is w/o merit.

 In determining if she is liable for the same crime it must be proven that there was conspiracy
 It was not proven by direct evidence even by the witness testimony that Evangeline Ladonga was merely present at the time of the issuance of the checks. However, this inference cannot be stretched to mean concurrence with the criminal design.
 Conspiracy must be established, not by conjectures, but by positive and conclusive evidence. Conspiracy transcends mere companionship and mere presence at the scene of the crime does not in itself amount to conspiracy. Even knowledge, acquiescence in or agreement to cooperate, is not enough to constitute one as a party to a conspiracy, absent any active participation in the commission of the crime with a view to the furtherance of the common design and purpose.
 Criminal liability cannot be incurred based on general allegation of conspiracy. In criminal cases, moral certainty -- not mere possibility -- determines the guilt or the innocence of the accused. Even when the evidence for the defense is weak, the accused must be acquitted when the prosecution has not proven guilt with the requisite quantum of proof required in all criminal cases.

HELD:

The instant petition is GRANTED. The assailed Decision, of the Court of Appeals convicting the petitioner of violation of B.P. Blg. 22 is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Petitioner Evangeline Ladonga is ACQUITTED of the charges against her under B.P. Blg. 22 for failure of the prosecution to prove her guilt beyond reasonable doubt. No pronouncement as to costs.

I hope this helps.

Jeff David

Legal Profession- In re: Cunanan

Resolution Cunanan, et. al
18March1954

FACTS OF THE CASE:
In the manner of the petitions for Admission to the Bar of unsuccessful candidates of 1946 to 1953; Albino Cunanan et. al petitioners.

In recent years few controversial issues have aroused so much public interest and concern as R.A. 972 popularly known as the “Bar Flunkers’ Act of 1953.” Generally a candidate is deemed passed if he obtains a general ave of 75% in all subjects w/o falling below 50% in any subject, although for the past few exams the passing grades were changed depending on the strictness of the correcting of the bar examinations (1946- 72%, 1947- 69%, 1948- 70% 1949-74%, 1950-1953 – 75%).

Believing themselves to be fully qualified to practice law as those reconsidered and passed by the S.C., and feeling that they have been discriminated against, unsuccessful candidates who obtained averages of a few percentages lower than those admitted to the bar went to congress for, and secured in 1951 Senate Bill no. 12, but was vetoed by the president after he was given advise adverse to it. Not overriding the veto, the senate then approved senate bill no. 372 embodying substantially the provisions of the vetoed bill. The bill then became law on June 21, 1953

Republic Act 972 has for its object, according to its author, to admit to the Bar those candidates who suffered from insufficiency of reading materials and inadequate preparations. By and large, the law is contrary to public interest since it qualifies 1,094 law graduates who had inadequate preparation for the practice of law profession, as evidenced by their failure in the exams.

ISSUES OF THE CASE:

Due to the far reaching effects that this law would have on the legal profession and the administration of justice, the S.C. would seek to know if it is CONSTITUTIONAL.
 An adequate legal preparation is one of the vital requisites for the practice of the law that should be developed constantly and maintained firmly.
 The Judicial system from which ours has been derived, the act of admitting, suspending, disbarring, and reinstating attorneys at law in the practice of the profession is concededly judicial.
 The Constitution, has not conferred on Congress and the S.C. equal responsibilities concerning the admission to the practice of law. The primary power and responsibility which the constitution recognizes continue to reside in this court.
 Its retroactivity is invalid in such a way, that what the law seeks to “cure” are not the rules set in place by the S.C. but the lack of will or the defect in judgment of the court, and this power is not included in the power granted by the Const. to Congress, it lies exclusively w/in the judiciary.
 Reasons for Unconstitutionality:
1. There was a manifest encroachment on the constitutional responsibility of the Supreme Court.
2. It is in effect a judgment revoking the resolution of the court, and only the S.C. may revise or alter them, in attempting to do so R.A. 972 violated the Constitution.
3. That congress has exceeded its power to repeal, alter, and supplement the rules on admission to the bar (since the rules made by congress must elevate the profession, and those rules promulgated are considered the bare minimum.)
4. It is a class legislation
5. Art. 2 of R.A. 972 is not embraced in the title of the law, contrary to what the constitution enjoins, and being inseparable from the provisions of art. 1, the entire law is void.
HELD:

