Civil Law 2- ObliCon- Heirs of Luis Bacus vs Court of Appeals, Spouses Faustino Duray and Victoriana Duray

This case is with regard to Art 1191 of the NCC- Reciprocal Obligations

Case of Heirs of Luis Bacus vs Court of Appeals, Spouses Faustino Duray and Victoriana Duray
G.R.No. 127695 03December2001

FACTS OF THE CASE:

On 1984 Luis Bacus leased to Faustino Duray a parcel of agricultural land with total land area of 3,002 of square meters, in Cebu. The lease was for six years ending in 1990, the contract contained an option to buy clause. Under the said option, the lessee had the exclusive and irrevocable right to buy 2,000 square meters 5 years from a year after the effectivity of the contract, at P200 per square meter. That rate shall be proportionately adjusted depending on the peso rate against the US dollar, which at the time of the execution of the contract was 14 pesos.

Close to the expiration of the contract Luis Bacus died on 1989, after Duray informed the heirs of Bacus that they are willing and ready to purchase the property under the option to buy clause. The heirs refused to sell, thus Duray filed a complaint for specific performance against the heirs of Bacus. He showed that he is ready and able to meet his obligations under the contract with Bacus. The RTC ruled in favor of the Durays and the CA later affirmed the decision.

ISSUES OF THE CASE:

Can the heirs of Luis Bacus be compelled to sell the portion of the lot under the option to buy clause?

- Yes, Obligations under an option to buy are reciprocal obligations. The performance of one obligation is conditioned on the simultaneous fulfillment of the other obligation. In other words, in an option to buy, the payment of the purchase price by the creditor is contingent upon the execution and delivery of the deed of sale by the debtor.
- When the Duray’s exercised their option to buy the property their obligation was to advise the Bacus’ of their decision and readiness to pay the price, they were not yet obliged to make the payment. Only upon the Bacus’ actual execution and delivery of the deed of sale were they required to pay.
- The Durays did not incur in delay when they did not yet deliver the payment nor make a consignation before the expiration of the contract. In reciprocal obligations, neither party incurs in delay if the other party does not comply or is not ready to comply in a proper manner with what is incumbent upon him. Only from the moment one of the parties fulfills his obligation, does delay by the other begin.

HELD:

The petition is DENIED nad the decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED.

Obligations and Contracts Terms:

• Reciprocal Obligations- Those which arise from the same cause, and in which each party is a debtor and a creditor of the other, such that the obligation of one is dependent upon the obligation of the other. They are to be performed simultaneously such that the performance of one is conditioned upon the simultaneous fulfillment of the other

I hope this helps.

Jeff David

Civil Law 2- ObliCon- Francisco Lao Lim vs Court of Appeals and Benito Villavicencio Dy

Case of Francisco Lao Lim vs Court of Appeals and Benito Villavicencio Dy
G.R.No. 87047 31October1990

This case is with regard to Art 1182 of the NCC- Potestative Condition- Stipulation dependent upon the sole will of the debtor


FACTS OF THE CASE:
Records show that Francisco Lim, entered into a contract of lease with Benito Dy for a period of 3 years, from 1976 to 1979. After the stipulated term expired the respondent refused to leave the premises, so Francisco Lim filed an ejectment suit against Benito Dy. This case was then taken over by a judicially approved compromise agreement which provides an automatic increase in rent of 20% every 3 years. On 1985 Dy, informed Lim of his intention to renew the lease up to 1988, Lim did not agree to the renewal.
In 1987 another ejectment suit was filed by Lim after the failure of Dy to vacate the premises. It was dismissed by the RTC and later affirmed by the CA for the following reasons: (1) the stipulation in the compromise agreement which allows the lessee (Benito Dy) to stay on the premises as long as he needs it and can pay rents is valid, being a resolutory condition, and therefore beyond the ambit of art 1308 of the NCC; and (2) the compromise agreement has the effect of res judicata.

ISSUES OF THE CASE:

Was the stipulation in the compromise agreement which allows the lessee to stay on the premises as long as he needs it and can pay rents is valid?

- No, since the stipulation “for as long as the defendant needed the premises and can meet and pay said increases” is a purely potestative condition because it leaves the effectivity and enjoyment of leasehold rights to the sole and exclusive will of the lessee.
- The continuance, effectivity, and fulfillment of a contract of lease cannot be made to depend exclusively upon the free and uncontrolled choice of the lessee between continuing payment of the rentals or not, completely depriving the owner of any say in the matter. Mutuality does not obtain in such a contract of lease and no equality exists between the lessor and the lessee.

HELD:

The decision of the Court of Appeals is REVERSED AND SET ASIDE. Benito Dy is ordered to immediately vacate and return the possession of the premises and pay the monthly rentals due thereon in accordance with the compromise agreement until he shall have actually vacated the same. This Judgment is immediately executory.

Obligations and Contracts Terms:

• Potestative Condition- This can be found in Art 1182 of the NCC. A potestative condition speaks of fulfillment of an obligation rests solely upon the will of the debtor. An obligation which is subject to a suspensive potestative condition is non- demandable, hence it is void. If it is the debtor himself who determines the fulfillment of the condition, such an agreement produces no juridical effect that can be enforced, and thus null

I hope this helps.

Jeff David

Civil Law 2- ObliCon- Security Bank & Trust Co. and Rosito C. Manhit vs. Court of Appeals and Ysmael Ferer

This case is with regard to Art 1182 of the NCC- Potestative Condition- Stipulation dependent upon the sole will of the debtor

Case of SECURITY BANK & TRUST COMPANY and ROSITO C. MANHIT vs COURT OF APPEALS and YSMAEL C. FERRER
G.R.No. 117009 11October1995

FACTS OF THE CASE:

SBTC and Manhit contracted Ferrer to construct in 200 days a building in consideration of 1,760,000.00. Ferrer was able to finish the construction of the building within the prescribed time, but incurred additional expenses of about 300,000.00 on top of the original cost due to drastic increases in construction materials. Ferrer made timely demands for payment of the increased cost, and SBTC and a representative of an architectural firm consulted by SBTC verified Ferrer’s claims for additional cost. A recommendation was then made to settle the claim for 200,000.00 but SBTC did not pay the amount, and instead denied any liability for the additional cost. Ferrer then filed a claim for breach of contract with damages in the RTC, which ruled in favor of Ferrer, Court of Appeals affirmed the decision.

ISSUES OF THE CASE:

Is SBTC liable for the increase in cost of the construction due to drastic increases in cost of material?

- Yes, since under Art 1182 of the NCC, a conditional obligation shall be void if its fulfillment depends upon the sole will of the debtor. Under Art IX of the building contract it allows for the adjustment of the contract price upon mutual agreement of the parties.
- It is the absence of this mutual agreement that the bank is using to support its contention that it is not liable for the increased cost, and in effect this is an obligation dependent on SBTC’s sole will, since its consent is required for the recovery of the increased cost to be allowed.
- This in effect allows SBTC to acquire the constructed building at a price that is far below its actual construction cost, and this constitutes unjust enrichment for SBTC at the expense of Ferrer. This is not allowed by law by virtue of Art 22 of NCC.

HELD:

WHEREFORE, with the above modification in respect of the amount of attorney's fees, the appealed decision of the Court of Appeals in CA G.R. CV No. 40450 is AFFIRMED.


Obligations and Contracts Terms:

Conditional Obligation- a condition wherein the execution of which is suspended by a condition which has not been accomplished, and subject to which it has been contracted.

Potestative Obligation- a condition whose fulfillment was completely within the power of the obligated party


I hope this helps.

Jeff David

Civil Law 2- ObliCon- JACINTO TANGUILIG doing business under the name and style J.M.T Engineering and General Merchandising vs. Court of Appeals and Vicente Herce Jr.

This case is with regard to ART 1174 of the NCC - Fortuitous Events

Case of JACINTO TANGUILIG doing business under the name and style J.M.T. ENGINEERING AND GENERAL MERCHANDISING vs COURT OF APPEALS and VICENTE HERCE JR.

G.R.No. 125994 29June2001

FACTS OF THE CASE:

Herce contracted Tanguilig to construct a windmill system for him, for consideration of 60,000.00. Pursuant to the agreement Herce paid the downpayment of 30,000.00 and installment of 15,000.00 leaving a 15,000.00 balance.

Herce refused to pay the balance because he had already paid this amount to SPGMI which constructed a deep well to which the windmill system was to be connected since the deepwell, and assuming that he owed the 15,000.00 this should be offset by the defects in the windmill system which caused the structure to collapse after strong winds hit their place. According to Tanguilig, the 60,000.00 consideration is only for the construction of the windmill and the construction of the deepwell was not part of it. The collapse of the windmill cannot be attributed to him as well, since he delivered it in good and working condition and Herce accepted it without protest. Herce contested that the collapse is attributable to a typhoon, a force majeure that relieved him of liability.

The RTC ruled in favor of Tanguilig, but this decision was overturned by the Court of Appeals which ruled in favor of Herce


ISSUES OF THE CASE:

Can the collapse of the windmill be attributed to force majeure? Thus, extinguishing the liability of Tanguilig?

- Yes, in order for a party to claim exemption from liability by reason of fortuitous event under Art 1174 of the Civil Code the event should be the sole and proximate cause of the loss or destruction of the object of the contract.
- In Nakpil vs. Court of Appeals, the S.C. held that 4 requisites must concur that there must be a (a) the cause of the breach of the obligation must be independent of the will of debtor (b) the event must be either unforeseeable or unavoidable; (c) the event be such to render it impossible for the debtor to fulfill his obligation in a normal manner; and (d) the debtor must be free from any participation in or aggravation of the injury to the creditor.
- Tanguilig merely stated that there was a strong wind, and a strong wind in this case is not fortuitous, it was not unforeseeable nor unavoidable, places with strong winds are the perfect locations to put up a windmill, since it needs strong winds for it to work.

HELD:

WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is MODIFIED. Respondent VICENTE HERCE JR. is directed to pay petitioner JACINTO M. TANGUILIG the balance of P15,000.00 with interest at the legal rate from the date of the filing of the complaint. In return, petitioner is ordered to "reconstruct subject defective windmill system, in accordance with the one-year guaranty" and to complete the same within three (3) months from the finality of this decision.

Obligations and Contracts Terms:

Fortuitous Events- Refers to an occurrence or happening which could not be foreseen, or even if foreseen, is inevitable. It is necessary that the obligor is free from negligence. Fortuitous events may be produced by two (2) general causes: (1) by Nature, such as but not limited to, earthquakes, storms, floods, epidemics, fires, and (2) by the act of man, such as but not limited to, armed invasion, attack by bandits, governmental prohibitions, robbery, provided that they have the force of an imposition which the contractor or supplier could not have resisted.


I hope this helps.

Jeff David

Civil Law 2- ObliCon- Danilo Solangon and Ursula Solangon vs. Jose Avelino Salazar

This case is with regard to Art 1170 of the NCC (Stipulated interest held unconscionable)

Case of DANILO SOLANGON AND URSULA SOLANGON vs JOSE AVELINO SALAZAR
G.R.No. 125994 29June2001

FACTS OF THE CASE:
On 1986, 1987, and 1990 the Solangons’ executed 3 real estate mortgages in which they mortgaged a parcel of land situated in Sta. Maria, Bulacan, in favor of the Salazar to secure payment of a loan of P60, 000.00 payable within a period of four (4) months, with interest thereon at the rate of 6% per month, to secure payment of a loan of P136, 512.00, payable within a period of one (1) year, with interest thereon at the legal rate, and to secure payment of a loan in the amount of P230, 000.00 payable within a period of four (4) months, with interest thereon at the legal rate.
This action was initiated by the Solangons to prevent the foreclosure of the mortgaged property. They alleged that they obtained only one loan form the defendant-appellee, and that was for the amount of P60, 000.00, the payment of which was secured by the first of the above-mentioned mortgages. The subsequent mortgages were merely continuations of the first one, which is null and void because it provided for unconscionable rate of interest. They have already paid the defendant-appellee P78, 000.00 and tendered P47, 000.00 more, but the latter has initiated foreclosure proceedings for their alleged failure to pay the loan P230, 000.00 plus interest.

ISSUES OF THE CASE:

Is a loan obligation that is secured by a real estate mortgage with an interest of 72% p.a. or 6% a month unconscionable?

- Yes, although the C.B. Circular No 905 lifted the ceiling on interest rates there is nothing in the said circular that grants lenders carte blanche authority to raise interest rates to levels which will either enslave their borrowers or lead to hemorrhaging of their assets.
- In the case of Medel vs. C.A. the S.C. has held that 5.5% per month was reduced for being iniquitous, unconscionable and exorbitant hence it is contrary to morals (contra bonos mores)
- In this case the Solangons’ are in a worse situation than the Medel case (6% per month interest rate) the said interest rate should be reduced equitably.
-

HELD:
WHEREFORE, the appealed decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED subject to the MODIFICATION that the interest rate of 72% per annum is ordered reduced to 12 % per annum.

Obligations and Contracts Terms:

Legal Interest- the legal rate of interest for the loan or forbearance of any money, goods or credits, where such loan or renewal or forbearance is secured in whole or in part by a mortgage upon real estate the title to which is duly registered, in the absence of express contract as to such rate of interest, shall be 12% per annum, unless it is unconscionable or contrary to laws, morals, public policy.

I hope this helps.

Jeff David

Civil Law 2- ObliCon- SECURITY BANK AND TRUST COMPANY vs. REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF MAKATI, BRANCH 61, MAGTANGGOL EUSEBIO and LEILA VENTURA,

This is with regard to ART 1170- Interest rate from damages as stipulated by parties

Case of Security Bank and Trust Company vs. R.T.C MAKATI BR. 61 MAGTANGGOL EUSEBIO AND LEILA VENTURA
G.R.No. 113926 23October1996

FACTS OF THE CASE:
On April 27, 1983, private respondent Magtanggol Eusebio executed 3 Promissory Notes from different dates in favor of petitioner Security Bank and Trust Co. (SBTC) in the amounts of 100,000, 100,000, and 65,000. Respondent bound himself to pay the said amounts in six (6) monthly installments plus 23% interest per annum.On all the abovementioned promissory notes, private respondent Leila Ventura had signed as co-maker. Upon maturity there were still principal balance remaining on the notes. Eusebio refused to pay the balance payable, so SBTC filed a collection case against him. The RTC rendered a judgment in favor of SBTC, although the rate of interest imposed by the RTC was 12% p.a. instead of the agreed upon 23% p.a. The court denied the motion filed by SBTC to apply the 23% p.a. instead of the 12% p.a.

ISSUES OF THE CASE:

Did the RTC err in using 12% instead of the 23% as agreed upon by the parties?

- Yes, the rate of interest was agreed upon by the parties freely. Significantly, respondent did not question that rate.
- P.D. No. 1684 and C.B. Circular No. 905 no more than allow contracting parties to stipulate freely regarding any subsequent adjustment in the interest rate that shall accrue on a loan or forbearance of money, goods or credits.
- It is not for respondent court a quo to change the stipulations in the contract where it is not illegal. Furthermore, Article 1306 of the New Civil Code provides that contracting parties may establish such stipulations, clauses, terms and conditions as they may deem convenient, provided they are not contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order, or public policy.
- The 12% shall be applied for obligations arising from loans, or forbearance of money in the absence of express stipulations

HELD:
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the decision of the respondent court a quo, is hereby AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that the rate of interest that should be imposed be 23% per annum.

Obligations and Contracts Terms:
PROMISSORY NOTE - A written document in which a borrower agrees (promises) to pay back money to a lender according to specified terms. A written promise to pay a certain sum of money, at a future time, unconditionally.

A promissory note differs from a mere acknowledgment of debt, without any promise to pay, as when the debtor gives his creditor an I 0 U. In its form it usually contains a promise to pay, at a time therein expressed, a sum of money to a certain person therein named, or to his order, for value received. It is dated and signed by the maker. It is never under seal.

He who makes the promise is called the maker, and he to whom it is made is the payee.

I hope this helps.

Jeff David

Civil Law 2- ObliCon- Ernesto Ang and Rosalinda Ang vs. Court of Appeals and Lee Chuy Realty Corporation

This case is with regard to Art 1170 of the NCC- Damages

Ernesto Ang and Rosalinda Ang vs. C.A. and Lee Chuy Realty Corporation
GR No 80058 13February 1989

Facts:
On December 1979 Lee Chuy Realty Corporation (buyer) issued in favour of Ernesto and Rosalinda Ang (seller), MBTC check in the amount of 50,000.00 as initial down payment for the purchase of the property. In the receipt that was accompanied the payment it supposedly embodied the terms and conditions of their agreement. This accompanying receipt was not returned and instead the buyers where sent another receipt prepared and signed by the Angs. The first receipt indicated the purchase price of 1.6 million while the new receipt did not. On January 12, 1980 the seller informed the buyer that they only have until January 24,1980 to pay the balance of the purchase price, with which the failure to do so will result in the cancellation of their agreement.
In response the buyers duly informed the sellers that they have been ready to comply with the obligation, while the sellers have not yet complied with their obligation to clear the subject properties of the obstructions thereon. By March 3, 1980 the buyers through their counsel, demanded for the refund of the down payment on account of the failure of the sellers to comply with their obligations, and their subsequent withdrawal from the sale. After the failure of the sellers to return the 50,000.00 the buyers filed a complaint for the collection of a sum of money plus damages before the RTC. The RTC decided in favour of the sellers. On appeal, the Court of Appeals overturned the decision of the RTC and held that it was the sellers that committed the breach of agreement.

Issue:
Was the court of Appeals correct in holding the Angs liable for breach of the agreement?

- Yes, as was shown the sellers breached the agreement when they failed to fulfil the obligation incumbent upon them namely: (1) That seller will undertake to remove and clear the subject property of all occupants and obstructions within the month of December 1979 and (2) That when the subject property is cleared of all occupants and obstructions, the seller shall deliver a deed of absolute sale in favour of private respondent with all pertinent papers necessary for the issuance of a certificate of title in the name of the buyer.
- It was the failure of the seller to comply with aforementioned conditions of the agreement that caused the delay in the payment of the obligation of the buyer (which is to pay the balance of the total payment on or before January 24, 1980).  this was merely a slight breach of agreement and does not merit a rescission of the contract
- Furthermore, the seller refused to proceed with the sale unless the buyer agreed to the higher price of 2,340,000.00 the seller with this action committed a serious breach of agreement. There already existed a perfected contract of sale between the parties and the purchase price was set at 1,600,000.00. The seller cannot increase the price that was agreed upon, without the consent of the buyer.  the disagreement with the price due to the seller’s refusal to sell means that it is a serious breach of contract and that it grants the buyer the right to rescind the agreement

Held:
The decision of the Court of Appeals is Affirmed. (As a consequence of the resolution of the sale, the parties should be restored to their original situation. Seller should refund the down payment with legal interest from the date of the extra-judicial demand made on March 3, 1980.)

Obligations and Contracts terms:
Reciprocal Obligations- The power to rescind is implied and any of the contracting parties may, upon non-fulfilment by the other party of his part of the obligation, resolve the contract. It shall not be permitted for slight or casual breaches of contract. It may only be granted on breaches that are so substantial and fundamental as to defeat the object of the parties making the agreement.

I hope this helps.

Jeff David

Civil Law 2- Olivia Navoa and Ernesto Navoa vs. Court of Appeals, Teresita Domdoma and Eduardo Domdoma

This case is with regard to Art 1169 of the NCC - Delay

Olivia Navoa and Ernesto Navoa vs. C.A., Teresita Domdoma and Eduardo Domdoma
GR No 59255 20December1995
Facts:
On December 1977 Teresita Domdoma and Eduardo Domdoma filed a case with the RTC for collection of various sums of money based on loans given by them to Olivia Navoa. They cased was dismissed on the ground that there was no cause of action and that the Domdoma’s do not have no capacity to sue. They appealed to the C.A. and was granted a favourable decision.
There were 6 instances in which the Domdoma’s gave Olivia Navoa a loan. The first instance is when Teresita gave Olivia a diamond ring valued at 15,000.00 which was secured by a PCIB check under the condition that if the ring was not returned within 15 days from August 15, 1977 the ring is considered sold. Teresita attempted to deposit the check on November 1977 but the check was not honoured for lack of funds. After this instance, there were other loans of various amounts that were extended by Teresita to Olivia, loans which were secured by PCIB checks, which were all dated to 1 month after the loan. All these checks were not honoured under the same reason as the first loan.
Issue:
Was the decision of the RTC to dismiss the case due to having no cause of action valid?
- NO, A cause of action is the fact or combination of facts which affords a party a right to judicial interference in his behalf.
- For the first loan it is a fact, that the ring was considered sold to Olivia Navoa 15 days after August 15, 1977, and even then, Olivia Navoa failed to pay the price for the ring when the payment was due (check issued was not honoured. Thus it is confirmed that Teresita’s right under the agreement was violated.
- As for the other loans extended by Teresita to Olivia, they were all secured by PCIB checks. It can be inferred that since the checks were all dated to 1 month after the loan, it follows that the loans are then payable 1 month after they were contracted, and also these checks were dishonoured by the bank for lack of funds.
- Olivia and Ernesto Navoa failed to make good the checks that were issued as payment for their obligations. Art 1169 of the Civil Code is explicit: those obliged to deliver or to do something incur in delay from the time the obligee judicially or extra-judicially demands from them the fulfilment of the obligations, the continuing refusal of Olivia and Ernesto Navoa to comply with the demand of payment shows the existence of a cause of action.