Under the authority of the court:

1. That the portion of art. 1 of R.A. 972 referring to the examinations of 1946 to 1952 and all of art. 2 of the said law are unconstitutional and therefore void and w/o force and effect.
2. The part of ART 1 that refers to the examinations subsequent to the approval of the law (1953- 1955) is valid and shall continue in force. (those petitions by the candidates who failed the bar from 1946 to 1952 are denied, and all the candidates who in the examination of 1953 obtained a GEN Ave. of 71.5% w/o getting a grade of below 50% in any subject are considered as having passed whether they have filed petitions for admissions or not.)


I hope this helps.

Jeff David

Aug 23, 2009

Criminal Law- People vs. Opero

This is with regard to Article 4 par 1 and it also touches upon Art 8 (w/ regards to conspiracy)

"the crime is different from that which was intended"

Case of People of the R.P. vs. Opero
No. L-48796 11JUNE1989
FACTS OF THE CASE:
Automatic review of the death sentence imposed on Roberto Opero for the crime of Robbery with homicide.
At about 04:00am  of April 27, 1978, Salvador Oliver and Demetrio Barcing both security guards assigned to the House International Hotel, in Ongpin street, Binondo, Manila checked room 314 of the said hotel and found Liew Soon Ping dead  while bound and gagged. Room 314 was ransacked and the personal belongings were thrown all around. After rushing back from Cebu, Dr. Hong the husband of the victim made an inventory of the things found missing in his residence, valued at 30,221 pesos.
The Samar P.C. arrested the suspects in the case, and turned them over to Sgt. Yanguiling in manila. During the autopsy of the body of the victim, it was found out that the cause of death was asphyxiation by suffocation.
** When a homicide results from a robbery, all those who took part in the robbery are all guilty of Robbery with homicide, unless proof is presented that the accused tried to prevent the killing.
ISSUES OF THE CASE:
Is Roberto Opero and others liable for the death of the victim, when the intent was for robbery only?
-appellant advanced the theory that the intent was to rob the victim and not to kill her, if the intent was to kill, then he could have easily done so, with the knife that he had.
-There is no basis in law or in jurisprudence for the appellant's assertion. It was repeatedly held that when direct and intimate connection exists between robbery and the killing, regardless of the two which precedes the other, or whether they are committed at the same time, the crime committed is the special complex crime of robbery with homicide.
-Even if the intent was not for the victim to be killed, what is important and decisive is that death results by reason or on occasion of the robbery
-needs to consider as well that there are two aggravating circumstances of superior strength and dwelling and that there is ONLY one mitigating circumstance of not having intended to kill the victim.
HELD:
-JUDGEMENT OF THE LOWER COURT WAS AFFIRMED APPELANT OPERO IS GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT OF ROBBERY WITH HOMICIDE.

I hope this helps.

Jeff David

Criminal Law- People vs. Delim

This case is with regard to Art 8 and 13 of the Revised Penal Code
"the act of one is the act of all"

Case of People of the R.P. vs. Delim
G.R. No. 142773 28January2003

FACTS OF THE CASE:

It is due to the automatic review of the decision of the RTC Branch 46 (Urdaneta City) finding the appellants, guilty beyond reasonable doubt and sentencing them to death for the murder of Modesto Bantas.

Appellants pleaded not guilty to the charge. The appellants and victim are “related” for modesto is an adopted son of their father. On January 23,1999 Marlon, Robert and Ronald Delim charged into the house and poked a gun at modesto and herded him outside the house. Leon and Manuel Delim both armed stayed put and made sure that randy and rita stayed put.