Held:
The petition is DENIED and the decision of the C.A. remanding the case to the RTC for trial on the merits is affirmed.

Obligations and Contracts terms:
Security- A means of ensuring the enforcement of an obligation or of protecting some interest in property. It may be personal or property security.
Cause of Action- is the fact or combination of facts which affords a party a right to judicial interference in his behalf. The requisites for a cause of action are: (a) a right in favour of the plaintiff by whatever means and under whatever law it arises or created, (b) an obligation on the part of the defendant to respect and not to violate such right; and, (c) an act or omission on the part of the defendant constituting a violation of the plaintiff’s right or breach of the obligation of the defendant to the plaintiff.

I hope this helps.

Jeff David

Civil Law 2- ObliCon- MMTC and Apolinario Ajoc vs. C.A. and Col. Sabalburo et al

This case is with regard to Art 1162- Culpa Aquiliana


Case of Metro Manila Transport Corporation and Apolinario Ajoc vs. C.A. and Col. Sabalburo et al
G.R.No. 141089 01August2002

FACTS OF THE CASE:
Last December 24 1986 Florentina Sabalburo and her companions were making their way to Baclaran to buy foodstuffs for Noche Buena. Florentina Sabalburo and her companions waited for the traffic light to turn red so that they could cross the street to take a ride to Baclaran. Upon crossing the street during the red light, Florentina Sabalburo was hit by a fast moving MMTC bus, driven by Apolinario Ajoc.
Ms. Sabalburo was then taken by the driver and conductress of the MMTC bus to San Juan de Dios hospital. The victim was not able to regain consciousness and she succumbed to her injuries on January 03, 1987. The Trial court decided in favor of Sabalburo et. al and ordered MMTC to pay damages. MMTC then appealed the case to the Court of Appeals which affirmed the decision of the trial court.

ISSUES OF THE CASE:

Was the RTC and CA correct in ordering MTCC to pay damages to the plaintiff?

- Yes, According to the S.C. both courts are correct in awarding damages to the plaintiff.
- Even though MMTC argues that the proximate cause of the victim’s death is her negligence thus requesting the court to apply Art 2179 of the civil code, instead of Art 2176, the S.C upheld the findings of the trial courts that the driver and MMTC had been negligent in its duties and it is this negligence that led to the death of the victim thus showing that Art 2176 is the more applicable provision in this case.
- Also MMTC is liable for the death of the victim due to Art 2180 of the civil code, wherein the obligation imposed by Article 2176 is demandable not only for one’s own acts or omissions-, but also for those of persons for whom one is responsible.
- It should be shown that whenever an employee’s negligence causes damage or injury to another, there instantly arises a presumption juris tantum that there was negligence on the part of the employer, either in the selection of the employee (culpa in eligiendo) or the supervision over him after the selection (culpa in vigilando). Hence, to escape solidary liability for a quasi-delict committed by his employee, an employer must rebut the presumption by presenting convincing proof that in the selection and supervision of his employee, he has exercised the care and diligence of a good father of a family. In the present case, petitioner MMTC failed to rebut the presumption of negligence on its part.

HELD:

The Decision of the Court of Appeals is affirmed.

Obligations and Contracts Terms:

CULPA AQUILIANA- refers to acts or omissions which cause damage to another, there being fault or negligence on the part of the defendant, who is obliged by law to pay for the damages done.

Art 2176 of the Civil Code is applied if there’s no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties. Although the Supreme Court has already held that a quasi- delict can occur even if there is a contractual relation, since the act that lead to the breaking a contract may also be a tort

I hope this helps.

Jeff David

Civil Law 2- ObliCon- F.F. Manacop Construction Co. Inc., vs. CA and MIAA

This case is with reference to Art 1160 of the New Civil Code- Quasi- Contracts

Case of FF. MAÑACOP CONSTRUCTION CO., INC. VS. C.A. and MIAA
G.R.No. 122196 15January1997

FACTS OF THE CASE:
Ff Mañacop Construction Company Inc, was contracted by MIAA to construct a perimeter fence from Asia Overseas Inc to Airscope Development Corp. for and in consideration of the quoted price of 307,440.00 Due to the urgency of the need, FFMCC proceeded with the fence construction even if the Notice to Proceed has not yet been signed by the General Manager.
After the Feb 1986 Revolution, the new general manager of MIAA stopped the construction of said fence, by the time of the halt in construction it is already 95% finished which was worth 282,068.00.
After making repeated demands to make MIAA pay for the constructed fence, FMCC filed a case against MIAA. During trial it has been found that MIAA is liable to pay 238,501.48 based upon quantum meruit since there is an absence of a written contract between parties. On appeal the Court agreed with MIAA with regard to the error of the trial court in the valuation of the obligation. According to the decision of the Appellate Court, the computation for the obligation owed by MIAA should be referred to the Commission on Audit, as was shown in the case of Eslao v. Commission on Audit.

ISSUES OF THE CASE:

Was the RTC correct in ordering MIAA to pay FMCC on the basis of Quantum Meuit?

- Yes. The S.C. basing its decision on the Eslao case, it was shown the contract was not fraudulent or mala in se, also it has been shown that the project was already covered by a specific appropriation.
- Property or benefit is not ultra vires (they can be a subject of an express contract and are within the contractual powers of the public body)
- It is shown as well that MIAA was reaping the benefits from the scallop fence and wire placed by the petitioner.
- It is also shown that the payment is limited to the actual cost of chargeable against funds authorized and certified for such purpose.
- Unliquidated claims present a justiciable question ripe for judicial determination which is beyond the powers of COA to adjudicate.

[ The difference between the Eslao case and this one, is that the matter was referred to the COA for the Eslao case because the matter on the exact amount was not at issue and the determination thereof involves a review of the factual findings and evidence in support thereof. For this case the Lower court has already determined the actual amount owed by MIAA to FMCC, so there was no need for referral to COA]

HELD:

The decision of the Court of Appeals is set aside and the decision of the RTC is reinstated.

Obligations and Contracts Terms:

Difference of Quantum Meruit from Quantum Valebant- Quantum Meruit allows recovery of the reasonable value regardless of any agreement as to value. It entitles the party to “as much as he, reasonable deserves”, as distinguished from Quantum Valebant or to “as much as what is reasonably worth.”



I hope this helps.

Jeff David

Civil Law 2- ObliCon- TRB Employees Union- Independent vs. NLRC and Emmanuel Noel A. Cruz

This case is with reference to Art 1160 of the New Civil Code- Quasi- Contracts
Case of Traders Royal Bank Employees Union- Independent vs NLRC and Emmanuel Noel A. Cruz
G.R.No. 120592 14March1997

FACTS OF THE CASE:
That TRB Employees Union, had a retainer agreement with Atty. Cruz, for 3,000.00 in consideration of the law firm’s undertaking to render the services enumerated in their contract. During the existence of the agreement the union referred to the private respondent the claims of its members for holiday, mid-year and year-end bonuses against their employer TRB.
The NLRC granted the petition of the union with regard to the demand for bonuses. After, the S.C. acting upon the challenge of TRBank of the NLRC decision in its decision on August 30, 1990 modified the decision of the NLRC by deleting the award of mid- year and year- end bonus differentials while affirming the award of holiday pay differential.

After TRB voluntarily complied with the decision, the respondent on September 18, 1990 notified the union, TRB management, and the NLRC of his right to exercise and enforce his attorney’s lien over the award of holiday pay differential through a letter dated October 8, 1990.

ISSUES OF THE CASE:

Was the lien made by the respondent attorney over the award as attorney’s fees valid?

- Yes, Because the contract between the Union and the attorney stipulates that the 3,000.00 paid as retainer fees is intended merely as a consideration for the law firm’s commitment to render the services enumerated on PART A and B of the retainer agreement.
- The retainer fee paid by the Union is not a payment for the firm’s execution or performance of the services listed in the contract, subject to the particular qualifications.
- Obligations do not emanate only from contracts. One of the sources of extra- contractual obligations found in our civil code is the quasi contract premised on the roman maxim that nemo alterius detrimento locupletari potest
- As early as 1903 the court has allowed the payment of reasonable professional fees to an interpreter, not withstanding the lack of understanding with his client as to his remuneration, on the basis a quasi-contract. It is not necessary that the parties agree on a definite fee for the special services rendered by the firm in order that the union may be obligated to pay compensation. Equity and fair play dictate that petitioner should pay the same after it accepted, availed itself of, and benefited from the firm’s services.
- The measure of compensation for private respondent’s services as against his client should be properly addressed by the rule of quantum meruit is used as the basis for determining the lawyer’s professional fees in the absence of a contract.
HELD:
The resolution of the NLRC with regard to the attorney’s fees is modified, and Union is hereby ordered to pay 10,000 for the firm’s rendered services.

Obligations and Contracts Terms:

• General Retaining Fee- is the fee paid to a lawyer to secure his future services as general counsel for any ordinary legal problem that may arise from routinary business of the client and referred to him for legal action. The reason for the remuneration is that the lawyer is deprived of the opportunity of rendering services for a fee to the opposing party or other parties. It is a compensation for lost opportunities.

I hope this helps.

Jeff David

Civil Law 2- ObliCon- Pichel vs. Alonzo

This case is with reference to Art 1157 of the New Civil Code- Sources of Contracts

Case of Luis Pichel vs. Prudencio Alonzo
G.R.No. L- 36902 30January1982

FACTS OF THE CASE:
That Prudencio Alonzo (VENDOR) executed a deed of sale for the coconut fruits of his land in Balactasan Plantation in Lamitan, Basilan, in favor of Luis Pichel (VENDEE). The land from which the subject coconut fruits are derived from was subjected to a cancellation of the award in 1965, due to the reason of violation of the law that disallows alienation of land (the vendor’s rights to the land were reinstated in 1972)
The vendor and his wife sold to the vendee the fruits of the coconut trees from 1968 to 1976 for consideration of 4,200. Even during the date of sale, the land was still leased to one Ramon Sua, and it was part of the agreement of the sale that the sum of 3,650.00 was to be paid by the vendor to Ramon Sua as to release the land.
The RTC decided in favor of the vendor, due to the fact that the deed of sale that was executed was invalid, due to its supposed violation of RA No. 477, in which they equated the deed of sale executed by the parties as a contract of lease.

ISSUES OF THE CASE:

Was the Deed of Sale valid?

- Yes, The RTC erred in constructing the deed of sale as a contract of lease.
- There was no need on the part of the RTC to interpret the contract, since there was no ambiguity, it merely contracts the sale of the fruits of the land, not the land itself.
- The S.C. relied upon ART 1370 of the Civil Code, regarding the rule on interpreting contracts.
- Its interpretation in express form is the preferred. Construction shall be employed when such literal interpretation is impossible.
- The possession of the coconut fruits for 7 years is different from possession of the land, since the coconut fruits are mere accessories and the land is the principal- a transfer of accessories does not necessarily mean a transfer of principal, it is the other way around.
- The vendor after having received the consideration for the sale of his coconut fruits cannot be allowed to impugn the validity of the contracts he entered into, to the prejudice of petitioner who contracted in good faith and consideration

HELD:
The Judgment of the lower court has been set aside, and another one entered in its place, dismissing the complaint.

Obligations and Contracts Terms:

• Difference between a contract of sale and a lease of things: that the delivery of the thing sold transfers ownership, while in a lease no such transfer of ownership results as the rights of the lessee are limited to the use and enjoyment of the thing leased.
• Contract of Lease- defined as giving or the concession of the enjoyment or use of a thing for a specified time and fixed price.

I hope this helps.

Jeff David

Civil Law 2- ObliCon- FGU Insurance vs. GPS Trucking

This case is with reference to Art 1159 of the New Civil Code

Case of FGU INSURANCE CORPORATION vs. G.P.S TRUCKING CORPORATION and LAMBERT M. EROLES
G.R.No. 141910 06August2002

FACTS OF THE CASE:
G.P. Sarmiento Trucking Corporation (GPS) undertook to deliver on 18 June 1994 thirty (30) units of Condura S.D. white refrigerators aboard one of its Isuzu truck, driven by Lambert Eroles. While the truck was traversing the north diversion road along McArthur highway in Barangay Anupol, Bamban, Tarlac, it collided with an unidentified truck, causing it to fall into a deep canal, resulting in damage to the cargoes.
FGU Insurance Corporation (FGU), an insurer of the shipment, paid to Concepcion Industries, Inc., the value of the covered cargoes: P204, 450.00. FGU, in turn, being the subrogee of the rights and interests of the insured sought reimbursement of the amount, from GPS. Since GPS failed to heed the claim, FGU filed a complaint for damages and breach of contract of carriage against GPS and its driver with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 66, of Makati City. In its answer, respondents asserted that GPS was the exclusive hauler only of Concepcion Industries, Inc., since 1988, and it was not so engaged in business as a common carrier. Respondents further claimed that the cause of damage was purely accidental. GPS, instead of submitting its evidence, filed with leave of court a motion to dismiss the complaint by way of demurrer to evidence on the ground that petitioner had failed to prove that it was a common carrier. The RTC and CA both ruled in favor of the Respondent.

ISSUES OF THE CASE:

WHETHER RESPONDENT GPS, EITHER AS A COMMON CARRIER OR A PRIVATE CARRIER, MAY BE PRESUMED TO HAVE BEEN NEGLIGENT WHEN THE GOODS IT UNDERTOOK TO TRANSPORT SAFELY WERE SUBSEQUENTLY DAMAGED WHILE IN ITS PROTECTIVE CUSTODY AND POSSESSION.

- In culpa contractual, upon which the action of petitioner rests as being the subrogee of Concepcion Industries, Inc., the mere proof of the existence of the contract and the failure of its compliance justify, prima facie, a corresponding right of relief. Thus, FGU has a claim for the amount paid out.
- The law, recognizing the obligatory force of contracts, will not permit a party to be set free from liability for any kind of misperformance of the contractual undertaking or a contravention of the tenor thereof
- GPS recognizes the existence of a contract of carriage between it and petitioner’s assured, and admits that the cargoes it has assumed to deliver have been lost or damaged while in its custody. In such a situation, a default on, or failure of compliance with, the obligation in this case, the delivery of the goods in its custody to the place of destination - gives rise to a presumption of lack of care and corresponding liability on the part of the contractual obligor the burden being on him to establish otherwise. GPS has failed to do so.

HELD:
The decision of the lower courts insofar as Lambert M. Eroles is concerned is affirmed but assailed decision with regard to GPS trucking is reversed. It, is hereby ordered to pay FGU Insurance Corporation the value of the damaged and lost cargoes in the amount of P204, 450.00

Obligations and Contracts Terms:

• expectation interest- the interest in having the benefit of his bargain by being put in as good a position as he would have been in had the contract been performed
• reliance interest- the interest in being reimbursed for loss caused by reliance on the contract by being put in as good a position as he would have been in had the contract not been made
• Restitution interest- which is his interest in having restored to him any benefit that he has conferred on the other party.
• Subrogee- the person or entity that assumes the legal right to attempt to collect a claim of another (subrogor) in return for paying the other's expenses or debts which the other claims against a third party. A subrogee is usually the insurance company which has insured the party whose expenses were paid.

I hope this helps.

Jeff David

Criminal Law- People vs. Genosa

THIS CASE IS WITH REGARD TO ART. 11 (1), AND ART 14 (16) OF THE R.P.C

Case of People of the R.P. vs. Genosa
G.R.No. 135981 15January2004

FACTS OF THE CASE:

That Marivic Genosa, the Appellant on the 15November1995, attacked and wounded his husband, which ultimately led to his death. According to the appellant she did not provoke her husband when she got home that night it was her husband who began the provocation. The Appellant said she was frightened that her husband would hurt her and she wanted to make sure she would deliver her baby safely. In fact, The Appelant had to be admitted later at the Rizal Medical Centre as she was suffering from eclampsia and hypertension, and the baby was born prematurely on December 1, 1995.

The Appellant testified that during her marriage she had tried to leave her husband at least five (5) times, but that Ben would always follow her and they would reconcile. The Apellant said that the reason why Ben was violent and abusive towards her that night was because 'he was crazy about his recent girlfriend, Lulu Rubillos.

The Appellant after being interviewed by specialists, has been shown to be suffering from Battered Woman Syndrome.
The appellant with a plea of self defense admitted the killing of her husband, she was then found guilty of Parricide, with the aggravating circumstance of treachery, for the husband was attacked while asleep.

ISSUES OF THE CASE:

Can Marivic Genosa be granted the Justifying circumstance of Self-defense, and can she be held liable for the aggravating circumstance of treachery?

No, Since self- defense since the existence of Battered woman syndrome, which the appellant has been shown to be suffering in the relationship does not in itself establish the legal right of the woman to kill her abusive partner. Evidence must still be considered in the context of self-defense.
In the present case, however, according to the testimony of the appellant there was a sufficient time interval between the unlawful aggression of the husband and her fatal attack upon him. She had already been able to withdraw from his violent behavior and escape to their children's bedroom. During that time, he apparently ceased his attack and went to bed. The reality or even the imminence of the danger he posed had ended altogether. He was no longer in a position that presented an actual threat on her life or safety.

Without continuous aggression there can be no self-defense. And absence of aggression does not warrant complete or incomplete self-defense.

No, There is treachery when one commits any of the crimes against persons by employing means, methods or forms in the execution thereof without risk to oneself arising from the defense that the offended party might make.

The circumstances must be shown as indubitably as the killing itself; they cannot be deduced from mere inferences, or conjectures, which have no place in the appreciation of evidence. Besides, equally axiomatic is the rule that when a killing is preceded by an argument or a quarrel, treachery cannot be appreciated as a qualifying circumstance, because the deceased may be said to have been forewarned and to have anticipated aggression from the assailant.

In the present case, however it was not conclusively shown, that the appellant intentionally chose a specific means of successfully attacking her husband without any risk to herself from any retaliatory act that he might make. To the contrary, it appears that the thought of using the gun occurred to her only at about the same moment when she decided to kill her spouse. In the absence of any convincing proof that she consciously and deliberately employed the method by which she committed the crime in order to ensure its execution, the doubt should be resolved in her favor.

HELD:

The conviction of Appellant Marivic Genosa for parricide is hereby AFFIRMED. However, there being two (2) mitigating circumstances and no aggravating circumstance attending her commission of the offense, her penalty is REDUCED to six (6) years and one (1) day of prision mayor as minimum; to 14 years, 8 months and 1 day of reclusion temporal as maximum.

ADDENDUM:

When can BWS (Battered Woman Syndrome) as self defense be appreciated?

Where the brutalized person is already suffering from BWS, further evidence of actual physical assault at the time of the killing is not required. Incidents of domestic battery usually have a predictable pattern. To require the battered person to await an obvious, deadly attack before she can defend her life "would amount to sentencing her to 'murder by installment.' Still, impending danger (based on the conduct of the victim in previous battering episodes) prior to the defendant's use of deadly force must be shown. Threatening behavior or communication can satisfy the required imminence of danger. Considering such circumstances and the existence of BWS, self-defense may be appreciated.


I hope this helps.

Jeff David

Statutory Construction- People vs. Yu Hai alias “HAYA”

Statutory Construction

- Headnotes and Epigraphs
- Construction to avoid Absurdity


Case of People of the Philippines vs. Yu Hai alias “HAYA”
GR Nos. L- 9598, 38216 15August1956

FACTS OF THE CASE:
On October 22, 1954, the accused was charged in the Justice of the Peace Court of Caloocan of a violation of Article 195, sub-paragraph 2 of the Revised Penal Code, for having allegedly permitted the game of panchong or paikiu, a game of hazard, and having acted as maintainer thereof. The accused moved to quash the information on the ground that it charged more than one offense and that the criminal action or liability therefore had already been extinguished; and the Justice of the Peace of Court, in its order of December 24, 1954, sustained the motion to quash on the theory that the offense charged was a light offense which, under Article 90 of the Revised Penal Code, prescribed in two months.

ISSUES OF THE CASE:

Did the court err in considering the offense committed as a light felony?

No, since the light offenses as defined in art 9 of the R.P.C states that “an offense which penalty arresto menor or a fine not exceeding 200 pesos." The argument of the SolGen on the matter is erroneous since the basis for his argument of classifying the offense committed as a correctional penalty, is Art 26 of the RPC which classifies fines not offenses.

Also, if the SolGen’s interpretation of the law is accepted then it will lead to and absurd situation wherein a light felony as defined by Art 9 will have 2 prescriptive periods, and 1 peso will mean the difference of 9 years and 10 months, and there is no reason for a law-maker to raise the prescriptive period for certain light offenses over other light offenses

Therefore it is more sensible and to apply Art 9 over Art 26 since we are discussing the prescription of a crime not the penalty. An as this construction is more favorable to the accused, it should be the one to be adopted.

HELD:

THE DECISION IS AFFIRMED WITH COSTS DE OFICIO.

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION LESSON:

Headnotes or epigraphs- When a statute is divided into several subjects or articles, having respective appropriate headings, it must be presumed that the provisions of each article are controlling upon the subject thereof and operate as a general rule for settling such questions therein.

Construction to avoid absurdity- If the words of the statute are susceptible of more than one meaning, the absurdity of the result of one construction is a strong argument against its adoption, and in favor of such sensible interpretation as will avoid such result.

I hope this helps.

Jeff David

NO NEW CASES FOR THE MEANTIME.

GUYS, DUE TO SOME PERSONAL REASONS I WILL NOT BE ABLE TO POST NEW DIGESTS FOR THE MEANTIME. BUT REST ASSURED, AFTER THIS HAS PASSED, MORE DIGESTS WOULD BE ADDED.