Modesto's lifeless body was then found on January 25, 1999. Marlon, Ronald, and Leon used denial and alibi as their evidence against the charge.
*alibis are the weakest of all defenses since it is easy to contrive and difficult to disprove

ISSUES OF THE CASE:

Is conspiracy and treachery present in this case to ensure that murder can be the crime?

Yes there is:
CONSPIRACY- is determined when two or more persons agree to commit a felony and decide to commit it. Conspiracy must be proven with the same quantum of evidence as the felony itself, more specifically by proof beyond reasonable doubt. It is not essential that there be proof as to the existence of a previous agreement to commit a crime. It is sufficient if, at the time of commission of the crime, the accused had the same purpose and were united in its executed.
appellants acted in unison when they abducted Modesto. So their acts were synchronized and executed with precision evincing a preconceived plan to kill Modesto

There is no:
TREACHERY- there is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes against person, employing means, methods, or forms in the execution thereof which tend directly and especially to insure its execution, without risk to himself arising from the defense which the offended party might make.
For it to be appreciated prosecution needs to prove:
a. employment of means of execution which gives the person no opportunity
to defend himself
b. the means of execution is deliberately and consciously adopted
in the appellants case there are no evidence to the particulars on how Modesto was assaulted and killed and this in fact does mean that treachery cannot be proven since it cannot be presumed that modesto was defenseless during the time that he was being attacked and shot at by the appellants.
Sheer numbers by the appellants when they attacked modesto does not constitute proof that the three took advantage of their numerical superiority and their handguns when Modesto was shot and stabbed.

HELD:
APPELLANTS ARE GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT OF THE FELONY OF HOMICIDE (THE DECISION OF THE LOWER COURTS WERE MODIFIED TO LOWER THE CRIME FROM MURDER TO HOMICIDE)

I hope this helps.

Jeff David

Criminal Law- People vs. Castromero

THIS CASE IS WITH REGARD TO ARTICLE 4 Par. 1 OF THE REVISED PENAL CODE
"crime is different from that which was intended"


Case of People of the R.P. vs. Castromero
G.R.No. 118992 09October1997
FACTS OF THE CASE:
The accused Celerino Castromero was found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the   crime of Rape with Serious Physical Injuries sentencing him to reclusion perpetua. That on the February 26, 1993 at about 2am in the province of batangas philippines,the accused armed with a balisong wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge w/ the offended party Josephine Baon against her will and consent and as a consequence thereof she suffered serious physical injuries, by jumping down through the 2nd floor window of her house.
Castromero and Baon are relatives. Josephine Baon's husband is the second-cousin of Castromero. They were neighbors wherein their houses are located a mere 50 meters apart. During the incident Castromero's penis due to their movement sideways was able to touch Baon's private parts. When Baon, noticed that Castromero was no longer holding the knife she tried to escape by pushing him off and jumping through the 2nd flr window. Upon falling down she yelled for help wherein her inlaws came out to help her and bring her to the hospital, as she was experiencing intense pain.
ISSUES OF THE CASE:
Was Rape committed in this case?
-         In determining if rape was consummated or merely attempted, we observe that there was NO complete of perfect penetration of the complainant's organ.
-         To consummate rape, perfect or complete penetration of the complainant's private organ is NOT essential. Even the slightest or mere touching of the lips of the female organ, or labia of the pudendum, is sufficient.
-         In people vs. Dela Pena (233 SCRA 573) held that the mere touching of the external genitalia of the penis capable of consummating a sexual act constitutes carnal knowledge.
-         For this case Rape was consummated, because sexual assault was perpetrated by force and intimidation
HELD:
JUDGEMENT OF THE LOWER COURT WAS AFFIRMED APPELANT CASTROMERO IS GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT OF RAPE WITH SERIOUS PHYSICAL INJURIES.


I hope this helps.

Jeff David