Statutory Construction- Regalado vs. Yulo

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION

Case of Regalado vs. Yulo
No. 42935 15February1935

FACTS OF THE CASE:

This case was brought about by the action quo warranto to determine the respective rights of the petitioner Felipe Regalado and one of the respondents, Esteban T. Villar, to the office of Justice of the peace of Malinao, Albay.

Felipe Regalado qualified for the office of justice of the peace of Malinao, Albay on April 12, 1906. On September 13, 1934 Regalado became 65 yrs old. As a consequence thereafter the judge of first instance of Albay, acting in accordance w/ instructions from the Sec of Justice, designated Esteban T. Villar, Justice of the peace of Malinao, Albay. Regalado surrendered the office to Villar under protest.


ISSUES OF THE CASE:

Whether or not under the provisions of section 203 of the Administrative Code, as amended by the Act No. 3899, the Justices and auxiliary justices appointed prior to the approval of the Act No. 3899 who reached the age of 65 yrs after said Act took effect shall cease to hold office upon reaching the age of 65 yrs.

No, Because justices appointed prior to the approval of the act and who completed 65 yrs of age on September 13 1934, subsequent to the approval of the Act which was on November 16 1931 and who by law is required to cease to hold office on January 1, 1933 is not affected by the said act.

HELD:
RESPONDENT ESTEBAN VILLAR BE OUSTED FROM THE OFFICE OF JUSTICE OF THE PEACE OF MALINAO, ALBAY, AND THAT THE PETITIONER FELIPE REGALADO BE PLACED IN POSSESSION OF THE SAME.

STAT CON LESSON:

The intent of the law is to be ascertained from the words used in its construction. (If legislative intent is not expressed in some appropriate manner, the courts cannot by interpretation speculate as to an intent and supply a meaning not found in the phraseology of the law.)

I hope this helps.

Jeff David

Statutory Construction- Commissioner vs. Relunia

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION- THE ISSUE WITH REGARD TO THE USE OF THE TITLE OF STATUTE TO MAKE INTERPRETATION EASIER


Case of Commissioner vs. Relunia
No. 11860 29May1959

FACTS OF THE CASE:

On December 10 1953, the RPS “MISAMIS ORIENTAL” a unit of the Philippine Navy was dispatched to Japan to transport contingents of the 14th BCT bound for Pusan Korea and carry Christmas gifts for our troops there. It seems thereafter, it was used for transportation purposes in connection with the needs of Filipino Soldiers in Korea.

While in Japan it loaded 180 cases containing various articles subject to custom duties. Upon arrival in the Philippines all theses articles were then declared forfeit by the Collector of Customs of Manila for violations of the customs law.

ISSUES OF THE CASE:

Is the RPS MISAMIS ORIENTAL being a Navy vessel required to have a manifest?

Yes, Because although the law prescribes that only vessels engaged in foreign trade are required to present a manifest, the interpretation of the court all vessels whether private or government owned including ships of the Philippine Navy, coming from a foreign port with the possible exception of war vessels or vessels employed by any foreign government not engaged in the transportation of merchandise by way of trade, as provided for in the 2nd paragraph of sec. 1221 of the Revised Administrative Code, are required to prepare and present a manifest to the customs authorities upon arrival at any Philippine Port.

HELD:
APPEALED DECISION OF THE COURT OF TAX APPEALS AS REGARDS TO THE FORFEITURE OF THE ELECTRIC RANGE IN QUESTION IS SET ASIDE, AND THE DECISION OF THE COMMISSIONER OF CUSTOMS AFFIRMING THAT OF THE COLLECTOR OF CUSTOMS AS REGARDS TO THE SAME ARTICLE IS AFFIRMED.

STAT CON LESSON:

The title of the statute can be resorted to if there is doubt as to the legislative intent. (The title can be resorted to as an aid where there is doubt as to the meaning of the law or the intention of the legislature, and not otherwise.)

I hope this helps.

Jeff David

Criminal Law- People of the R.P. vs. Pugay

THIS CASE IS WITH REGARD TO ART. 3(2) & 8(2) OF THE R.P.C.

"A Conspiracy exists when two or more people come to an agreement concerning the commission of a felony and decide to commit it."

"A man must use common sense, and exercise due reflection in all his acts; it is his duty to be cautious, careful and prudent, if not from instinct, then through fear of incurring punishment."


Case of People of the R.P. vs. Pugay
No. L-74324 17November1988

FACTS OF THE CASE:
The accused are pronounced by the RTC of Cavite guilty beyond reasonable doubt for the crime of murder of Bayani Miranda and sentencing them to a prison term ranging from 12 years (prison mayor) as mimimum to 20 years (prison temporal) as maximum and for samson to be sentenced to reclusion perpetua.

Miranda and the accused Pugay are friends. Miranda used to run errands for Pugay and they used to sleep together. On the evening of May 19, 1982 a town fiesta was held in the public plaza of Rosario Cavite. Sometime after midnight accused Pugay and Samson with several companions arrived (they were drunk), and they started making fun of Bayani Miranda. Pugay after making fun of the Bayani, took a can of gasoline and poured its contents on the latter, Gabion (principal witness) told Pugay not to do the deed. Then Samson set Miranda on fire making a human torch out of him. They were arrested the same night and barely a few hours after the incident gave their written statements.

ISSUES OF THE CASE:

Is conspiracy present in this case to ensure that murder can be the crime? If not what are the criminal responsibilities of the accused?

There is no:
CONSPIRACY- is determined when two or more persons agree to commit a felony and decide to commit it. Conspiracy must be proven with the same quantum of evidence as the felony itself, more specifically by proof beyond reasonable doubt. It is not essential that there be proof as to the existence of a previous agreement to commit a crime. It is sufficient if, at the time of commission of the crime, the accused had the same purpose and were united in its executed.
Since there was no animosity between miranda and the accused, and add to the that that the meeting at the scene of the incident was purely coincidental, and the main intent of the accused is to make fun of miranda.
Since there is no conspiracy that was proven, the respective criminal responsibility of Pugay and Samson arising from different acts directed against miranda is individual NOT collective and each of them is liable only for the act that was committed by him.

**Conspiracy may be implied from concerted action of the assailants in confronting the victim.

Criminal Responsibilities:
PUGAY: Having failed to exercise diligence necessary to avoid every undesirable consequence arising from any act committed by his companions who at the same time were making fun of the deceased. - GUILTY OF RECKLESS IMPRUDENCE RESULTING TO HOMICIDE

SAMSON:Since there are NO sufficient evidence that appears in the record establishing qualifying circumstances (treachery, conspiracy). And granted the mitigating circumstance that he never INTENDED to commit so grave a wrong. - GUILTY OF HOMICIDE

HELD:
JUDGEMENT OF THE LOWER COURT WAS AFFIRMED WITH MODIFICATIONS. JUDGEMENT FOR GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT FOR MURDER WAS LOWERED TO THE ABOVE JUDGEMENTS.

I hope this helps.

Jeff David

Political Law- Neri vs. Senate Committee on Accountability of Public Officers and Investigations

POLITICAL LAW- THIS IS WITH REGARD TO THE ISSUE OF THE CHECKS TO THE CONGRESSIONAL POWER OF INQUIRY

"what are the checks to the Legislature's all encompassing, awesome power of investigation?

The right to information by congress is not an absolute right"

Case of Neri vs. Senate Committee on Accountability of Public Officers and Investigations
G.R.No. 180643 04September2008

FACTS OF THE CASE:

On September 26, 2007, Neri; appeared before the respondent committees and testified for about 11 hours on the matters concerning the National Broadband Project, a project awarded to a Chinese company ZTE. The Petitioner therein disclosed that when he was offered by Abalos a bribe of 200 million pesos to approve the project, he informed PGMA of the attempt and she instructed him not to accept the bribe. However when he was probed further on PGMA’s and petitioner’s discussions relating to the NBN Project, petitioner refused to answer, invoking exec privilege. The questions that he refused to answer were:

1. whether or not PGMA followed up the NBN Project.
2. whether or not PGMA directed him to prioritize it.
3. whether or not PGMA directed him to approve it.

The petitioner did not appear before the respondent committees upon orders of the President invoking exec privilege. He explained that the questions asked of him are covered by exec privilege. He was cited in contempt of respondent committees and an order for his arrest and detention until such time that he would appear and give his testimony.

ISSUES OF THE CASE:
1. Is there a recognized presumptive presidential communications privilege in our legal system?
2. Did the respondent committee commit a grave abuse of discretion in issuing the contempt order?

- YES, presidential communications privilege is fundamental to the operation of government and inextricably rooted in the separation of powers under the constitution.
- The constitutional infirmity found in the blanket authorization to invoke exec privilege granted by the President to exec officials in sec 2(b) of E.O. 464 does not apply in this case.
- In this case, it was the President herself, through exec sec. Ermita, who invoked exec privilege on a specific matter involving an exec agreement between Philippines and China, which was the subject of the 3 questions asked.
- If what is involved is the presumptive privilege of presidential communications when invoked by the President on a matter clearly within the domain of the Executive, the said presumption dictates that the same be recognized.
- YES, an unconstrained congressional investigative power, like an unchecked executive generates its own abuses.
- Constant exposure to congressional subpoena takes its toll on the ability of the executive to function effectively.
- The Legislative inquiry must be confined to permissible areas and thus prevent “roving commissions.”
- The court although a co-equal branch of government to the legislature, must look into the internal rules of congress w/ regard to ensuring compliance by congress to it. Since, the issuance of a contempt order must be done by a vote of majority of all its members. The issuance of the order was w/o concurrence of the majority.

HELD:
RESPONENTS COMMITTEES’ MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION DATED 08APRIL2008 IS HEREBY DENIED.


I hope this helps.

Jeff David

Political Law- Senate of the Phils. vs. Ermita

POLITICAL LAW- THIS CASE IS WITH REGARD TO THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF E.O. 464

"A transparent government is one of the hallmarks of a republican state. History has been witness to the fact that the power to withhold information lends itself to abuse, hence the need to guard it zealously."


Case of Senate of the Phils. vs. Ermita
G.R.No. 169777 20April2006

FACTS OF THE CASE:

On September 23, 2005, the committee of the senate as a whole issued invitations to various officials of the executive department and Military officials for them to appear as resource speakers in a public hearing on the North Rail Project, and on the issues of “Gloriagate,” Wire-tapping of the President, Electoral fraud, as was shown in the respective privileged speeches of the Senators.

On September 27 & 28 2005, after being invited most of those “resource persons” were not able to make it due to prior commitments (i.e. military officials), while on 27 September then Senate President Drilon, received a letter from Executive Secretary Ermita requesting a postponement of the hearing (re: Northrail).

On September 28, 2005 the president issued E.O 464, and Ermita sent a letter to the Senate President, informing him of the E.O. and that the resource persons from the executive dept would not be able to attend w/o the consent of the president. With regard to the hearing on the wire-tapping of the President, Col. Balutan and Gen. Gudani were relieved from their military posts and faced court martial proceedings for testifying w/o the president’s approval.

ISSUES OF THE CASE:

IS E.O. 464 VALID?

- The congress has the power of inquiry that is expressly recognized by ART 6.21 of the Constitution, where congress may conduct inquiries in aid of legislation
- Since congress has authority to inquire into the operations of the executive branch, it would be inconsistent to hold that the power of inquiry does not extend to executive officials who are the most familiar with and informed on the executive operations, although there are exemptions to the power of inquiry which exemptions fall under the rubric of “executive privilege” (the power of the government to withhold info from the public, the courts, the congress) it is only recognized in relation to certain types of information of a sensitive character, and it is inclined heavily against secrecy and in favor of disclosure.
- The power of congress to compel the appearance of exec officials under sec 21 and the lack of it under sec 22 find their basis in the principle of Separation of Powers. While the exec branch is a co-equal branch of the legislature, it cannot frustrate the power of congress to legislate by refusing to comply w/ its demands for info.
- Congress undoubtedly has a right to information from the executive branch, whenever it is sought in aid of legislation. If the executive branch withholds such information on the ground that it is privileged, it must so assert it and state the reason therefore and why it must be respected.

HELD:
PETITIONS ARE PARTLY GRANTED, Sec(s) 2(b) &3 of E.O. 464 ARE DECLARED VOID. Sec(s) 1&2(a) ARE HOWEVER, VALID.


I hope this helps.

Jeff David

Satutory Construction- Pascual vs. Pascual- Bautista

Satutory Construction

Case of Pascual vs. Pascual- Bautista
207SCRA 561 25March1992

FACTS OF THE CASE:

Petitioners Olivia and Hermes Pascual are the acknowledged natural children of the natural children of the late Eligio Pascual the latter being a full blood brother of the decedent Don Andres Pascual. Adela Soldevilla Pascual the surviving spouse of the late Don Andes Pascual filed w/ the RTC Branch 162, a special proceeding case no.7554 for administration of the intestate estate of her late husband. Olivia and Hermes are illegitimate children of Eligio Pascual (although they contend that the term “illegitimate children” as described in art 992 should be construed as “spurious children”) .

ISSUES OF THE CASE:

Can Art. 992 of the Civil Code of the Philippines be interpreted to exclude recognized natural children from the inheritance of the deceased?

Yes, Because the art. 992 of the Civil Code explicitly states that:

“An illegitimate child has no right to inherit ab intestato from the legitimate children and relatives of his father or mother; nor shall such children or relatives inherit in the same manner from the illegitimate child.”

In applying the above doctrine to the case at bar respondents did not err in holding that petitioners herein cannot represent their father Eligio Pascual in the succession of the latter to the intestate estate of the decedent Andres Pascual, since under Art 176 of the Family Code all illegitimate children are generally placed under one category, whether spurious or not.

HELD:

PETITION IS DISMISSED FOR LACK OF MERIT AND THE ASSAILED DECISION OF THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS DATED APRIL 29,1988 IS AFFIRMED

STAT CON LESSON:

When the law is clear, it is not susceptible to interpretation. (It must be applied regardless of who maybe affected, even if the law may be harsh or onerous)

I hope this helps.

Jeff David

Criminal Law- People of the Philippine Islands vs. Diokno

THIS CASE IS REGARDING ARTICLE 13 PAR(S) (5,6, & 7)

"Those who act with passion or obfuscation suffers a diminution of his intelligence and intent"

Case of People of the Philippine Islands vs. Diokno
G.R.No. L- 45100 26October1936

FACTS OF THE CASE:
The accused Epifanio and Roman Diokno appealed the decision of the C.F.I of Laguna. On 04 January 1935, Salome Diokno, to whom Yu Hiong was engaged for about a year, invited the latter to go with her. Yu Hiong accepted the invitation but he told Salome that her father was angry with him. On 05- 06 January 1935 Roman Diokno, telegraphed his father informing him that his sister has eloped w/ the Chinaman. On 07 January 1935 they chanced upon the Chinaman at the house of Antonio Layco, upon confrontation, the Chinaman implored pardon, and was then stabbed by the accused Roman stabbed him at the back and later on the left side, and Epifanio stabbed him once, upon falling on the landing of the stairs the Chinaman was then stabbed repeatedly.
The municipal police was alerted to the incident and was able to catch Epifanio in the crime scene; he admitted that he stabbed the victim. While Roman was then accosted after 3 days, the wounds that were inflicted on the Chinaman were mortal which then caused the death of the victim.

ISSUES OF THE CASE:

CAN THE ACCUSED BE GRANTED THE PRIVILEGE OF MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCE AS BASED ON ART 13 PAR(s) 5, 6 & 7?

- YES. With regard to art 13 par 5, because although the elopement took place on January 4, 1935, and the aggression on the 7th, the offense did not cease while and her marriage to the deceased unlegalized. Therefore, there was no interruption from the time the offense was committed to the vindication of it. That the accused belongs to a family of old customs to whom the elopement of a daughter with a man constitutes a grave offense to their honor and causes disturbance of the peace and tranquility of the home.
- YES. With regard to art 13 par 6, because the fact, that the accused The fact that the accused saw the victim run upstairs when he became aware of their presence, as if he refused to deal with them after having gravely offended them, was certainly a stimulus strong enough to produce in their mind a fit of passion which blinded them and led them to commit the crime with which they are charged
- Yes. With regard to art 13 par 7, it can be granted to Epifanio Diokno, after surrendering immediately.

HELD:

PETITIONERS ARE FOUND GUILTY OF THE CRIME OF HOMICIDE AND GRANTING 3 MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCES FOR EPIFANIO AND 2 MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCES FOR ROMAN, W/ NO AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCES, THUS THEY ARE ENTITLED TO A PENALTY A DEGREE LOWER THAN WHAT IS PRESCRIBED BY LAW PRISION MAYOR IN THIS CASE (8 YEARS TO 1 DAY)
I hope this helps.

Jeff David

Criminal Law- People vs. Morales

THIS IS WITH REGARD TO ARTICLE 12 PAR(S) 5 &6 OF THE REVISED PENAL CODE

"The accused must not have opportunity for escape of self-defense"

Case of People of the R.P. vs. Morales
G.R.No. 148518 15April2004

FACTS OF THE CASE:

That on or about the 9th day of November, 1994, in the municipality of Bacolor, province of Pampanga, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring and confederating together and mutually helping one another, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, abduct and kidnap Jefferson C. Tan, Joanna C. Tan, Jessie Anthony C. Tan, Malou Ocampo and Cesar Quiroz, while the latter were on board a L-300 van with Plate No. CKW-785 at San Vicente, Bacolor, Pampanga, for the purpose of extorting ransom money from the parents of the said victims with threat to kill the said victims if their parents failed to deliver the ransom money, that said victims were brought and detained in Bataan until the father of victims, Feliciano Tan, paid and delivered to the aforesaid accused the amount of P92,000.00.

ISSUES OF THE CASE:

For this particular case, since 2 appellants are involved, the digest would only look into the issue of Fernando Morales;

- CAN FERNANDO MORALES BE GRANTED THE EXEMPTING CIRCUMSTANCES OF IRRESISTIBLE FORCE AND/OR UNCONTROLLABLE FEAR OF AN EQUAL OR GREATER INJURY

- IF CONSPIRACY WAS PROVEN BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT

- No. Since according to the ruling in the case of People v. Del Rosario. Under Article 12 of the Revised Penal Code, a person is exempt from criminal liability if he acts under the compulsion of an irresistible force, or under the impulse of an uncontrollable fear of equal or greater injury, because such person does not act with freedom. In Del Rosario, however, we held that for such defense to prosper the duress, force, fear intimidation must be present, imminent and impending, and of such nature as to induce a well-grounded apprehension of death or serious bodily harm if the act be done. A threat of future injury is not enough
- By not availing of the chance to escape (since the other accused were waiting for them at the distance of 1 kilometer) their allegation of fear or duress becomes untenable, for it to apply: it is necessary that the compulsion be of such a character as to leave no opportunity to escape or self-defense in equal combat.
- The fear (threats against family members), were not of imminence as to prevent any chance of escape, and that this fear they allegedly suffered does not suffice to grant them the exempting circumstance.
- Yes. The acts done by the appellants (was involved in the initial abduction, feeding/guarding the children while they are w/ them, instructing the father to go to Gumi for the ransom) clearly shows that there was close coordination, indicating a common purpose or design
- Conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the commission of a felony and decide to commit it. Where all the accused acted in concert at the time of the commission of the offense, and it is shown by such acts that they had the same purpose or common design and were united in its execution, conspiracy is sufficiently established.
- It must be shown that all participants performed specific acts with such closeness and coordination as to indicate a common purpose or design to commit the felony.

HELD:

DECISION OF THE LOWER COURT CONVICTING THE ACCUSED FOR THE CRIME OF KIDNAPPING FOR RANSOM AND SENTENCING EACH TO DEATH IS AFFIRMED

I hope this helps.

Jeff David

Criminal Law- Guevarra vs. Almodovar

THIS CASE IS WITH REGARD TO ARTICLE 12 (3) OF THE R.P.C.

"Intent distinguished from discernment"

Case of People of the Guevarra vs. Almodovar
G.R.No. 75256 26January1989

FACTS OF THE CASE:
The Petitioner John Philip Guevarra, petitioned the court for a special civil action for certiorari against the Hon. Judge Ignacio Almodovar of the city court of Legaspi. The petitioner, then 11 years old was target shooting with his best friend Teodoro Amine, Jr. and three other children in the backyard in the morning of 29October1984. Unfortunately, Teodoro was hit by a pellet on the left collar bone, w/c then caused his death.

ISSUE OF THE CASE:

Can an 11- year old boy be charged w/ the crime of homicide thru reckless imprudence?

- Intent and discernment are two different concepts. Intent means: a determination to do certain things; an aim; the purpose of the mind, including such knowledge as is essential to such intent. Discernment means: the mental capacity to understand the difference between right and wrong
- While they (intent and discernment) are products of mental processes w/in a person; intent refers to the desired of one’s act (active) while discernment refers to the moral significance that a person ascribes to an act (passive)
- Minors 9yrs to 15yrs are presumed to be without criminal capacity; but this presumption may be rebutted if it could be proven that they were capable of appreciating the nature and criminality of the act, that is, that (they) acted w/ discernment
- Discernment is embraced w/in the concept of intelligence w/c is one of the elements of a culpable felony, thus it is important that a minor 9yrs to below 15 yrs of age to have acted w/ discernment to show that he acted w/ intelligence thus being liable for the offense under Art 365 of the R.PC

HELD:
PETITION DISMISSED FOR LACK OF MERIT AND THE TRO EFFECTIVE 17SEPTEMBER1986 IS LIFTED. LET IT BE REMANDED TO THE LOWER COURT FOR TRIAL ON THE MERITS. NO COSTS.

I hope this helps.

Jeff David

Statutory Construction- Baga vs. Philippine National Bank

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION- WITH REGARD TO AN ISSUE OF A PARTICULAR STATUTE BEING PARAMOUNT OVER A GENERAL STATUTE IN CASE OF CONFLICT


Case of Petronila Baga vs. Philippine National Bank
No. L-9695 10September1956

FACTS OF THE CASE:
In JUNE 1953 PNB was appointed upon petition of the U.S.V.A as guardian to the estate of the minor Baga. 4 months after, Baga filed a petition stating that after marrying Garcia she is now emancipated under the New Civil Code, and that her emancipation has an effect of terminating her guardianship, and then would enable her to administer her own property under art 399 of the code.

ISSUES OF THE CASE:

Whether the lower correctly held that art 399 of the New Civil Code modified or supplemented sec 28 of the Veterans guardianship act.

The emancipation provisions in the code into the cases provided for by sec 23 of the R.A. 390 would result in its discordance with the model legislation and violate the legislative intent.
R.A. 390 being a special law limited in its operation to money benefits from Veteran's Acts, must control as against the provisions of the the New Civil Code which is a general statute.

HELD:

THE COURT REVERSED THE LOWER COURT'S DECISION. (EMANCIPATION BY MARRIAGE DOES NOT TERMINATE A MINOR'S GUARDIANSHIP CONSTITUTED UNDER R.A. 390)

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION LESSON:

Repeals by implication are not favored, a special law must be taken as intended to constitute an exception to the general law, in the absence of special circumstances forcing a contrary conclusion.(When a general and a particular provision are inconsistent the latter is paramount to the former)
I hope this helps.

Jeff David

Statutory Construction- Laxamana vs. Baltazar

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION- WITH REGARD TO AN ISSUE OF A PARTICULAR STATUTE BEING PARAMOUNT OVER A GENERAL STATUTE IN CASE OF CONFLICT


Case of Jose Laxamana vs. Jose T. Baltazar
No. L-5955 19September1952

FACTS OF THE CASE:
July 1952 the mayor of Saxmoan Pampanga was suspended the vice-mayor Jose T. Baltazar, assumed office as mayor by virtue of sec. 2195 of the Revised Administrative Code. However the Provincial Governor acting under the Revised Election Code sec 21(a) with the consent of the Provincial Board appointed Jose L. Laxamana as mayor of Saxmoan, who immediately took the corresponding official oath.

ISSUES OF THE CASE:

If the provision in the revised administrative was repealed by the subsequent provision of the Revised election code.

In the revised administrative code it explicitly says that in the absence of the municipal president the vice-president should take its place.
Even after the enactment of the Revised Election Code the Dep't of the Interior and the ofc of the executive secretary have consistently held that in the case of suspension or other temporary disability shall by operation of the law assume the office of mayor.

HELD:

THE COURT DISMISSED THE QUO WARRANTO PETITION OF LAXAMANA

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION LESSON:

Where one statute deals with a subject in general terms and another deals with the same subject in a more detailed way, the two shall be harmonized if possible but if there be any conflict the latter will prevail (When a general and a particular provision are inconsistent the latter is paramount to the former)
I hope this helps.

Jeff David

Criminal Law- People vs. Oriente

THIS CASE IS WITH REGARD TO ARTICLE 11 Par. 1 and ARTICLE 13 Par(s): 3 and 4 OF THE REVISED PENAL CODE

"FELONIES AND CIRCUMSTANCES WHICH AFFECT CRIMINAL LIABILITY (11")
"CIRCUMSTANCES WHICH MITIGATE CRIMINAL LIABILITY (13)"

Case of People of the R.P. vs. Oriente
G.R.No. 155094 30January2007

FACTS OF THE CASE:

This case is about Manuel Oriente’s appeal of his conviction for the crime of homicide. The appellant w/ other persons, attacked and assaulted Romulo Vallo, hitting him with a lead pipe on different parts of the body, thereby inflicting upon him serious and mortal wounds which were the direct and immediate cause of his death (as confirmed by the medico- legal). In the case there was one witness for the prosecution; Arnel Tanael.
When the case was tried at the C.A. the court (C.A.) found that the R.T.C erred in finding two mitigating circumstances were present, namely, lack of intent to commit so grave a wrong and sufficient provocation or threat on the part of the offended party, so the court modified the penalty imposed by the R.T.C.

ISSUES OF THE CASE:
[in this particular case there are a number of issues, but the most compelling is the 2nd and 4th issues]

DID THE C.A. AND THE R.T.C ERR IN NOT APPRECIATING THAT THERE WAS AN UNLAWFUL AGGRESSION ON THE PART OF THE VICTIM, AND THE MEANS EMPLOYED BY APPELLANT TO PREVENT THE SAME WAS REASONABLE AND FALLS UNDER THE JUSTIFYING CIRCUMSTANCES OR SELF-DEFENSE


- No. Since when self-defense is invoked, the burden of evidence shifts to the accused to show that the killing is legally justified. It must be shown by clear and convincing evidence. The appellant cannot rely on the weakness of the evidence of the prosecution.
- All three requirements for self- defense must concur; but unlawful aggression is condition sine qua non.
- The fact that the deceased was not able to make use of his gun after being hit in the forehead by the weapon of the appellant as alleged by the defense makes their claim of self-defense unusual
- Injuries sustained by the deceased were extensive
- Importantly, the appellant failed to establish the existence of the gun, that was alleged to have constituted the “unlawful aggression”

CAN THE ACCUSED BE GRANTED THE OPPORTUNITY OF MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCE, DUE TO THE PREMISE THAT THERE WAS LACK OF INTENT IN THE PART OF THE APPELLANT TO COMMIT SO GRAVE A WRONG AND THAT THERE WAS SUFFICIENT PROVOCATION ON THE PART OF THE DECEASED?

- Modification of the penalties was based on the presence of mitigating or aggravating circumstances.
- The claim of lack of intent to commit so grave a wrong cannot be appreciated because the acts employed by the accused were reasonably sufficient to produce and did actually produce the death of the victim
- Provocation in this case cannot be appreciated as well since provocation is deemed sufficient if it is adequate to excite a person to commit the wrong, w/c must be proportionate in gravity
- The fact that a heated or intense argument preceded the incident is not by itself the sufficient provocation on the part of the offended party as contemplated by law. Also, appellant failed to establish by competent evidence that the deceased had a gun and used it to threaten petitioner.

HELD:
PETITION DENIED. DECISION AND RESOLUTION OF C.A. ARE AFFIRMED W/ MODIFICATIONS, the C.A. erred in imposing 12 years and one day of reclusion temporal as the maximum term of the indeterminate sentence. In the computation of the maximum term, the law prescribes that the attending circumstances should be considered. There being no aggravating or mitigating circumstance in this case, the penalty that should be imposed is the medium period of the penalty prescribed by law, that is, reclusion temporal in its medium period, or, anywhere between fourteen years, eight months and one day to seventeen years and four months
I hope this helps.

Jeff David

Criminal Law- People vs. Valledor

This case is with regard to ART 12 par 1

"An insane person is exempt from criminal liability, unless he acted during a lucid interval"


Case of People of the R.P. vs. Valledor
G.R.No. 129291 03July2002

FACTS OF THE CASE:

This case is about Enrico Valledor’s appeal of his conviction for the crime of consummated, frustrated and attempted murder. Last 06 March 1991, the appellant attacked Roger Cabiguen (stabbed on the forearm), Elza Rodriguez (stabbed on the chest), Ricardo Maglalang (was inflicted w/ physical injuries on different parts of the body) There were two other people inside the room (they were not harmed by the appellant). Roger and Ricardo were both wounded, while Elza died from the stab wound. After his arrest, accused-appellant was intermittently confined at the National Center for Mental Health. Thus, he was arraigned only on February 19, 1993 wherein he pleaded not guilty. Thereafter, the cases were archived until November 15, 1994, when accused-appellant was declared mentally fit to withstand trial. This time, accused-appellant admitted commission of the crimes charged but invoked the exempting circumstance of insanity.

The appellant’s plea of insanity was anchored on the following instances:
1.) On January 1990 the Mother of the appellant noticed that he is behaving abnormally. The mother then brought the appellant to Dr. de Guzman, a medical practitioner. She then disclosed to the doctor that insanity runs in the family
2.) Dr. de Guzman then diagnosed the appellant as suffering from “psychosis w/ schizophrenia” and prescribed the appellant w/ an anti-depressant known as thoracin which kept the appellant sane for a period of 2 months
3.) On 04 March 1991, the appellant’s mother noticed that he is acting strangely, so she left to buy Thoracin, but when she returned the appellant is nowhere to be found.
4.) On 06 March 1991 (date of commission of crime) he was seen swimming across the river Barangay Captain and Councilman took the appellant out of the water inside the boat, accused-appellant kept on crying and uttering words to the effect that his family will be killed. Suspecting that appellant was mentally ill, the Barangay Captain, asked the Councilman to accompany accused-appellant to Puerto Princesa City. Sibunga acceded and thereafter took a jeepney with appellant, while on the jeepney the appellant then jumped off the jeepney and boarded a tricycle.
5.) On 11 March 1991 he was interviewed by the City Health Officer I and was recommended to be committed to the NATIONAL MENTAL HOSPITAL
6.) While under the care of the hospital the medical findings for the appellant was that he was suffering from: Psychosis or Insanity classified under Schizophrenia

ISSUES OF THE CASE:

Can Insanity as an exempting circumstance be granted to the accused?

No, since in considering insanity as a defense, it presumed that all persons to be of sound mind. Otherwise stated, the law presumes all acts to be voluntary, and it is improper to presume that acts were done unconsciously
- The acts made by the appellant shows that he does not have complete absence of the power to discern as shown by his stabbing of the two victims (roger and elza) while leaving the other two people in the room unharmed, also his action of fleeing from the scene after the incident indicated that he was aware of the wrong he committed.
- The actions performed by the appellant does not sufficiently prove his insanity at the time of commission of the crime: "A man may act crazy but it does not necessarily and conclusively prove that he is legally so."
- Although it can be argued that the appellant is suffering from mental illness what is decisive is his mental condition at the time of the perpetration of the offense. Failing to discharge the burden of proving that he was legally insane when he stabbed the victims, he should be held liable for his felonious acts.

HELD:

THE COURT FOUND THE ACCUSED GUILTY WITH MODIFICATIONS: HE IS GUILTY OF THE CRIME OF MURDER FOR THE KILLING OF ELZA RODRIGUEZ, AND ATTEMPTED MURDER FOR BOTH ROGER CABIGUEN AND ROGELIO MAGLALANG (FROM FRUSTRATED MURDER FOR INJURIES CAUSED TO MAGLALANG IT WAS REDUCED TO ATTEMPTED MURDER)


I hope this helps.

Jeff David

Statutory Construction- Commissioner of Internal Revenue vs. TMX Sales Inc.

Statutory Construction

Case of Commissioner of Internal Revenue vs. TMX Sales Inc.
GR No. 83736 15January1992

FACTS OF THE CASE:
Private respondent TMX Sales, Inc., a domestic corporation, filed its quarterly income tax return for the first quarter of 1981, declaring an income of P571,174.31, and consequently paying an income tax thereon of P247,010.00 on May 15, 1981. During the subsequent quarters, however, TMX Sales, Inc. suffered losses so that when it filed on April 15, 1982 its Annual Income Tax Return for the year ended December 31, 1981, it declared a gross income of P904,122.00 and total deductions of P7,060,647.00, or a net loss of P6,156,525.00 (CTA Decision, pp. 1-2; Rollo, pp. 45-46).
Thereafter, on July 9, 1982, TMX Sales, Inc. thru its external auditor, SGV & Co. filed with the Appellate Division of the Bureau of Internal Revenue a claim for refund in the amount of P247,010.00 representing overpaid income tax. (Rollo, p. 30)
This claim was not acted upon by the Commissioner of Internal Revenue. On March 14, 1984, TMX Sales, Inc. filed a petition for review before the Court of Tax Appeals against the Commissioner of Internal Revenue, praying that the petitioner, as private respondent therein, be ordered to refund to TMX Sales, Inc. the amount of P247,010.00, representing overpaid income tax for the taxable year ended December 31, 1981.
In his answer, the Commissioner of Internal Revenue averred that "granting, without admitting, the amount in question is refundable, the petitioner (TMX Sales, Inc.) is already barred from claiming the same considering that more than two (2) years had already elapsed between the payment (May 15, 1981) and the filing of the claim in Court (March 14, 1984). (Sections 292 and 295 of the Tax Code of 1977, as amended)."
On April 29, 1988, the Court of Tax Appeals rendered a decision granting the petition of TMX Sales, Inc. and ordering the Commissioner of Internal Revenue to refund the amount claimed.

ISSUES OF THE CASE:

In a case involving corporate quarterly income tax, does the two-year prescriptive period to claim a refund of erroneously collected tax provided for in Section 292 (now Section 230) of the National Internal Revenue Code commence to run from the date the quarterly income tax was paid, as contended by the petitioner, or from the date of filing of the Final Adjustment Return (final payment), as claimed by the private respondent?

The filing of quarterly income tax returns required in Section 85 (now Section 68) and implemented per BIR Form 1702-Q and payment of quarterly income tax should only be considered mere installments of the annual tax due.
The two-year prescriptive period provided in Section 292 (now Section 230) of the Tax Code should be computed from the time of filing the Adjustment Return or Annual Income Tax Return and final payment of income tax.
Where the tax account was paid on installment, the computation of the two-year prescriptive period under Section 306 (Section 292) of the Tax Code, should be from the date of the last installment.

HELD:

COURT HELD THAT THE PETITION WAS DENIED AND IT AFFIRMED THE DECISION OF THE COURT OF TAX APPEALS.

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION LESSON:

Court stated that statutes should receive a sensible construction, such as will give effect to the legislative intention and so as to avoid an unjust or an absurd conclusion. INTERPRETATIO TALIS IN AMBIGUIS SEMPER FRIENDA EST, UT EVITATUR INCONVENIENS ET ABSURDUM.
Where there is ambiguity, such interpretation as will avoid inconvenience and absurdity is to be adopted. Furthermore, courts must give effect to the general legislative intent that can be discovered from or is unraveled by the four corners of the statute, and in order to discover said intent, the whole statute, and not only a particular provision thereof, should be considered.

I hope this helps.

Jeff David

Statutory Construction- People vs. Purisima

Statutory Construction

Case of People of the R.P. vs. Purisima
GR Nos. L-42050-66 20November1978

FACTS OF THE CASE:
There are twenty-six (26) Petitions for Review filed by the People of the Philippines represented, respectively, by the Office of the City Fiscal of Manila, the Office of the Provincial Fiscal of Samar, and joined by the Solicitor General, are consolidated in this one Decision as they involve one basic question of law.
Before those courts, Informations were filed charging the respective accused with "illegal possession of deadly weapon" in violation of Presidential Decree No. 9. On a motion to quash filed by the accused, the three Judges mentioned above issued in the respective cases filed before them — the details of which will be recounted below — an Order quashing or dismissing the Informations, on a common ground, viz, that the Information did not allege facts which constitute the offense penalized by Presidential Decree No. 9 because it failed to state one essential element of the crime.

ISSUES OF THE CASE:

Are the Informations filed by the People sufficient in form and substance to constitute the offense of "illegal possession of deadly weapon" penalized under Presidential Decree (PD for short) No. 9?

There are two elements to the the offense: first, the carrying outside one's residence of any bladed, blunt, or pointed weapon, etc. not used as a necessary tool or implement for a livelihood; and second, that the act of carrying the weapon was either in furtherance of, or to abet, or in connection with subversion, rebellion, insurrection, lawless violence, criminality, chaos, or public disorder.
The petitioner by having one particular stand of the carrying of any dangerous weapon outside of the residence w/o regard to motive or intent makes this a case of statutory construction.

HELD:

COURT DISMISSED ALL MOTIONS MADE BY THE PETITIONER AND AFFIRMS ALL DECISIONS MADE BY THE RESPONDENT JUDGES.

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION LESSON:

The problem of determining what acts fall within the purview of a statute, it becomes necessary to inquire into the intent and spirit of the decree and this can be found among others in the preamble or, whereas" clauses which enumerate the facts or events which justify the promulgation of the decree and the stiff sanctions stated therein.

It is a salutary principle in statutory construction that there exists a valid presumption that undesirable consequences were never intended by a legislative measure, and that a construction of which the statute is fairly susceptible is favored, which will avoid all objectionable, mischievous, indefensible, wrongful, evil, and injurious consequence

I hope this helps.

Jeff David

Statutory Construction- People of the Philippine Islands vs. Rivera

Case of People of the Philippine Islands vs. Faustino Rivera
GR Nos. L-38215, 38216 22December1933

FACTS OF THE CASE:
The accused Faustino Rivera was being charged by the crime of Indictment of the Innocent planned and punished under the Art 363 of the Revised Penal Code. The Provincial Prosecutor filed a case against Rivera for filing a complaint in writing and executing an oath accusing falsely and without probable cause Vito Sunday and Felisa Moreno of the crime of theft.

ISSUES OF THE CASE:

Does Art 363 of the R.P.C apply in this case?

It does not apply since the law that the crime Rivera was accused of committing is not explicitly stated in the R.P.C (although it is worthy to mention that the crime of indictment of the innocent is present in the Old Penal Code)
The old penal code described it as the charge of the offense is the imputation itself if made in front of the administrative/ judicial officer while the R.P.C defines the offense as the act that leads (tends directly) to imputation of the offense.
The art 363 of the R.P.C was defined or described as “planting of evidence.”

HELD:

COURT HELD THAT THE ACCUSED FAUSTINO RIVERA IS NOT GUILTY OF THE CRIME FO INCRIMINATION OF THE INNOCENT.

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION LESSON:

It is well settled law that where the text of a statute is clear, it is improper to resort to a caption or title to make it obscure.

It is a well settled rule that statutes should receive a sensible construction, such as will give effect to the legislative intention and so as to avoid an unjust or an absurd conclusion. (Lau Ow Bew vs. United States, 144 U. S., 47, 59; 36 Law. ed., 340, 344.)

I hope this helps.

Jeff David

Criminal Law- People vs. Ladonga

This Case is in reference to the application of Art 8 and 10 of the Revised Penal Code

"B.P. Blg 22- Bouncing Checks Law"

Case of People of the R.P. vs. Ladonga
G.R. No. 141066 17February2005

FACTS OF THE CASE:
The Petitioner Evangeline Ladonga seeks a review of the Decision, dated May 17, 1999, of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 20443, affirming the Decision dated August 24, 1996, of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 3 of Bohol, in Criminal Case Nos. 7068, 7069 and 7070 convicting her of violation of B.P. Blg. 22, otherwise known as The Bouncing Checks Law.

The RTC, convicted both Evangeline Ladonga and her spouse Adronico, both are regular customers in the pawnshop business of Mr. Oculam in Tagbilaran City, Bohol; sometime in May 1990, the Ladonga spouses obtained a P9,075.55 loan from him, guaranteed by United Coconut Planters Bank (UCPB) Check No. 284743, post dated to dated July 7, 1990 issued by Adronico; sometime in the last week of April 1990 and during the first week of May 1990, the Ladonga spouses obtained an additional loan of P12,730.00, guaranteed by UCPB Check No. 284744, post dated to dated July 26, 1990 issued by Adronico; between May and June 1990, the Ladonga spouses obtained a third loan in the amount of P8,496.55, guaranteed by UCPB Check No. 106136, post dated to July 22, 1990 issued by Adronico; the three checks bounced upon presentment for the reason "CLOSED ACCOUNT"; when the Ladonga spouses failed to redeem the check, despite repeated demands, he filed a criminal complaint against them.

ISSUES OF THE CASE:

In this case Evangeline Ladonga is trying to contest her conviction on the grounds that she was not a party to the agreement and that she was not a signatory to the checks and that the decision of the Court of Appeals with regard to her being a co-conspirator is w/o merit.

 In determining if she is liable for the same crime it must be proven that there was conspiracy
 It was not proven by direct evidence even by the witness testimony that Evangeline Ladonga was merely present at the time of the issuance of the checks. However, this inference cannot be stretched to mean concurrence with the criminal design.
 Conspiracy must be established, not by conjectures, but by positive and conclusive evidence. Conspiracy transcends mere companionship and mere presence at the scene of the crime does not in itself amount to conspiracy. Even knowledge, acquiescence in or agreement to cooperate, is not enough to constitute one as a party to a conspiracy, absent any active participation in the commission of the crime with a view to the furtherance of the common design and purpose.
 Criminal liability cannot be incurred based on general allegation of conspiracy. In criminal cases, moral certainty -- not mere possibility -- determines the guilt or the innocence of the accused. Even when the evidence for the defense is weak, the accused must be acquitted when the prosecution has not proven guilt with the requisite quantum of proof required in all criminal cases.

HELD:

The instant petition is GRANTED. The assailed Decision, of the Court of Appeals convicting the petitioner of violation of B.P. Blg. 22 is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Petitioner Evangeline Ladonga is ACQUITTED of the charges against her under B.P. Blg. 22 for failure of the prosecution to prove her guilt beyond reasonable doubt. No pronouncement as to costs.

I hope this helps.

Jeff David